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CHAPTER 1 
 
General Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This first chapter starts with a summary of the literature on emotional intelligence 
and gives an introduction to the empirical studies of this doctoral dissertation. 
First, the value of emotional intelligence for society and the importance to 
examine and improve the validity of current maximum performance emotional 
intelligence measures in childhood and adolescence is explained. Next, a 
historical view on emotional intelligence research is presented. Then, the 
theoretical approaches to emotional intelligence are introducted, explaining the 
difference between mixed and ability models, whereafter the measurement 
approaches to emotional intelligence are described, discussing the difference 
between traditional self-report and maximum performance tests. Based on the 
historical overview of emotional intelligence and the presented theoretical and 
measurement approaches to emotional intelligence we take position for the ability 
model approach and favor maximum performance measurement. After, we 
addresss the lack of well-established maximum performance measures in 
childhood and adolescence and provide a brief description of two tests - the 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children and the Mayer-Salovey-
Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth Version - that have been developed 
for use in childhood and adolescence, we discuss their validity evidence, and 
identify their limitations. At the end of this chapter, the need to investigate and 
improve the validity of these two tests is explained. The overarching research 
questions of the current dissertation are proposed and a short outline of the 
conducted studies is presented. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past two decades, emotional intelligence has witnessed unparalleled interest 
in both popular (e.g., Goleman, 1995) and scientific psychology (e.g., Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990). Emotional intelligence has been proposed to consist out of a set of 
emotion-related abilities that involve reasoning about emotions and using 
emotions to assist reasoning, extending the classical intelligence approach in 
important ways (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008). These emotion-related 
abilities are believed to contribute to success in life (Matthews, Zeidner, & 
Roberts, 2007). Emotional intelligence has therefore been claimed to be an 
important predictor of various outcomes in educational environments (e.g., 
learning; Barchard, 2003), the workplace (e.g., selection of employees, behavior 
of employees and employers; Côté & Miners, 2006) and clinical contexts (e.g., 
treatment; Nelis, Quoidbach, Mikolajczak, & Hansenne, 2009; Nelis et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, emotional intelligence is of significant importance for society. Its 
implementation in psychological tests and training material costs, however, a 
substantial amount of money. Research investigating emotional intelligence and 
the applicability of emotional intelligence is therefore essential. Especially 
because the field of emotional intelligence research is still discussing about how 
the concept of emotional intelligence has to be theoretically defined and 
empirically assessed.  
 Within this context, the present literature overview serves multiple 
purposes. First, the origins of emotional intelligence are described and it is shown 
that emotional intelligence offers a new way of looking to the historical debate on 
the relationship between emotions and intelligence. Next, the mixed model 
approach and the ability model approach to emotional intelligence are explained 
and self-report measurement and maximum performance measurement of 
emotional intelligence are discussed. At the end of this overview, we discuss why 
we take position for the ability model approach and favor maximum performance 
measurement in the current dissertation. Over the years, many researchers 
decided to define emotional intelligence in agreement with the ability model 
approach. Despite a wide variety of maximum performance measures for use in 
adulthood has been developed and studied, research has only recently turned 
attention to the development of such measures for use in childhood and 
adolescence. The few available child and adolescent measures are derived from 
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their adult precursors, yet, it is not clear whether they have a similar meaning and 
function the same way. Due to the scarcity of empirical evidence on these 
measures, the main objective of the current dissertation is to investigate and 
improve the validity of two state-of-the-art maximum performance measures in 
children and adolescents, namely the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for 
Children and the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth 
Version. Guiding research questions of the current dissertation are proposed and 
a short outline of the conducted studies is presented. 
 
A HISTORICAL VIEW ON EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH 
In the period between 1900 and 1969, intelligence research and emotion 
research were narrow and separated fields. This epoch was characterized by an 
exponential growth of research on intelligence and the development of the first 
intelligence tests (Mayer, 2001). In 1920, Thorndike wrote about the existence of 
several types of intelligence, that is, a mechanical, an abstract and a social type 
(Landy, 2005). He considered social intelligence as the ability to perceive the 
internal state, motives and behavior of the self and others, and to act wisely 
based on the gathered information: “The ability to understand and manage men 
and women, boys and girls, and to act wisely in human relations“ (Thorndike, 
1920, p. 228). Later on, Wechsler stated that intelligence incorporates intellectual 
and non-intellectual elements and defined intelligence as follows: “The aggregate 
or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to 
deal effectively with his environment” (Wechsler, 1958, p. 7). More specifically, 
the non-intellectual elements refer to affective, personal and social factors that 
are essential keys to predict success in life (Wechsler, 1940, 1943). Due to 
apparently discouraging efforts to identify a social intelligence, the 
conceptualization of intelligence remained in essence cognitive. Research on 
emotions was predominantly focused on the chicken-and-egg problem. It was 
questioned whether a physiological reaction was followed by an emotional 
experience or the emotional experience gave rise to the physiological reaction. At 
the same time, it was discussed whether emotions are culturally determined and 
idiosyncratic or on the contrary possess a universal meaning (Mayer, 2001). The 
term emotional intelligence was used on an occasional and inconsistent basis. In 
a literary critic, it was noted that some characters within Jane Austen's book 
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“Pride and prejudice” exhibited “emotional intelligence” in comparison to others 
(Van Ghent, 1953, p. 103). Emotional intelligence was referred to as “… 
emotionally informed intelligence - or shall we say, that intelligence which informs 
the emotions …” (Van Ghent, 1953, p. 107). In a prefeminist German article on 
motherhood, it was speculated that if women have a lack of emotional 
intelligence this may result in a rejection of their roles as mothers and 
housewives (Leuner, 1966). 
In the period between 1970 and 1989, research on emotions and 
research on intelligence became integrated in the new field of cognition and 
affect, putting the interaction between thoughts and feelings central (Matthews, 
Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). The meaning of emotions, the specific conditions 
under which they arose and their influence on thought was studied (Mayer, 
1986). Research on artificial intelligence also showed a growing interest in the 
understanding and reasoning ability of computers with respect to emotional 
aspects in stories (Dyer, 1983). Furthermore, the idea of multiple intelligences 
became of great importance. Gardner (1983, 1999) described seven types of 
intelligence: linguistic, logical-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, 
interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligence. He saw intrapersonal intelligence as 
the ability to have knowledge of one’s own feelings and to explore them, and 
interpersonal intelligence as the ability to recognize the state of mind, intentions 
and desires of others. He considered them as important as the more traditional 
intelligence types. During this time, social intelligence was defined as a 
multidimensional construct, constituting of social skills, empathy skills, prosocial 
attitudes, social anxiety and emotionality (Marlowe, 1986). Moreover, brain 
research identified connections between emotion and cognition (e.g., Ten 
Houten, Hoppe, Bogen, & Walter, 1985). In this period, the term emotional 
intelligence appeared more often in the literature. In the abstract of his doctoral 
dissertation, Payne (1986) used the term emotional intelligence and argued that 
“the mass suppression of emotion throughout the civilized world has stifled our 
growth emotionally, leading us down a path of emotional ignorance”. He stated 
that emotional intelligence “involves relating creatively to fear, pain and desire” 
and expressed that his dissertation offers guidance on “how to relate to them in 
emotionally intelligent ways.” In a Mensa Magazine article in 1987, Beasley used 
the term emotional quotient. He defined emotional quotient and intelligence 
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quotient as “one's ability to feel” and “one's ability to think” respectively, saying 
that “emotional quotient is to the heart what intelligence quotient is to the brain” 
(Beasley, 1987, p. 25). Although suggestions have been made that this is the first 
published use of the term emotional quotient, Bar-On later claimed to have used 
the term in an earlier unpublished version of his graduate thesis (Bar-On, 1988). 
In the period between 1990 and 1993, the field of emotional intelligence 
research really emerged. The first introduction of emotional intelligence in 
scientific literature was made by Salovey and Mayer (1990) by publishing their 
landmark article, “Emotional intelligence”, in the journal Imagination, Cognition, 
and Personality. They defined emotional intelligence as “the ability to monitor 
one’s own and others’ feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to 
use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, 
p. 189), and provided also information on the first ability emotional intelligence 
scale. Three years later, Mayer and Salovey (1993) called for further research on 
emotional intelligence in a follow-up editorial in the journal Intelligence, stating 
that emotional intelligence might be considered as a standard intelligence. During 
this time, especially brain research provided further foundation for emotional 
intelligence (Damasio, 1994). 
Five years later, the concept of emotional intelligence rapidly became 
popularized and broadened after publication of the book “Emotional intelligence: 
Why it can matter more than IQ” by psychologist and New York Times science 
writer Daniel Goleman (Goleman, 1995). According to him “emotional intelligence 
refers to the capacity for recognizing our own feelings and those of others, for 
motivating ourselves, and for managing emotions well in ourselves and in our 
relationships. It describes abilities distinct from, but complementary to, academic 
intelligence, the purely cognitive capacities measured by IQ” (Goleman, 1998, p. 
317). His book appeared on the New York Times best-seller list. This book, 
however, also led to strong criticisms and hot debates in the scientific world 
because it contained inaccurate and scientifically unproven statements. At that 
time, many other popular books on emotional intelligence popped up and diverse 
tests were sold as being emotional intelligence measures without appropriate 
validity evidence. 
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From 1998 to this date, the number of peer-reviewed published articles on 
emotional intelligence grew exponentially. Many refinements of the emotional 
intelligence concept took place and diverse new measures were developed. 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
Although the fast popularization of emotional intelligence has stimulated 
academic research, it has also given rise to a wide variety of different models and 
definitions which caused considerable confusion. These different 
conceptualizations can be roughly classified into two main approaches: the mixed 
models of emotional intelligence and the ability models of emotional intelligence. 
Mixed models believe that emotional intelligence is a mixture of personality traits 
and non-cognitive skills and competencies, whereas ability models consider 
emotional intelligence as a type of classical intelligence, dealing with the 
cognitive processing of emotional information (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000). 
Because the different conceptualizations have become too numerous, the 
following sections are restricted to the most influential ones. 
 
Mixed models of emotional intelligence 
In the mixed model approach, emotional intelligence is defined as “an array of 
non-cognitive capabilities, competencies, and skills that influence one’s ability to 
succeed in coping with environmental demands and pressures” (Bar-On, 1997, p. 
14). According to this rather broad definition, emotional intelligence embodies a 
conglomerate of dispositional, motivational, and situational aspects (MacCann, 
Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2003). 
Two influential models have been proposed, each with a slightly different 
conceptualization. One of the most frequently cited models is that of Bar-On 
(1997). His model, that is embedded in a personality approach, consists of five 
broad emotional intelligence factors that each contain several narrow facets: (1) 
intrapersonal: emotional self-awareness, assertiveness, self-regard, self-
actualization and independence, (2) interpersonal: empathy, interpersonal 
relationship and social responsibility, (3) adaptation: problem solving, reality 
testing, and flexibility, (4) stress management: stress tolerance and impulse 
control, and (5) general mood: optimism and happiness.  
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A second model is the emotional competence model of Boyatzis, 
Goleman, and Rhee (2000). Emotional intelligence is here defined as “an ability 
to recognize, understand, and use emotional information about oneself or others 
that leads to or causes effective or superior performance” (Boyatzis & Sala, 2004, 
p. 149). Their model considers emotional intelligence as a set of learned 
competencies. It distinguishes four main clusters, each consisting of various 
competencies: (1) self-awareness: emotional self-awareness, accurate self-
assessment, and self-confidence, (2) self-management: emotional self-control, 
achievement, initiative, transparency, adaptability, and optimism, (3) social 
awareness: empathy, service orientation, and organizational awareness, and (4) 
social skills: inspirational leadership, influence, conflict management, change 
catalyst, developing others, teamwork and collaboration. 
 
Ability models of emotional intelligence 
In the ability model approach, emotional intelligence is defined as “the ability to 
perceive and express emotion, assimilate emotion in thought, understand and 
reason with emotion, and regulate emotion in the self and others” (Mayer et al., 
2000, p. 396). Ability models can be divided into two types of models: (1) specific 
ability models, and (2) integrative ability models. Specific ability models mainly 
focus on individual mental abilities that are of importance to emotional 
intelligence. Most of the specific ability models rely on research traditions that 
were not specifically targeted at emotional intelligence. For instance, emotion 
perception research stemmed originally from research in nonverbal perception, 
but also established considerable impact in emotional intelligence research. 
Integrative ability models propose an integration of those abilities into a 
comprehensive, overarching model (Mayer et al., 2008).  
A well-known example of an integrative ability emotional intelligence 
model is Lane and Schwartz’s (1987) cognitive-developmental model of 
emotional awareness. In this model, emotional awareness, or the ability to be 
aware of one’s own and others’ emotions, is seen as a cognitive ability that 
develops in stages with age. It has been considered as a separate form of 
cognitive development that can progress independently from other cognitive 
domains (Lane & Pollerman, 2002; Lane & Schwartz, 1987). This hierarchically 
build model distinguishes five stages or levels of progress in emotional 
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awareness with in ascending order awareness of 1) physical sensations, 2) 
action tendencies, 3) single emotions, 4) blends of emotions, and 5) blends of 
these blends of emotions. When people reach a higher level of emotional 
awareness, new abilities are developed while previous ones are still part of the 
emotional awareness processing repertoire, although they may be modified 
(Lane & Schwartz, 1987). Emotional awareness research originally stemmed 
from research on alexithymia. Later on, emotional awareness became considered 
as a centerpiece of the emotional intelligence construct (Lane, 2000), especially 
because people who have complex emotional information at their disposal may 
use this information to assist higher level emotional processes (such as using 
emotions to facilitate thoughts, understanding emotions and managing emotions) 
(Barchard, Bajgar, Leaf, & Lane, 2010). 
The integrative four-branch model of Salovey and Mayer (1990) is one of 
the most widely accepted emotional intelligence models. In this model, emotional 
intelligence is defined as a broad intellective factor consisting of four conceptually 
related hierarchically organized branches of emotion-related abilities (Mayer & 
Salovey, 1997). The first branch, perceiving emotions, deals with the ability to 
accurately identify emotions in one’ self and others’ (non-)verbal behavior. The 
second branch, facilitating thoughts, involves the ability to use emotions to 
enhance thinking and reasoning. The third branch, understanding emotions, 
refers to the ability to label emotions and to recognize relationships and 
transitions among them. The fourth and final branch, managing emotions, 
encompasses the ability to successfully manage emotions in oneself and others 
by maintaining or changing emotions. The first two branches together form 
experiential emotional intelligence, whereas the last two branches jointly form 
strategic emotional intelligence. Experiential emotional intelligence and strategic 
emotional intelligence together form general emotional intelligence. 
 
MEASUREMENT APPROACHES TO EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
The process of test construction for emotional intelligence measures did not 
account for the fundamental distinction between typical and maximum 
performance (e.g., Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Cronbach, 1949; Hofstee, 
2001). While some emotional intelligence measures are based on self-report 
questionnaires that assess people’s typical behavior (e.g., Schutte et al., 1998), 
Chapter 1  13 
other measures are based on maximum performance tests that assess people’s 
behavior when exerting as much effort as possible (e.g., Mayer et al., 2000). 
Petrides and Furnham (2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2003, 2006) stated that the use of 
these different measurement approaches is problematic because both probably 
yield different results, even if the same underlying model is used. Therefore, they 
proposed an in part overlapping alternative to the conceptual differentiation 
between mixed and ability models of emotional intelligence, taking into account 
the different measurement approaches and operational definitions that are 
adopted by the mixed and ability model approaches. In specific, they 
differentiated between trait emotional intelligence and ability emotional 
intelligence, arguing that self-report questionnaires foster the idea of emotional 
intelligence as a personality trait (trait emotional intelligence or emotional self-
efficacy), whereas maximum performance tests raise the idea of emotional 
intelligence as a cognitive ability (ability emotional intelligence or cognitive-
emotional ability). 
Since then, various studies have been performed on this issue and these 
studies indeed all highlight that self-report and maximum performance measures 
of emotional intelligence do not converge (e.g., O’Connor & Little, 2003; Van 
Rooy, Viswesvaran, & Pluta, 2005; Warwick & Nettelbeck, 2004). For example, 
Joseph and Newman (2010b) compared correlations among self-report mixed-
based emotional intelligence tests, self-report ability-based emotional intelligence 
tests, and maximum performance ability-based emotional intelligence tests. They 
showed that the lowest correlation was found between self-report ability-based 
emotional intelligence tests and maximum performance ability-based emotional 
intelligence tests, supporting that trait emotional intelligence and ability emotional 
intelligence should be considered as two different constructs. In the following 
section, Petrides and Furnham’s distinction is used to discuss current emotional 
intelligence measurement. 
 
Self-report emotional intelligence measures 
Self-report emotional intelligence measures are especially designed to map 
people’s perceptions and beliefs about competencies in particular domains of 
emotional intelligence (Salovey, Woolery, & Mayer, 2000). In this type of 
measurement people are generally asked to judge on a rating scale to which 
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extent they agree or disagree with a series of descriptive statements concerning 
their own level of emotional intelligence, and often also a number of emotion-
related dispositions (e.g., Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006; 
Pérez, Petrides, & Furnham, 2005; Schutte et al., 1998; Wong & Law, 2002). 
 Most self-report emotional intelligence measures are based on mixed 
emotional intelligence models. The most well-known examples are the Bar-On’s 
Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-I; Bar-On, 1997), the Emotional Competency 
Inventory (ECI; Boyatzis et al., 2000), the Trait Emotional Intelligence 
Questionnaire (TEIQue; Petrides & Furnham, 2003), and the Trait Meta Mood 
Scale (TMMS; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). Some self-
report emotional intelligence measures are based on ability emotional intelligence 
models. Most of these took the four-branch model of emotional intelligence as 
starting point for their development, such as the Self-Report Emotional 
Intelligence scale (SREI; Schutte et al., 1998), the Wong and Law Emotional 
Intelligence Scale (WLEIS; Wong & Law, 2002), and the Self-Rated Emotional 
Intelligence Scale (SREIS; Brackett et al., 2006). It has to be noted that these 
self-report ability-based emotional intelligence measures do not measure 
people’s actual emotion-related abilities. They only assess self-perceptions of 
these abilities. 
Despite the fact that self-report emotional intelligence measures are 
widely used to measure emotional intelligence, they are characterized by 
important weaknesses. First, their discriminant validity has been questioned, 
because of their overlap with traditional personality measures (e.g., Davies, 
Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Joseph & Newman, 2010a; Van Rooy et al., 2005). 
Recent meta-analytic evidence has for example revealed that (1) substantial 
correlations exist among the Big Five personality traits and self-report mixed-
based emotional intelligence measures (r’s range between .29 and .53) and to a 
lesser extent self-report ability-based emotional intelligence measures (r’s range 
between .29 and .40), and (2) only small or no correlations exist between 
cognitive ability and respectively self-report mixed-based emotional intelligence 
measures (r = .11) and self-report ability-based emotional intelligence measures 
(r = .00) (Joseph & Newman, 2010b). Second, their convergent validity has been 
threatened because self-report emotional intelligence measures have either weak 
correlations or unexpected correlations with emotion measures (e.g., Roberts, 
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Matthews, & Zeidner, 2010). Moreover, the incremental validity of self-report 
emotional intelligence measures has been criticized. Recent meta-analytic results 
showed for instance substantial correlations among self-report emotional 
intelligence measures and physical, mental and psychosomatic health measures 
(Martins, Ramalho, & Morin, 2010), yet, stressed that these correlations may be 
derived from their overlap with personality measures. Additionally, while there are 
substantial correlations among self-report emotional intelligence measures and 
psychopathology measures (e.g., Bar-On, 1997; Hemmati, Mills, & Kroner, 2004), 
there is a strong item overlap between these measures (Matthews, Zeidner, & 
Roberts, 2012; Williams, Daley, Burnside, & Hammond-Rowley, 2010). 
Furthermore, since self-report emotional intelligence measures rather reflect self-
perceived performance instead of actual performance, they are liable to self-
evaluation bias. Indeed, it has been consistently shown that people have 
inaccurate perceptions of their own abilities and tend to overestimate their own 
abilities (e.g., Bracket et al., 2006; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Paulhus, Lysly, 
& Yik, 1998). Finally, self-report emotional intelligence measures are also liable to 
response bias, social desirability, deception, and impression management, which 
are known to be common confounds in other self-report measures (e.g., Day & 
Carroll, 2008; Grubb & McDaniel, 2007; Matthews et al., 2002; Petrides & 
Furnham, 2000a; Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001). 
In light of these weaknesses, many researchers in the field of emotional 
intelligence consider self-report emotional intelligence measures not appropriate 
to assess actual emotion-related abilities. It has been proposed that the use of 
self-report emotional intelligence measures is only justified to investigate the 
discrepancy between self-perceptions of emotion-related abilities and more 
objective measures of these emotion-related abilities (Rivers, Brackett, Salovey, 
& Mayer, 2007). 
 
Maximum performance emotional intelligence measures 
Maximum performance emotional intelligence measures are developed to assess 
people’s emotion-related abilities (e.g., Mayer et al., 2008). In this type of 
measurement, people are presented with a series of items that require emotion-
based problem solving and have to select what they think is the most adequate 
16  Chapter 1 
response. People’s answers are then evaluated against a set of predetermined 
scoring criteria (Roberts et al., 2001). 
Maximum performance emotional intelligence measures are typically 
based on ability emotional intelligence models and assess either one or all four 
emotion-related abilities of perceiving emotions, facilitating thoughts, 
understanding emotions, and managing emotions. The measures that assess 
only one emotion-related ability are mainly focused on the assessment of 
emotion perception, such as for instance the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity 
(PONS; Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979), the Diagnostic 
Analysis of Nonverbal Accuracy (DANVA); Nowicki & Duke, 1994), the Emotional 
Accuracy Research Scale (EARS; Mayer & Geher, 1996), the Japanese and 
Caucasian Brief Affect Recognition Test (JACBART; Matsumoto et al., 2000), the 
Montréal Set of Facial Displays of Emotions (MSFDE; Beaupré, Cheung, & Hess, 
2000), the Emotion Recognition Index (ERI; Scherer & Scherer, 2011), the 
Multimodal Emotion Recognition Test (MERT; Bänziger, Grandjean, & Scherer, 
2009), and the Geneva Emotion Recognition Test (GERT; Schlegel, Grandjean, 
& Scherer, 2014). One measure, the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale 
(LEAS; Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, & Walker, 1990), assesses understanding 
emotions (Mayer et al., 2008). To date, only few maximum performance 
emotional intelligence measures cover the four emotion-related abilities. The 
MSCEIT (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002) is the successor of the 
Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Test (MEIS; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000), 
and is the most widely used. Recently, also the Ability Emotional Intelligence 
Measure (AEIM; Warwick, Nettelbeck, & Ward, 2010) has been developed. 
Most research findings stem from the MEIS and the MSCEIT tests. 
Contrary to self-report emotional intelligence measures, these measures have 
shown convergent and discriminant validity. For example, meta-analyses have 
found moderate correlations with intelligence, and small correlations with the Big 
Five personality traits (Roberts, Schultze, & MacCann, 2008; Van Rooy et al., 
2005). It is, however, troubling that the MSCEIT fails to converge with the 
JACBART and other performance-based measures (Farrelly & Austin, 2007; 
Roberts et al., 2006). Furthermore, these measures have to some extent 
incremental validity over intelligence and personality in predicting criteria of social 
and emotional functioning (Lopes et al., 2004; Martins et al., 2010). It has been 
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suggested that the typically modest correlations show that what is measured is 
helpful, but not of critical importance in real-life contexts (Matthews et al., 2012).  
One of the main issues in maximum performance emotional intelligence 
measures is that responses to emotion-related questions cannot be objectively 
scored because there are no straightforward criteria for what constitutes a correct 
response (e.g., Brody, 2004; Conte, 2005; Roberts et al., 2001; Wilhelm, 2005). 
Attempts have been made to overcome this problem mainly by use of expert 
scoring or consensus scoring. In expert scoring, experts in the field of emotion 
are consulted to decide on the correctness of responses to emotion-related 
questions. In consensus scoring, correct responses are determined on what large 
representative groups of non-experts agree on. Other criteria (i.e., conceptual, 
correlational, and developmental) are then used to decide on the status of 
emotional intelligence as a standard intelligence. First, emotional intelligence 
should consist of a set of mental abilities. Second, it should show the expected 
correlations with intelligence, personality, and other constructs. And third, it 
should vary with age and experience (Mayer et al., 2000). Despite the fact that 
both scoring methods have yielded converging evidence over the years (Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2012), they have also been severely criticized (e.g., 
Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2004; Maul, 2012a). Indeed, it has recently been 
argued that these scoring techniques do not allow to clearly link variation in 
observed responses to variation in emotional intelligence (Maul, 2012b). 
 
MAXIMUM PERFORMANCE ABILITY-BASED EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
MEASUREMENT IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE 
Based on the historical view on emotional intelligence research and the 
presented theoretical and measurement approaches to emotional intelligence the 
current doctoral dissertation conceptualizes emotional intelligence from an ability 
model approach and considers only maximum performance measurement 
appropriate to measure emotion-related abilities. There are semantic, theoretical, 
and empirical reasons why this position is taken. First, emotional intelligence is 
build out of a descriptor emotional that modifies the noun intelligence, parallel to 
others, like verbal-comprehension intelligence, perceptual-organizational 
intelligence, or broad-visualization intelligence (Carroll, 1993). Thus, the noun 
intelligence semantically points to a construct that represents a cognitive ability or 
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a realm of cognitive abilities. Since the mixed model approach on emotional 
intelligence generally lacks a primary focus on intelligence and blends in a 
variation of emotion-related dispositions, it falls outside the semantic boundaries 
of the concept of intelligence (Rivers et al., 2007). Second, theories that 
conceptualize emotional intelligence as an ability or an array thereof allow for a 
stronger top-down theory testing compared to the more inductive personality-
related conceptualizations of emotional intelligence. Finally, the empirical 
evidence of maximum performance tests and not self-report questionnaires 
militates for the ability conceptualization of emotional intelligence, and the 
empirical evidence of self-report questionnaires for personality conceptualizations 
of emotional intelligence is rather heterogeneous and more inconsistent (e.g., 
Mayer, et al., 2008). 
Research from the ability model approach to emotional intelligence has 
primarily focused on maximum performance measurement of emotion-related 
abilities in adults. However, if we want to fully understand the nature of emotional 
intelligence, research should also turn its scope to children and adolescents and 
address the need for valid assessment instruments in younger age groups. 
Therefore, we focus in this dissertation on two state-of-the-art maximum 
performance measures for children and adolescents, namely the Levels of 
Emotional Awareness Scale for Children (LEAS-C; Bajgar, Ciarrochi, Lane, & 
Deane, 2005) and the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth 
Version (MSCEIT-YV; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2015). In the next paragraphs, 
each of these two measures is described, the (limited) empirical evidence is 
presented, and key issues are identified and related to the studies of this 
dissertation. 
 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children 
The LEAS-C is the child version of the LEAS and holds likewise a unique position 
among self-report and maximum performance emotional intelligence measures. 
Children are not asked to appraise their own level of emotional awareness (as 
would be the case in typical self-report measures). However, they are also not 
asked to resolve a problem and responses are not scored on correctness (as 
would be the case in standard maximum performance measures). Instead, 
children are asked to describe how they themselves and another character (that 
Chapter 1  19 
tap the self-perspective and the other-perspective) would feel in a set of 12 real-
life scenarios. These scenarios are assumed to elicit the dispositional way 
children deal with emotional information. Of these 12 scenarios, 10 are slightly 
modified LEAS scenarios, and two are newly constructed scenarios. Both the 
theoretical framework and the scoring procedure are identical for the LEAS-C and 
the LEAS. In line with the cognitive-developmental Levels of Emotional 
Awareness (LEA) model of emotional awareness, three scores are assigned for 
each scenario that are meant to reflect the level of emotional complexity in 
children’s descriptions: a score for self-awareness, a score for other-awareness, 
and a score for total-awareness. At Level 0, cognitions (e.g., I would think it was 
not a good idea right from the start) are scored. At Level 1, bodily sensations 
(e.g., I would feel nauseous) or direct states of the lack of an emotional response 
(e.g., I would feel nothing at all) are scored. At Level 2, actions (e.g., I would feel 
like I cannot move) or general emotional states (e.g., I would feel good) are 
scored. Next, single emotions (e.g., I would feel jealous) are scored at Level 3. 
Furthermore, blends of emotions (e.g., I would feel joy and love at the same time) 
are scored at Level 4. Finally, combinations of blends that are differentiated for 
the self and the other are scored at Level 5 (e.g., I would feel ashamed and 
scared, my friend would feel angry and sad). The self- and the other-awareness 
scores are based on the highest reported level of emotional complexity in the 
description and range from 0 to 4. The total-awareness score is equivalent with 
the highest score of the self- and the other-awareness score. However, a score of 
5 is given in case both the self- and the other-awareness score are 4 and the 
emotion words that are used for the self-perspective and the other-perspective 
are differentiated. 
At the beginning of this doctoral dissertation, empirical evidence was 
limited to the study of Bajgar et al. (2005). In this study, the initial validation of the 
LEAS-C was described, based on a sample of 51 children between the ages of 
10 and 11. Preliminary validity evidence was provided. A high inter-rater reliability 
and an acceptable reliability were observed for self-awareness, other-awareness, 
and total-awareness scores. Emotional awareness was related to the cognitive-
developmental level in parental descriptions, vocabulary, verbal productivity, 
emotion expression, and emotion comprehension. Significant small to moderate 
positive correlations were found between total-awareness scores and emotion 
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comprehension, vocabulary, and verbal productivity. Further, other-awareness 
scores showed significant small to moderate positive correlations with emotion 
expression and emotion comprehension, while self-awareness scores showed no 
significant correlations with any of the variables of interest. Gender differences, 
controlled for vocabulary and verbal productivity, showed that girls outperformed 
boys for self-awareness, other-awareness, and total-awareness scores. Finally, 
age differences were studied. Due to the restricted age range in the sample, the 
LEAS-C scores were pro-rated and compared with normative LEAS data (Lane et 
al., 1996). While the within-gender means were in the expected direction, 
showing that lower total-awareness scores were observed for girls and boys in 
comparison to females and males, these differences were not significant. Thus, 
the key tenet of the LEA model that emotional awareness develops with age was 
not supported. 
A first explanation for why age differences have not been found may be 
related to the small sample with a restricted age range in the study of Bajgar et 
al. (2005). Furthermore, this study was limited in scope because the internal 
structure was not investigated and only a limited breadth of correlates was 
studied. Therefore, Chapter 2 of this doctoral dissertation aims to extend the 
preliminary validity evidence of the original LEAS-C and investigate whether age 
differences can be revealed in a substantially larger sample with a much broader 
age range. More specifically, the original scoring procedure is applied and validity 
evidence is collected by testing the internal structure, studying a much broader 
network of convergent and discriminant relationships, and investigating gender 
and age differences in a large sample of children and adolescents with a broad 
age range. 
Another explanation for why age differences have not been found may be 
related to the original LEAS-C test itself. The instructions and the scoring 
procedure are mainly focused on feelings while contemporary emotion 
psychology recognizes a component process definition to emotion with different 
emotion components considered important (such as appraisal, action tendency, 
bodily reaction, expression, and feeling) (Scherer, 2005). With respect to the 
instructions, the word feel can be interpreted in different ways as this word is 
often used in daily life to stress the subjective nature of the emotional experience. 
Because it may refer to all aspects of the emotion process that can be ‘felt’ 
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(Mulligan & Scherer, 2012), children may (1) report on the most salient aspect of 
the emotional experience (which can be an appraisal, an action tendency, a 
bodily reaction, or an expression), (2) give a feeling or an emotion term, or (3) 
provide information on the whole emotion process. The variability in the 
interpretation of the instructions may lead to construct irrelevant response 
variation. With respect to the scoring procedure, the highest level of emotional 
complexity is taken as the definite score for each perspective in each scenario, 
irrespective of whether descriptions also cover information on other levels. 
Children’s information in the descriptions is thus not scored on the complexity of 
the emotional experience defined in terms of a component process definition to 
emotion. So, Chapter 3 of this doctoral dissertation aimed to improve the validity 
evidence of the original LEAS-C and examine whether age differences can be 
revealed by (1) changing the instructions from feel to experience and explicitly 
instructing children to attend to all emotion components, and (2) applying a 
scoring procedure that takes the different emotion components that are 
represented in the descriptions into account. More specifically, the original 
scoring procedure and a new componential scoring procedure are applied, and 
validity evidence is for both scoring procedures collected by testing the internal 
structure, studying a broad network of convergent and discriminant relationships, 
and investigating gender and age differences in a substantially large sample of 
children and adolescents with a broad age range. 
 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test – Youth Version 
The MSCEIT-YV is the child version of the MSCEIT, the most widely used 
omnibus test of the four-branch emotional intelligence model. Although the 
overarching framework for the youth and adult versions of the MSCEIT is 
identical, the tasks and the scoring procedure are different. While the MSCEIT 
consists of two separate, but related tasks per branch, the MSCEIT-YV consists 
of a single task per branch. The ability of perceiving emotions (32 items) is 
measured by eight faces. For each face, children have to rate to which extent 
four different emotions are present in the face. The ability of facilitating thoughts 
(24 items) is measured via six synesthesia assignments. For each assignment, 
children have to rate to which extent an emotion feels like four different 
sensations or to which extent a combination of sensations feels like four different 
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emotions. The ability of understanding emotions (23 items) is measured by a 
series of multiple choice items on emotion definitions (i.e., combining correct 
emotion terms with feeling descriptions), emotion transitions and changes (i.e., 
detecting emotions that arise from particular event descriptions), and emotion 
blends (i.e., selecting combinations of emotions that correspond to emotional 
state descriptions). Children have to select the best suited answer out of four or 
five options. The ability of managing emotions (18 items) is measured through six 
stories. For each story, children have to rate to which extent three actions would 
be helpful in attaining the given emotional state. Furthermore, while the MSCEIT 
provides an expert scoring procedure and a consensus scoring procedure, the 
MSCEIT-YV is scored by a procedure that is predominantly based on adult 
criteria that combine theoretical criteria, research findings, and expert 
judgements. This strategy was taken because the most frequently endorsed 
answers for a wide diversity of items were ‘clearly’ not the best suited answers. 
So, a consensus scoring key was not considered feasible (Papadogiannis, 
Logan, & Sitarenios, 2009). The scoring of the MSCEIT-YV results in four branch 
scores and a total emotional intelligence score. 
At the start of this doctoral dissertation, empirical evidence was restricted 
to the study of Peters, Kranzler, and Rossen (2009). This study was performed in 
a sample of 50 children between the ages of 10 and 18 and described first 
validity evidence of the MSCEIT-YV. A good reliability was observed for the total 
emotional intelligence scores. Emotional intelligence was related to coping ability 
(task-oriented coping, emotion-oriented coping, avoidance coping, distraction, 
and social diversion), general cognitive ability (general intellectual ability, reading 
ability, and math ability), academic achievement (reading achievement and math 
achievement), deviant behavior (discipline referrals), and self-reported emotional 
intelligence. Perceiving emotions, facilitating thoughts, understanding emotions 
and overall emotional intelligence showed moderate negative correlations with 
discipline referrals and moderate positive correlations with reading achievement 
and reading ability. Perceiving emotions, understanding emotions, and overall 
emotional intelligence revealed moderate negative correlations with emotion-
oriented coping and moderate positive correlations with general intellectual 
ability. Moreover, only understanding emotions and overall emotional intelligence 
showed moderate positive correlations with math achievement. Furthermore, 
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relationships were compared between the MSCEIT-YV and the youth version of 
the EQ:I (EQ:I-YV; Bar-On & Parker, 2000) with external criteria without and with 
controlling for general cognitive ability. Moderate positive correlations were found 
between the MSCEIT-YV scores and the EQ:I-YV scores, supporting that both 
measure two different emotional intelligence constructs. In general, the MSCEIT-
YV outperformed the EQ:I-YV in predicting the external criteria. Finally, significant 
positive correlations were found between age and facilitating thoughts, 
understanding emotions, managing emotions, and overall emotional intelligence. 
A first area of concern for the MSCEIT-YV is related to the applicability of 
the scoring procedure that is mainly based on adult criteria by combining expert 
judgements, research findings and theoretical criteria. It may be questioned 
whether adult criteria can be used to evaluate the correctness of responses to 
emotion-related questions for children and adolescents. Therefore, Chapter 4 of 
this doctoral dissertation focuses on the comparability of the cognitive 
representation of the emotion domain between children and adolescents on one 
hand and students and adults on the other hand. In a first free listing study, a 
representative set of emotion terms is identified. Furthermore, it is investigated 
how the emotion vocabulary develops from childhood into adolescence. A 
second similarity rating study is focused on the dimensional structure of 
perceived similarities between emotion terms. Here, it is investigated whether 
children and adolescents evaluate emotion terms the same way as students and 
adults do, that is, according to the emotion dimensions of valence, power, arousal 
and novelty. The results of these studies can make important contributions to the 
emotion domain because these studies take several pitfalls and methodological 
considerations of prior research on the emotion lexicon and the dimensional 
emotion structure into account. The results of these studies can also make 
important contributions to the emotional intelligence domain as these studies deal 
with how people represent emotions. Emotion terms embody the whole emotional 
experience and are also those terms that are central to the MSCEIT-YV because 
virtually every item makes use of emotion terms. If similar emotion terms are 
reported by children and adolescents than those commonly used in adult 
research and children and adolescents evaluate emotion terms the same way as 
adults do, it would be justified to use adult criteria to decide on the correctness of 
responses to emotion-related questions. Furthermore, the results of these studies 
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(frequencies of emotion terms and distances among emotion terms) can also 
form a solid base for the development of additional items for the following 
MSCEIT-YV study. 
A second area of concern for the MSCEIT-YV is embedded in the broader 
debate that variation in the scores yielded by the current scoring procedures 
cannot be clearly linked to variation in true emotional intelligence. It can be 
investigated whether raw responses of rating-based ability emotional intelligence 
tests allow to directly identify emotional intelligence without further 
transformations. So, Chapter 5 of this doctoral dissertation aims to examine and 
generalize the structure of raw responses at item level of the rating-based ability 
MSCEIT-YV tests. Moreover, because the study of Peters et al. (2009) was 
limited in scope due to the small sample, the absence of information on the 
internal structure, and the inclusion of a limited breadth of correlates, this chapter 
aims to extend the preliminary validity evidence of the MSCEIT-YV by additionally 
testing the internal structure, investigating a much broader network of convergent 
and discriminant relationships, and studying gender and age differences. It is 
thus tested whether emotional intelligence as measured in raw responses meets 
the conceptual, correlational, and developmental criteria that have been put 
forward to treat emotional intelligence as a legitimate form of intelligence. A first 
study deals with the rating-based MSCEIT-YV tests for perceiving emotions, 
facilitating thoughts, and managing emotions. A second study further examines 
the generalizability of the results and looks additionally at a rating version of the 
MSCEIT-YV understanding test and additional sets of items for perceiving 
emotions, facilitating thoughts, and managing emotions. 
 
OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
Because research from the ability model approach to emotional intelligence has 
mainly focused on the value of maximum performance measures in adults, the 
present dissertation aims to examine and improve the validity of two state-of-the-
art maximum performance measures in children and adolescents, namely the 
LEAS-C and the MSCEIT-YV. To this end, six empirical studies are conducted to 
answer four general research questions (see Table 1). These studies are 
presented in the next four chapters. 
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Table 1 
Overview of Research Questions Broken Down by the Maximum Performance 
Emotional Intelligence Test of Interest and Focus on Validation and Adaptation 
 Maximum Performance Emotional Intelligence Test 
 
LEAS-C  
(structure - complexity) 
MSCEIT-YV  
(content - correctness) 
Validation Research question 1: 
Is the original LEAS-C a valid 
measure to assess emotional 
awareness? 
(Chapter 2, one study) 
Research question 3: 
Do children and adolescents 
represent emotions the same 
way as students and adults 
do? (Chapter 4, two studies)  
Adaptation Research question 2: 
Can the validity of the original 
LEAS-C be improved by 
redesigning the instructions and 
the scoring procedure based on 
the componential emotion 
approach?  
(Chapter 3, one study) 
Research question 4: 
Does a scoring directly based 
on the raw responses of 
rating-based ability MSCEIT-
YV tests confirms the 
conceptual, correlational, and 
developmental criteria that are 
used to decide on emotional 
intelligence as a standard 
intelligence?  
(Chapter 5, two studies)  
 
In Chapter 2, it is examined whether the original LEAS-C is a valid 
measure to assess emotional awareness in children and adolescents. A first 
explanation for why age differences in emotional awareness have not been found 
in the initial validation study of Bajgar et al. (2005), is that the sample was too 
small and the age range was too restricted. Therefore, the study in this chapter 
aims to extend existing validity evidence and test age differences in emotional 
awareness in a larger sample with a broader age range. 
In Chapter 3, it is examined whether the validity of the original LEAS-C 
can be improved if the instructions and the scoring procedure are adapted on the 
basis of the componential emotion approach (Scherer, 2005). A second 
explanation for why age differences in emotional awareness have not been found 
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in the initial validation study of Bajgar et al. (2005), is related to the LEAS-C 
assessment itself. The instructions and scoring procedure are mainly focused on 
feelings while contemporary emotion psychology acknowledges the importance 
of different emotion components (i.e., appraisal, action tendency, bodily reaction, 
expression, and feeling). Consequently, the study in this chapter aims to examine 
the validity of an adapted LEAS-C that is focused on these different emotion 
components and test age differences in emotional awareness in a large sample 
with a broad age range. 
In Chapter 5, it is examined whether a scoring that is directly based on 
the raw responses of rating-based ability MSCEIT-YV tests confirms the 
conceptual, correlational, and developmental criteria that are used to consider 
emotional intelligence as a standard intelligence. Research on the MSCEIT has 
caused considerable confusion on the status of emotional intelligence as 
standard intelligence because it has been suggested that the application of 
current scoring procedures does not allow to clearly link variation in scores to 
variation in true emotional intelligence. Therefore, the research in this chapter 
investigates the structure of raw responses of rating-based ability emotional 
intelligence tests and its implications for the conceptual, correlational, and 
developmental criteria that have been put forward to decide on emotional 
intelligence as an intelligence. A first study is focused on the three rating-based 
MSCEIT-YV tests. A second study is additionally focused on an adapted multiple 
choice test of the MSCEIT-YV and additional sets of items for each of the other 
three rating-based MSCEIT-YV tests. 
In Chapter 6, the results of the studies in this dissertation are 
summarized and the research questions are answered. Moreover, strengths and 
limitations are discussed and directions for future research are proposed. We 
close by a general conclusion. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
The Assessment of Emotional Awareness in Children: 
Validation of the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) is a widely used scenario-
based instrument that has been developed for the measurement of emotional 
awareness in adults. Although the LEAS has been validated in numerous studies, 
published validity research on the recently developed child version (LEAS-C) is 
scarce. The objective of the present study was to evaluate the construct validity 
of the Dutch LEAS-C in a sample of 318 children, aged 10 to 17 years. Outcomes 
revealed novel structural evidence in favor of alternative design-driven modeling. 
Further, the pattern of relationships with ability- and trait-oriented emotional 
intelligence, intelligence, personality, social and emotional impairment, and 
gender was generally consistent with previous theorizing and adult studies on the 
LEAS. Reasons for absence of age differences are discussed. In conclusion, this 
study corroborates the construct validity of the LEAS-C and highlights the 
importance of fully exploring the LEAS-C in its potential. Directions for future 
research are proposed. 
                                                          
1
 Veirman, E., Brouwers, S. A., & Fontaine, J. R. J. (2011). The assessment of emotional 
awareness in children: Validation of the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for 
Children, European Journal of Psychological Assessment, 27, 265-273. 
doi:10.1027/1015-5759/a000073 
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INTRODUCTION 
Emotional awareness has been defined as the cognitive ability to identify and 
describe one’s own emotional experiences and those of others (Lane & 
Schwartz, 1987). It is considered to be a central aspect of emotional intelligence 
because conscious processing of emotional information fosters adaptive 
emotional and intellectual growth (Lane, 2000). Awareness of emotions that 
might arise in a particular situation helps people to be prepared before the 
situation occurs, to adapt to that situation, and to deal with the possible 
consequences of the situation. 
A commonly used measure of emotional awareness in adulthood is the 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS). The LEAS is a written 
performance instrument in which adults have to imagine themselves in 20 
fictional real-life scenarios and describe how they and other characters in those 
scenarios would feel. Descriptions are coded by an independent observer on the 
degree of complexity within the emotional representation. The distinguished 
levels of complexity range from representations without emotional content (e.g., 
cognitions), over representations focused on tangible emotion aspects (e.g., 
visceral or action-oriented), to representations with a balanced integration of 
more complex and inconsistent information (e.g., single emotions, blends of 
emotions, combined blends) in which emotional experiences of self and other are 
differentiated (Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990). 
The most attractive feature of the LEAS is that it combines the strengths of 
the trait and the ability approach to emotional intelligence. Without asking 
respondents to rate their own level of emotional awareness, which is typical for 
the trait approach, the dispositional way to deal with emotional information is 
elicited by free responses in a representative set of everyday emotional 
scenarios. Moreover, without scoring for correctness, which is typical for the 
ability approach, the ability to represent emotional information is coded in the 
complexity of free responses (MacCann, Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2003). 
Thus, the LEAS assesses the dispositional complexity by which emotional 
information is represented. 
Since its construction, cumulative evidence for the validity of the LEAS has 
been gathered. For example, the LEAS is positively related to the recognition of 
emotional stimuli (Lane et al., 1996). Also, brain studies have demonstrated a 
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positive relation between the quantity of blood flow in the anterior cingulate cortex 
and the LEAS during film- and recall-induced emotions (Lane et al., 1998). By 
consequence, the LEAS has gradually grown into an established addition to the 
literature on emotion psychology and has gained increasing value as a 
psychological assessment instrument that is used for several applied purposes. 
Lane and Schwartz (1992) have, for instance, proposed taking the levels of 
emotional awareness into account when selecting interventions (e.g., 
pharmacological, behavioral, cognitive, insight-oriented) in the treatment of 
depression. While medication and relaxation exercises are more appropriate at a 
low emotional awareness level (e.g., somatic complaints), insight-oriented 
counseling is more adequate at a high emotional awareness level (e.g., 
conflicting emotions). 
Although most research on emotional awareness has been done with 
adults, recently, research has also looked at emotional awareness in childhood. 
Problems with adaptation to school and developmental lapses are expected to 
relate to problems in children’s emotional awareness. For example, Izard et al. 
(2008) showed that training focused on increasing emotional awareness resulted 
in reduced aggression in 2- to 5-year-old children. With the growing interest in 
childhood a need for adequate assessment had emerged. 
Bajgar, Ciarriochi, Lane, and Deane (2005) created a modified child version 
of the LEAS (or LEAS-C) with 12 real-life scenarios. Although the LEAS and the 
LEAS-C differ in the number and content of scenarios, the design and scoring 
procedure were kept similar, which guaranteed comparability and continuity 
between both instruments. Although a promising instrument, the validity of the 
LEAS-C has barely been examined. Bajgar et al. (2005) examined the validity of 
the LEAS-C themselves in a small (N = 51) sample of 10- and 11-year-old 
children with a limited breadth of correlates (cognitive development, emotion 
knowledge, and verbal intelligence). To date, no further studies are known. 
The present paper reports on a validation study of the LEAS-C in a 
considerably larger sample (N = 318) that covers a wider age range (10 to 17 
years). The internal structure and a broad network of convergent and discriminant 
relationships are investigated. Both aspects are considered to be of decisive 
importance in establishing the validity of a scale (Messick, 1989). As both design 
and scoring approach of the child and the adult version are analogous, 
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hypotheses are mainly based on previous theorizing and research with the adult 
version. 
 
Internal structure 
According to Lane and Schwartz (1987), the complexity of and the differentiation 
between self and other emotional representations in each of the scenarios are 
indicators of the emotional awareness construct. Thus far, only one study has 
investigated the factor structure of the LEAS among adults (Bydlowski et al., 
2002). Separate exploratory factor analyses were applied on self, other, total, and 
joint self and other scores. Each time, evidence for a single predominant factor 
was found. The current study is the first to investigate the structure of the LEAS-
C by means of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). As in the study by Bydlowsky 
et al. (2002), fit of a one-factor structure was tested for the total scores2. Then, 
four additional models were tested and compared for the self and other scores 
jointly. These models have been derived a priori from the design of the LEAS-C, 
which has two characteristics. First, the child has to describe self and other 
perspectives. So, a first issue is whether self and other representations are 
interchangeable, or whether they are distinct, albeit related, aspects of emotional 
awareness. According to Bydlowsky et al. (2002) they are interchangeable, but 
for example, Decety and Sommerville (2003) state that while self and other 
representations are not identical they do overlap to some degree. Second, each 
scenario generates a self and an other score. Thus, a second issue is whether 
the scenarios introduce shared method variance, which can be modeled by 
allowing residual correlations for the self and other scores of each scenario. As 
argued by Cole, Ciesla, and Steiger (2007), correlated residuals are justified if 
they are design-driven. Including residuals decreases undetectable 
misspecifications and the risk of identifying latent variables that do not represent 
the intended constructs. Consideration of both issues results in four a priori 
models, namely, (1) a one-factor model without correlated residuals, (2) a two-
                                                          
2
 The total score is computed as the highest value of the self and the other score, 
possibly increased if there is a differentiation between self and other. Because total 
scores are dependent from self and other scores, no internal structure analysis can be 
executed on self, other, and total scores jointly. 
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factor model without correlated residuals, (3) a one-factor model with correlated 
residuals, and (4) a two-factor model with correlated residuals. 
 
Network of convergent and discriminant relationships, gender, and age 
Since emotional awareness is considered a part of emotional intelligence, and 
the LEAS-C integrates the trait and the ability approach to emotional intelligence, 
convergent validity was investigated with ability- and trait-oriented emotional 
intelligence in particular, and intelligence and personality in general. Discriminant 
validity was studied with social and emotional impairment. Moreover, gender and 
age differences were focused on. 
 
Ability- and trait-oriented emotional intelligence 
It was hypothesized that children who give a spontaneous, more complex 
representation of emotional information have a better understanding of emotion 
words and the emotion domain in general. Among adults, positive relations have 
been reported with perceiving emotions in stories, reasoning about and 
understanding emotions in the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS; 
Ciarrochi, Caputi, & Mayer, 2003), and understanding emotions in the Mayer-
Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Lumley, Gustavson, Ty 
Partridge, & Labouvie-Vief, 2005). Furthermore, it may be expected that children 
who have a disposition to attend to emotions for intra- and interpersonal 
functioning will also develop more complex representations of emotional 
information. Research in adults with the Toronto Alexithymia Scale - 20 (TAS-20) 
reported negative correlations with externally-oriented thinking and overall 
alexithymia (e.g., Lane et al., 1996; Waller & Scheidt, 2004). 
 
Intelligence and personality 
Because describing one’s own and other’s feelings is a highly verbally loaded 
task, a positive relation with verbal intelligence is expected (see also Bajgar et al., 
2005). Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade (2008) define emotional intelligence as an 
ability that works with and operates on emotional information, and thus, an 
integral part of the intelligence domain. This implies that emotional awareness 
should also relate to abstract reasoning, as is the case for other intelligence 
branches, which would highlight new convergent evidence. Of the Big Five 
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personality dimensions, openness is particularly relevant for emotional 
awareness. Next to imagination, esthetic sensitivity, and intellectual curiosity, this 
personality factor is characterized by attentiveness to inner feelings and 
emotional functioning (Costa & McCrae, 1992). It is expected that more open 
children develop more complex emotional representations. Using the NEO 
Personality Inventory - Revised (NEOPI-R), Ciarrochi et al. (2003) found a 
positive relation with openness in adults. 
 
Social and emotional impairment 
The study of social and emotional impairment is particularly important for 
demonstrating discriminant validity. The LEAS-C claims to assess the complexity 
and not the content of emotional representations. While the tendency to have 
negative emotional representations has been demonstrated to relate to 
psychopathology (e.g., Wright & Beck, 1983), the mere complexity should not 
show these relationships. In adults no correlations have been observed with 
mood and psychopathology scales of anxiety, stress, and depression (e.g., 
Ciarrochi, Scott, Deane, & Heaven, 2003). 
 
Gender and age 
There is a longstanding hypothesis that women are more emotional than men 
(Barrett, Lane, Sechrest, & Schwartz, 2000). It has repeatedly been found that 
women outperform men on particular facets of the emotion domain, including 
emotional complexity as measured by the LEAS-C (Bajgar et al., 2005), and the 
LEAS (e.g., Lane et al., 1996). At present, age differences were not found with 
the LEAS-C (Bajgar et al., 2005). The level of representational complexity, 
however, depends on the degree of past emotional language experience, which 
suggests that differences occur with increasing age (Lindquist & Feldman-Barrett, 
2008). Children’s representations evolve from an initial focus on the here and 
now to an internal mental world that is shared with other people. Adolescents, in 
turn, become more guided by norms and abstract ideals and their representations 
come to also rely on cultural and societal values. Adults develop even more 
complex representations (Labouvie-Vief, 2003). The results of Bajgar et al. 
(2005) could be explained by the restricted 2-year age range. With the 8-year age 
range in the current study, increasing emotional awareness was tested. 
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MATERIALS AND METHOD 
Participants 
A total of 318 Belgian children (47% males), aged 10 to 17 (Mage = 13.30, SDage = 
1.80), took part in the study. The sample of the Flemish school population was 
selected with respect to gender, age, and inclusion of primary school children and 
secondary school children over the different education levels. Eligibility for 
inclusion in the study was informed by an official report published by the Flemish 
Ministry of Education and Training. Only children who had Dutch as their first 
language were included. 
 
Measures 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children (LEAS-C; Bajgar et al., 
2005) 
The LEAS-C can be used to assess emotional awareness from age 8 years and 
onward. In 12 scenarios participants are asked to report on two questions, i.e., 
“How would you feel?” and “How would the other person feel?” Each scenario is 
assigned three scores that reflect self, other, and overall emotional awareness. 
Self and other scores are independently determined on a 5-point scale ranging 
from 0 (no answer and cognitions), over 1 (bodily sensations), 2 (actions and 
general emotional states), 3 (unidimensional emotions), to 4 (blends of 
emotions). Total scores depend on the degree of differentiation between the 
emotional state of self and other. The total score is the highest score obtained for 
self or other score when no differentiation is made, but assigned a score of 5 
when differentiation is clearly apparent (see Appendix 1 for an example 
scenario). The English LEAS-C was translated into Dutch by the first author, in 
collaboration with a departmental colleague3. The final version was decided upon 
by a committee of bilingual experts on emotions. Cronbach’s αs were .73 for self, 
.73 for other, and .76 for overall emotional awareness. 
 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth Version 
(MSCEIT-YV; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, in press) 
                                                          
3
 Original and translated versions of the LEAS-C are available at the website of the 
Illawarra Institute of Mental Health, University of Wollongong, Australia 
(http://www.uow.edu.au/health/iimh/ResearchThemes/index.html). 
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The MSCEIT-YV is a 101-item performance test of emotional intelligence that can 
be used from age 10 years and onward. Four branches, i.e., perceiving emotions, 
facilitating thoughts, understanding emotions, and managing emotions, and 
overall emotional intelligence are measured. Corresponding Cronbach’s αs were 
respectively .65, .69, .53, and .63 at the branch level, and .75 at the overall level. 
 
Alexithymia Questionnaire for Children (AQ-C; Rieffe, Oosterveld, & 
Meerum Terwoght, 2006) 
The AQ-C, based on the TAS-20, is a 20-item self-report questionnaire of 
alexithymia in which difficulties in identifying feelings, difficulties in describing 
feelings, externally-oriented thinking, and overall alexithymia are assessed. It can 
be used from age 9 years and onward. Items are rated on a 3-point scale (1 = not 
true and 3 = true). Cronbach’s αs were .73 for difficulties in identifying feelings, 
.70 for difficulties in describing feelings, .32 for externally-oriented thinking4, and 
.70 for overall alexithymia. 
 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Third Edition - NL (WISC-III-NL; 
Kort et al., 2005) and Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM; Raven, 
1960) 
The WISC-III and the SPM can be used to assess intelligence from age 6 years 
and onward. The WISC-III measures verbal and nonverbal ability through 13 
subtests. Scoring leads to three main scores, i.e., verbal IQ, performance IQ, and 
total IQ. The SPM consists of 60 multiple choice items of abstract reasoning that 
are arranged in five different subsets that vary in difficulty. Cronbach’s α for the 
SPM was .85. 
 
Hierarchical Personality Inventory for Children (HiPIC; Mervielde & De 
Fruyt, 1999) 
The HiPIC, based on the NEO-PI-R questionnaire, consists of 144 self-report 
items that represent the Big Five personality factors of neuroticism, extraversion, 
openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. It can be used from age 8 
years and onward. Items are rated on a 5-point scale (1 = uncharacteristic and 5 
                                                          
4
 Cronbach’s α of externally-oriented thinking is low, though consistent with literature 
(Rieffe et al., 2006). 
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= very characteristic). Cronbach’s αs were .34 for neuroticism 5 , .65 for 
extraversion, .66 for agreeableness, .81 for openness, and .82 for 
conscientiousness. 
 
Beck Youth Inventories (BYI; Dillen, Fontaine, & Verhofstadt-Denève, 2009) 
The BYI assess social and emotional impairment by way of five 20-item self-
report inventories on self-concept, depression, anxiety, anger, and disruptive 
behaviors. They can be used from age 7 years and onward. Items are rated on a 
4-point scale (0 = never to 3 = always). Corresponding Cronbach’s αs were 
respectively .84, .88, .84, .88, and .81. 
 
Procedure 
Participation was based upon informed consent of both parents and their 
underage children. Parents of possible participants received a letter describing 
the study and its aims. Included in the letter was information that parents and 
participants were allowed to decline at any given time during the research. After 
permission, the measures were completed individually at home. The tests were 
administrated by trained research assistants. During the administration 
participants and research assistants were seated at a table facing one another. 
After participation, participants and their parents were debriefed and thanked. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Internal structure 
The factor structure of the LEAS-C was investigated with CFA using Mplus 4.1. 
(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2006). Evaluation of the fit indices was based on 
guidelines provided by Schweizer (2010) according to which a good fit is 
indicated by χ²/df < 2, comparative fit index (CFI) > .95, root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) < .05, and standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR) < .10; and an acceptable fit is indicated by χ²/df < 3, CFI > .90, RMSEA 
< .08, and SRMR < .10. Furthermore, the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
was used to evaluate model parsimony. Lower BIC values indicate more 
parsimonious models (Kline, 2005, p. 143). The theoretically expected one-factor 
                                                          
5
 Neuroticism α is unexpectedly low given the fair to good αs of the other scales in this 
study. 
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model for the total scores showed acceptable to good fit values. When the four a 
priori design-driven models were applied and compared on self and other scores 
jointly, only the two-factor model with scenario residual correlations showed 
acceptable to good fit and moreover had the lowest BIC value. For the other 
three models, at least one fit value pointed to inacceptable fit (see Table 1). 
The present study is the first to apply CFA to a LEAS instrument, be it the 
child or adult version. The results are clear-cut for the child version. The total 
score, which is mostly used for assessment, fits the a priori one-factor structure. 
Thus, summing total scores across the 12 scenarios is justified (see Table 2 for 
standardized factor loadings). Analyses on self and other scores jointly, however, 
call for refinement into a hierarchically organized construct with self and other 
emotional awareness as two highly related, but distinct factors, a finding that is in 
line with developmental, social, and neuropsychological evidence (e.g., Decety & 
Sommerville, 2003). Though an overall score is still justified because self and 
other scores are highly correlated, our results also revealed nonshared variance. 
Furthermore, the finding that scenario correlated residuals had to be included 
demonstrated the presence of shared method variance. Children are influenced 
by the specific content of the scenarios. Two scenarios, namely “crash during 
lunchtime” and “getting picked for the team” shared especially high method 
variance (see Table 2 for standardized factor loadings and residual correlations). 
 Table 1 
Comparison of Fit Indices of Various Models Regarding the Structure of the LEAS-C Obtained by Confirmatory Factor Analyses 
(Maximum Likelihood) 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; 
CFI = comparative fit index: BIC = Bayesian information criterion. 
Model χ2 df χ2/df SRMR RMSEA CFI BIC 
Theoretical        
One-factor total 102.23 54 1.89 .05 .05 .91 9107.56 
Design-driven        
One-factor self + other no correlated residuals 888.27 252 3.52 .07 .09 .61 20599.85 
Two-factor self + other no correlated residuals 
 
871.93 251 3.47 .07 .09 .61 20586.10 
One-factor self + other correlated residuals 
 
414.29 240 1.73 .05 .05 .89 20156.95 
Two-factor self + other correlated residuals 
 
333.36 239 1.39 .05 .04 .94 20078.61 
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Table 2 
Standardized Parameter Estimates for the Total Model and the Final Model on 
Self and Other Scores Jointly of the LEAS-C Obtained by Confirmatory Factor 
Analyses (Maximum Likelihood) 
  One-factor  Two-factor 
Scenario Ftotal  Fself Fother EC 
1.  Running a race (you-friend) .47  .41 .40 .21** 
2.  Fire trucks at home (you-mum) .45  .50 .47 .35** 
3.  Saving pocket money (you-friend) .55  .49 .53 -.04 
4.  Nice words (you-person) .53  .50 .52 .05 
5.  Death of pet (you-father) .48  .46 .46 .19** 
6.  Crash during lunchtime (you-kid) .36  .36 .43 .59** 
7.  Visiting the dentist (you-dentist) .53  .52 .26 .11* 
8.  Unacceptable work (you-teacher) .59  .55 .50 .08 
9.  Secrets (you-kid) .53  .43 .51 .07 
10.  Getting picked for the team (you-kid) .42  .41 .45 .56** 
11.  Sharing chips (you-friend) .30  .30 .28 .17** 
12.  Visited after a while (you-friend) .42  .41 .46 .28** 
Note. Ftotal: Factor loadings of total scores on the identified Total factor (one-
factor total model); Fself: Factor loadings of self scores on the first identified Self 
factor, Fother: Factor loadings of other scores on the second identified Other 
factor, and EC: Error covariance’s (two-factor self + other model, correlated 
residuals). Correlation between Fself and Fother is .79.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Network of convergent and discriminant relationships, gender and age 
Ability- and trait-oriented emotional intelligence 
Pearson product moment correlations are presented in Table 3 6 . Emotional 
complexity shows a positive relation with overall emotional intelligence and 
further appears to relate to understanding and managing emotions, the most 
cognitively saturated parts of emotional intelligence7. Moreover, low emotional 
awareness tends to go together with an externally-oriented style of thinking, 
whereas no relation was found with difficulties in identifying and describing 
feelings. These findings are in line with prior evidence that suggests that the 
cognitive-attentional aspects of alexithymia are closely related to lack of 
                                                          
6
 As commonly applied in research on the child and adult version, results are discussed 
against external criteria in terms of total scores. For convention, we presented 
correlations with self, other, and total scores in Table 3. 
7
 Cautious interpretation is warranted because the MSCEIT-YV is not yet released. 
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mentalized emotional experience, whereas the more affective facets of 
alexithymia relate rather to the amount of distress (Waller & Scheidt, 2004)8. 
 
Intelligence and personality 
Verbal aspects of intelligence are related to the LEAS-C. However, emotional 
awareness is not exclusively related to linguistic competence but also appeals to 
abstract thought, which supports new convergent evidence. In addition, 
emotional complexity is not related to visual-perceptual aspects of intelligence, 
which supports novel discriminant evidence. With relation to personality, more 
openness is, indeed, accompanied by a greater awareness of emotions. In 
addition, our results underline the importance of agreeableness and 
conscientiousness (see Table 3). Though we have no obvious explanation for 
agreeableness, conscientious children may have been more motivated to 
perform well on the quite extensive test battery. Further study will be required to 
unravel current findings. 
 
Social and emotional impairment 
Emotional complexity was not related to self-concept, depression, anxiety, anger, 
and disruptive behaviors (Table 3). These results provide discriminant evidence, 
which emphasizes the measurement of structure instead of content. 
 
  
                                                          
8
 Distress as measured by the BYI was, indeed, low to moderately related with difficulties 
in identifying and describing feelings (rself-concept: -.17-.31; rother subscales: .16-.53), but not 
with externally-oriented thinking. 
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Table 3 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of External Criteria and Pearson 
Correlations (r) with LEAS-C 
Scale M SD rself rother rtotal 
Emotional Awareness      
LEAS-C – Self 30.94 5.98 -   
LEAS-C – Other 29.22 6.30 .65** -  
LEAS-C – Total 34.85 5.49 .89** .76** - 
Emotional Intelligence      
MSCEIT-YV – Perceiving emotions 95.70 13.92 .05 .06 .02 
MSCEIT-YV – Facilitating thoughts 106.58 12.56 .07 .08 .08 
MSCEIT-YV – Understanding emotions 101.84 8.80 .18** .16** .19** 
MSCEIT-YV – Managing emotions 105.50 10.25 .12* .16** .13* 
MSCEIT-YV – Total 104.62 9.31 .17** .19** .18** 
Alexithymia      
AS-C – Identification 12.45 3.01 -.04 .02 .00 
AS-C – Communication 9.31 2.41 -.07 .01 -.03 
AS-C – Externally-oriented thinking 14.50 2.37 -.18** -.12* -.19** 
AS-C – Total 36.26 5.48 -.13* -.03 -.09 
Intelligence      
WISC-III – Verbal IQ 105.92 14.90 .19** .18** .21** 
WISC-III – Performance IQ 101.14 14.49 .06 .06 .10 
WISC-III – Total IQ 104.28 14.78 .15** .14* .17** 
SPM – Abstract reasoning 46.09 6.34 .18** .21** .18** 
Personality      
HiPIC – Neuroticism 41.30 9.54 .08 .08 .09 
HiPIC – Extraversion 110.09 14.12 .04 .01 .07 
HiPIC – Openness 80.72 11.72 .12* .09 .15** 
HiPIC – Agreeableness 139.46 14.96 .14* .08 .11* 
HiPIC – Conscientiousness 101.23 15.08 .17** .12* .17** 
Social and Emotional Impairment      
BYI – Self concept 35.96 7.01 .05 .06 .07 
BYI – Depression 10.52 6.44 .03 .02 .07 
BYI – Anxiety 14.31 6.76 -.07 -.03 -.03 
BYI – Anger 11.80 6.69 -.02 -.09 .01 
BYI – Disruptive behaviors 6.54 4.32 -.07 -.08 -.06 
Note. LEAS-C: Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children; MSCEIT-YV: 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth Version; AS-C: 
Alexithymia Scale for Children; WISC-III: Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children 
Third Edition - NL; SPM: Standard Progressive Matrices; HiPIC: Hierarchical 
Personality Inventory for Children; BYI: Beck Youth Inventories. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Gender and age 
Three ANCOVAs were executed to examine gender differences. Since verbal 
and written language performance is typically better in girls than in boys, we 
controlled for verbal ability (Burman, Bitan, & Booth, 2008). Girls outperformed 
boys on self, F(1, 315) = 13.24, p < .001; other, F(1, 315) = 6.88, p < .01; and 
total scores, F(1, 315) = 10.45, p = .001. Unexpectedly, bivariate correlations 
showed no relationship between age and self (r = .01; p = .80), other (r = .00; p = 
.98), and total scores (r = .06; p = .26). Although developmental research 
suggests that most 3-year-old children understand emotion words such as happy, 
mad, sad, and scared (e.g., Harter, 1982), it remains unlikely that linguistic 
emotional complexity is fully developed by the age of 10. As argued by Labouvie-
Vief (2003), cognitive emotion schemata evolve from childhood, over 
adolescence, to adulthood from relatively automatic and simple representations 
to highly complex and integrated representations. Probably the current 
assessment approach is not capable of capturing higher developments of 
emotional awareness. The nature of scoring scheme offers a plausible 
explanation. Less (e.g., sad) and more complex (e.g., jealous) emotion terms are 
not distinguished in the score they are awarded and the degree of integration of 
various emotion characteristics within the emotional representations is not 
acknowledged. For instance, the word “anger” receives the same score as the 
phrase “I would feel angry because I was unjustly treated, I would want to hit this 
person and start to shout, and I would feel very hot.” In current emotion 
psychology, different emotion components such as bodily sensations, 
expressions, action tendencies, appraisals, subjective experiences, and 
regulation, are the hallmark of an emotion, and the recognition of 
interrelationships of emotion components signifies an awareness of the 
differences between states and situations (Scherer, 2005). 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present study indicates that the LEAS-C provides a valuable assessment of 
emotional awareness in childhood. The tested models point to a clear-cut internal 
structure and nearly all hypotheses on the pattern of convergent and discriminant 
relationships were confirmed. However, it will be important to expand our validity 
evidence in future research. 
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Our findings have demonstrated that it is advisable to also address younger 
age groups to explore the development of emotional awareness in early 
childhood as measured by the LEAS-C. Further, we anticipate examining the 
stability of our novel structural evidence and the extent to which the LEAS-C is 
capable of visualizing differences between self and other emotional awareness. 
In-depth structural analyses and examination of internal (e.g., coping) and 
external oriented constructs (e.g., interpersonal functioning) in relation to self and 
other emotional awareness are desirable. Finally, since the magnitude of 
correlations we found was rather low, it is advisable to establish additional ties to 
the network of convergent and discriminant relationships. A particular concept of 
interest that is not restricted to the emotion domain is mentalizing (or theory of 
mind). Mentalizing constitutes of a self-reflective and an interpersonal function 
that distinguishes inner vs. outer, pretend vs. real, and intrapersonal vs. 
interpersonal aspects of reality, to predict human behavior, and to guide one’s 
own and others’ behaviors (Fonagy, Gergeley, Jurist, & Target, 2002). Further 
research could add valuable insight about how both concepts relate to each 
other. 
Finally, the current study calls for meaningful adaptations of the LEAS-C 
that allow better discrimination at the upper side of the construct. Optimization of 
the scale construction could be obtained by selecting a reduced number of 
scenarios with low error covariances. Current scoring rules could be adapted to a 
more sophisticated scoring scheme. 
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Appendix 1 
The 5 Levels of Emotional Awareness with Response Examples: LEAS-C 
Scenario #7. The dentist tells you that you have some problems with your teeth 
that need to be fixed immediately. The dentist makes an appointment for you to 
come back the next day. How would you feel? How would the dentist feel? 
Note. From Bajgar, J., Ciarrochi, J., Lane, R., & Deane, F. (2005). Development 
of the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children (LEAS-C). British 
Journal of Developmental Psychology, 23, 569-586. Reproduced with permission 
from the British Journal of Developmental Psychology, © The British 
Psychological Society.  
Level Ability to describe emotions Example of response 
0  No response/cognitions I would feel like I should have brushed my 
teeth more often than I did. The dentist 
would feel like I didn’t brush my teeth 
enough. 
1 Bodily sensation I would feel it would hurt. I don’t know how 
the dentist would feel. 
2 Global hedonic state I would feel alright because we had it done 
before. He would feel good. 
3 Unidimensional emotion We would both feel angry of course! 
4 Differentiated emotions I would feel scared. The dentist would 
probably feel worried and happy to fix me 
and get money. 
5 More complex and 
differentiated states 
I would feel a bit worried for my teeth but 
excited because I don’t know what will 
happen. The dentist would feel hopeful and 
sorry. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Towards a Componential Emotion Approach for the Assessment of 
Emotional Awareness in Children and Adolescents1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children (LEAS-C) is a 
performance-based instrument that measures emotional awareness in the 
structure of written responses to a set of real-life scenarios. It has been believed 
that emotional awareness develops with age, yet, robust age differences have 
not yet been established with the LEAS-C. The present study investigated 
whether a componential emotion approach to the instructions and the scoring 
procedure improves the validity of the LEAS-C and reveals age differences. An 
adapted LEAS-C was administered to a sample of 574 children and adolescents 
aged 8 to 16 years and scored with the original scoring and a new componential 
scoring. An acceptable reliability for the original scoring and a good reliability and 
a high inter-rater reliability for the componential scoring were observed. 
Confirmatory factor analyses provided best fit for a one-factor model on total 
scores and a one-factor model on self and other scores for the componential 
scoring. The pattern of relationships with alexithymia, emotional intelligence, 
intelligence, personality, and social and emotional impairment, and gender 
differences were comparable to those found in prior research. The expected 
relationship with age was found, with stronger correlations for the componential 
scoring than the original scoring. In conclusion, this study supported the value of 
the componential emotion approach for the validity of the LEAS-C and showed 
age differences in emotional awareness. 
                                                          
1
 Veirman, E., & Fontaine, J. R. J. (manuscript in preparation). Towards a componential 
emotion approach for the assessment of emotional awareness in children and 
adolescents. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Emotional awareness has been defined as the cognitive ability to identify and 
describe emotional experiences in oneself and others (Lane & Schwartz, 1987). It 
is intertwined with alexithymia, or the impaired capacity to construct mental 
representations of emotions (Lane et al., 1996). Furthermore, it is considered 
fundamental to emotional intelligence (Lane, 2000), because complex emotional 
information can be used to support higher level emotional processes such as 
using emotions to facilitate thoughts, understanding emotions and managing 
emotions (Barchard, Bajgar, Leaf, & Lane, 2010). 
The construct of emotional awareness has been derived from the Levels 
of Emotional Awareness (LEA) model that incorporates Piaget’s (Flavell, 1962) 
theory of cognitive development and Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) theories of 
symbolization and language development (Lane & Schwartz, 1987). According to 
this model, emotional awareness is structured from cognitive schemata that 
people use to filter and process internal and external emotional information. 
Individual differences in the complexity (or the degree of integration and 
differentiation) of these schemata mirror people’s past experience with emotion 
language (Bajger, Ciarrochi, Lane, & Deane, 2005). Over the years, many 
studies using the Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS; Lane, Quinlan, 
Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990) provided cumulative evidence for the validity of 
this LEA model (e.g., Lane et al., 1996). Until now, only few studies used the 
child version of the LEAS (LEAS-C; Bajgar et al., 2005) to investigate the LEA 
model in children (Bajgar et al., 2005; Manchini, Agnoli, Trombini, Baldaro, & 
Surcinelli, 2013; Marchetti, Valle, Massaro, & Castelli, 2010; Veirman, Brouwers, 
& Fontaine, 2011). Although the development of emotional awareness is a 
fundamental tenet of the LEA model, these studies found (virtually) no age 
differences in emotional awareness.  
Veirman et al. (2011) suggested that the lack of robust age differences in 
emotional awareness may be due to the central position of feelings in the LEAS-
C assessment, while contemporary emotion psychology holds that multiple 
emotion components constitute an emotion (Scherer, 2005). Therefore, they 
called for adaptations to the LEAS-C assessment. The present research acted 
upon this call and investigated whether a componential emotion approach to the 
instructions and the scoring procedure of the LEAS-C improves the validity of the 
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original version of the LEAS-C and reveals age differences in a large sample of 
children and adolescents.  
We begin with an overview of the LEAS-C and the existing validity 
evidence of this test. Then, the componential emotion approach is introduced and 
how it can help to overcome the limitations of the instructions and the scoring 
procedure of the original version of the LEAS-C. We end by presenting the 
current study. 
 
LEAS-C measurement procedure and empirical evidence 
The LEAS-C holds an appealing intermediate position between self-report and 
maximum performance emotional intelligence assessment. It is not a typical self-
report test because children are not asked to evaluate their own level of 
emotional awareness, nor it is a standard maximum performance test because 
children are not asked to resolve a problem and responses are not scored on 
correctness. Instead, children are asked to describe how they (self-perspective) 
and others (other-perspective) would feel in a set of 12 real-life scenarios, what is 
assumed to elicit the dispositional way of dealing with emotional information. The 
ability to represent emotional information is for each scenario coded in three 
scores: a score for self-awareness, a score for other-awareness, and a score for 
total-awareness. These scores are meant to reflect the level of emotional 
complexity in children’s descriptions. Cognitions (e.g., I would expect him to help 
me) are scored at Level 0, bodily sensations (e.g., I would feel a terrible pain in 
my head) or direct states of the lack of an emotional response (e.g., I would feel 
nothing) are scored at Level 1, actions (e.g., I would feel like smashing the wall) 
or general emotional states (e.g., I would feel bad) are scored at Level 2, single 
emotions (e.g., I would feel surprised) are scored at Level 3, blends of emotions 
(e.g., I would feel sadness and guilt at the same time) are scored at Level 4, and 
combinations of blends that are differentiated for the self and the other are 
scored at Level 5 (e.g., I would feel embarrassed and overwhelmed, my friend 
would feel relieved and happy) (Bajgar et al., 2005). The self- and the other-
awareness score range from 0 to 4 and are based on the highest reported level 
of emotional complexity in the description. The total-awareness score equals the 
highest score of the self- and the other-awareness score, yet, a score of 5 is 
assigned if both the self- and the other-awareness score are 4 and there is 
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differentiation between the emotion words that are used for the self-perspective 
and the other-perspective. 
 Prior validation studies with the LEAS-C showed an acceptable reliability, 
with αs ranging between .64 and .76 (Bajgar et al., 2005; Marchetti et al., 2010; 
Veirman et al., 2011), and a high inter-rater reliability, with r’s ranging between 
.86 and .93 (Bajgar et al. 2005; Marchetti et al., 2010). Further, internal structure 
analyses supported a one-factor model on the total scores and a two-factor 
model on self and other scores jointly (Veirman et al., 2005). Convergent validity 
has been found with self-report and maximum performance emotional 
intelligence, intelligence and personality. Small negative correlations have been 
reported with externally-oriented thinking, the cognitive facet of alexithymia, and 
overall alexithymia. Further, small to moderate positive correlations have been 
observed with empathy (Marchetti et al., 2010), emotion comprehension (Bajgar 
et al., 2005), emotion recognition (Bajgar et al., 2005; Mancini et al., 2013), and 
understanding emotions, managing emotions, and overall emotional intelligence 
(Veirman et al., 2011). Research investigating the relationship with intelligence 
found small to moderate correlations with vocabulary, verbal productivity (Bajgar 
et al., 2005; Mancini et al., 2013), verbal intelligence (Veirman et al., 2011), and 
abstract reasoning (Mancini et al., 2013; Veirman et al., 2011). Small correlations 
have also been observed with scholastic language grades (Mancini et al., 2013). 
For personality, small correlations have been found with openness, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Discriminant validity has also been 
established. No correlations were observed with performance intelligence and 
social and emotional impairment (i.e., self-concept, depression, anxiety, anger, 
and disruptive behaviors) (Veirman et al., 2011). Gender differences have shown 
that girls outperformed boys (Bajgar et al., 2005; Mancini et al., 2013; Veirman et 
al., 2011). In contrast, the theoretically expected age differences were not 
significant (Bajgar et al., 2005; Veirman et al., 2011). Only one study found a 
small age effect for total-awareness scores (β = .09), yet, not for self- and other-
awareness scores (Mancini et al., 2013). The lack of evidence for robust age 
differences in emotional awareness is problematic for the validity of the cognitive-
developmental LEA model, especially because it is unlikely that emotional 
awareness would be fully developed by childhood. For example, Labouvie-Vief 
and colleagues (Labouvie-Vief, Chiodo, Goguen, Diehl, & Orwoll, 1995; 
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Labouvie-Vief, De Voe, & Bulka, 1989; see also Labouvie-Vief, 2003) found in 
their developmental research with hundreds of 10- to 80-year-olds that people 
gain cognitive-affective complexity as they mature (i.e., they gained more 
conscious insight into emotion aspects that were unconscious before, acquired 
clearer differentiation of self from others, and blended distinct emotions). 
As suggested by Veirman et al. (2011), a more plausible explanation is 
that robust age differences cannot be found due to limitations of the LEAS-C test. 
In specific, the main focus on feelings in the instructions and the scoring 
procedure contrasts with contemporary emotion psychology that recognizes a 
component process definition of emotion (e.g., Scherer, 2005). In this definition, 
an emotion is seen as an episode that is characterized by interrelated, 
synchronized changes in five emotion components (or states of the organismic 
subsystems): (1) the appraisal (or cognitive) component involves changes in the 
evaluation of objects or events depending on its personal significance, (2) the 
bodily reaction (or neurophysiological) component involves changes in 
physiological responses of the body such as for instance a slowed heart rate or 
sweating, (3) the action tendency (or motivational) component involves changes 
in the preparation and direction of behavioral tendencies such as doing nothing 
or hiding from others, (4) the expression (or motor) component involves changes 
in the communication of reactions and behavioral intentions in facial (e.g., 
smiling, frowning), vocal (e.g., whispering, screaming), and gestural (e.g., head 
bent down) behavior, and (5) the feeling (or subjective experience) component 
involves changes in the monitoring and regulation of internal state and person-
environment interaction, and as such is the integrated conscious experience of 
the other components, such as feelings of anger or shame. Moreover, it has been 
found that these five emotion components are encoded in languages across the 
world (Fontaine & Scherer, 2013). 
Based on this component process definition of emotion, we can now 
argue that emotional awareness or the complexity of emotion schemata is 
reflected in the extent to which all components that constitute an emotion are 
cognitively represented. So, it can be questioned whether the current instructions 
and scoring procedure of the LEAS-C are able to capture emotional awareness 
defined in this way. 
With respect to the instructions, children may differentially interpret the 
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word feel and thus vary in what they think they are expected to respond, 
independent of the complexity of their mental representation of the emotional 
experience. In daily life, the word feel(ing) is often used to stress the subjective 
nature of an emotional experience. So, it can refer to all aspects of the emotion 
process that can be ‘felt’ (Mulligan & Scherer, 2012). Some children might think 
that they have to report the most salient aspect of the emotional experience 
(which can be an appraisal, an action tendency, a bodily reaction, or an 
expression), other children might think that they should give a feeling or an 
emotion term, and still other children might think that they need to report on the 
whole emotion process. Such divergence in the interpretation of the instructions 
will lead to construct irrelevant response variation. This possible source of 
construct irrelevant response variation can be avoided by making explicitly clear 
in the instructions that, while attended to all emotion components, children should 
try to report as completely as possible on the emotional experience. 
As concerns the scoring procedure, children may be disadvantaged in the 
scores they are assigned because the highest level of emotional complexity is 
taken as the final score for each perspective in each scenario, regardless of 
whether descriptions contain information on other levels. For instance, someone 
who describes “I would think that the way I was treated was unjustified, I would 
feel angry, I would start yelling at the other person and feel hot inside my body, I 
would want to hit the other person, but would suppress my aggression” receives 
the same score than someone who just describes “I would be angry”. So, the 
current scoring procedure does not fully capture the complexity of the emotional 
experience defined in terms of a component process definition to emotion. This 
problem could be dealt with in the scoring procedure by accounting for the 
different emotion components on which information is given. 
 
Current study 
In light of the alternative explanations for why age differences in emotional 
awareness have not been robustly established in prior research with the LEAS-C, 
the current study made two adaptations to the LEAS-C test: (1) the instructions 
are changed from “How would you / the other person feel?” to “What would you / 
the other person experience?” with an explicit explanation that experience can 
refer to all components of the emotion process, and (2) a componential scoring 
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procedure is developed that counts the different emotion components that are 
represented in descriptions. These two adaptions are expected to improve 
validity of the original LEAS-C and especially reveal age differences. This is 
examined in four steps. First, the reliability of the original scoring and the 
componential scoring is compared and the inter-rater reliability is investigated for 
the componential scoring. Second, the internal structure is investigated via 
confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). Three models are tested for both scoring 
methods: a one-factor model on the total scores, a one-factor model on self and 
other scores jointly, and a two-factor model on self and other scores jointly. 
Based on previous research, it is expected that the one-factor model on the total 
scores would provide a satisfying fit, and that the two-factor model on self and 
other scores jointly is adequate. Third, the network of convergent and 
discriminant relationships (i.e., alexithymia, emotional intelligence, intelligence, 
personality, and social and emotional impairment) and gender differences are 
examined. Here, we expect to replicate prior findings on the pattern of 
correlations and on gender differences. Finally, we investigate whether the 
adaptations will reveal age differences. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHOD 
Participants 
The sample of the Flemish school population comprised 574 Belgian children 
(39% males) aged between 8 and 16 (Mage = 13.45, SDage = 1.84). We consulted 
an official report published by the Flemish Ministry of Education and Training to 
select primary school children and secondary school children from different 
educational levels with respect to gender and age. The mother tongue of Dutch 
was used as a requisite for inclusion. 
 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children - adapted 
Because the componential instructions stimulate respondents to provide much 
more information, the full version of the LEAS-C with 12 scenarios would have 
                                                          
 Although not considered as a ‘real’ component in the component process definition to 
emotion, regulation was included as an additional component because of its central 
position in emotion research (e.g., Gross & Thompson, 2007) and emotional intelligence 
research (e.g., Salovey & Mayer, 1990). 
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been long and time-consuming for respondents to complete. To diminish the risk 
that overload and tiredness may negatively affect the scores, the length of the 
instrument was reduced. Therefore, six scenarios out of the 12 were selected. 
The scenarios of this short version of the LEAS-C (i.e., fire trucks at home, saving 
pocket money, nice words, death of a pet, inacceptable work, and secrets) have 
shown to share high factor loadings and low error covariances for a final two-
factor model on the self and other scores jointly in previous research (see Table 
2 in Veirman et al., 2011). These six scenarios also represent major sources of 
variation in the emotion domain. They capture the main dimensions of emotional 
experience, namely valence (i.e., happiness), power (i.e., anger/sadness), 
arousal (i.e., anxiety), and novelty/care (i.e., surprise, concern) (Fontaine, 
Veirman, & Groenvynck, 2013). The scenarios are presented in the same order 
of appearance as in the original instrument. In each scenario, participants are 
asked to report on two questions, i.e., “What would you experience in this 
situation (for example feel, think, sense, show, want to do, and how would you 
cope with)?” and “What would the other person experience in this situation (for 
example feel, think, sense, show, want to do, and how would the other person 
cope with)?” Two scoring procedures are applied: the original scoring key 
proposed by Lane and Schwartz (1987) as presented in the introduction, and a 
new componential emotion scoring key. In this componential scoring, emotional 
complexity is coded as the number of different emotion components that are 
represented in the descriptions (feelings, appraissals, bodily reactions, 
expressions, action tendencies, and regulation). For each scenario, self-
awareness and other-awareness scores range between 0 (no components are 
represented in the description) and 6 (all components are at least once 
represented in the description). For instance, the description ‘I would feel scared, 
have a faster breathing and would like to run away” contains a feeling, a bodily 
reaction, and an action tendency, resulting in a score of 3 for the self-perspective, 
whereas the description ‘I feel scared’ contains only a feeling, resulting in a score 
of 1 for the self-perspective. The total-awareness score ranges between 0 and 12 
per scenario, and is calculated as the sum of the self-awareness score and the 
other-awareness score. 
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Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth Version 
(MSCEIT-YV; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2015) 
The 101-item (of which 97 items are scored) MSCEIT-YV measures performance 
on four emotional intelligence branches, i.e. perceiving emotions, facilitating 
thoughts, understanding emotions, and managing emotions, and overall 
emotional intelligence. It can be used from age 10 onwards. Cronbach’s αs were 
.65 for perceiving emotions, .65 for facilitating thoughts, .64 for understanding 
emotions, .67 for managing emotions, and .76 for total emotional intelligence. 
 
Alexithymia Questionnaire for Children (AQ-C; Rieffe, Oosterveld, & 
Meerum Terwoght, 2006) 
The AQ-C is a 20-item self-report questionnaire, assessing difficulties in 
identifying feelings, difficulties in describing feelings, externally-oriented thinking, 
and overall alexithymia. It is suited for administration from age 9 onwards. Items 
are rated on a 3-point scale (1 = not true and 3 = true). Corresponding 
Cronbach’s αs were .75, .72, .36, and .71. 
 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Third Edition - NL (WISC-III-NL; 
Kort et al., 2005) and Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM; Raven, 
1960) 
The WISC-III and the SPM measure intelligence from age 6 onwards. The WISC-
III assesses verbal and nonverbal intelligence. Through 13 subtests, three main 
scores are yielded, i.e., verbal IQ, performance IQ, and total IQ. The SPM 
measures abstract reasoning and comprises 60 multiple choice items, divided in 
five different sets with increasing difficulty. Cronbach’s α for SPM was .85. 
 
Hierarchical Personality Inventory for Children (HiPIC; Mervielde & De 
Fruyt, 1999) 
The HiPIC is a 144 self-report questionnaire, assessing the Big Five personality 
factors of neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, openness, and 
conscientiousness. It can be used from age 8 onwards. Items are rated on a 5-
                                                          
 The low Cronbach’s α for externally-oriented thinking is consistent with those reported in 
literature (Rieffe et al., 2006), though, signify that a carefull interpretation of correlations 
with this scale is needed. 
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point scale (1 = uncharacteristic and 5 = very characteristic). Cronbach’s αs were 
respectively .32, .69, .65, .83, and .87. 
 
Beck Youth Inventories (BYI; Dillen, Fontaine, & Verhofstadt-Denève, 2009).  
The BYI measure social and emotional impairment and consist of five 20-item 
self-report inventories on self-concept, depression, anxiety, anger, and disruptive 
behaviors. These inventories can be used from age 7 onwards. Items are rated 
on a 4-point scale (0 = never to 3 = always). Corresponding Cronbach’s αs were 
.82 for self-concept, .89 for depression, .88 for anxiety, .88 for anger, and .83 for 
disruptive behaviors. 
 
Procedure 
Parents of eligible children received a letter describing the study, its objectives, 
and information that they could end participation at any time during the research 
without justification. Upon permission, parents and their children filled out 
informed consents. Tests were administered individually at home by trained 
research assistants, seated at a table in front of the children. After participation, 
parents and children were debriefed and thanked for their cooperation. 
 
RESULTS 
Frequencies of levels and components 
The 574 children and adolescents each filled out six scenarios, or 3444 
scenarios, with a total of 6888 self and other descriptions. These descriptions 
were scored in agreement with both the original scoring procedure and the 
componential scoring procedure. For the original scoring, self descriptions were 
coded 528 times at Level 0 (or 15.33%), 55 times at Level 1 (or 1.60%), 642 
times at Level 2 (or 18.64%), 1532 times at Level 3 (44.48%), and 687 times at 
Level 4 (or 19.95%); other descriptions were coded 525 times at Level 0 (or 
15.24%), 66 times at Level 1 (or 1.92%), 610 times at Level 2 (or 17.71%), 1663 
times at Level 3 (or 48.29%), and 580 times at Level 4 (or 16.84%); and total 
descriptions were coded 194 times at level 0 (or 5.63%), 24 times at Level 1 (or 
0.70%), 392 times at Level 2 (or 11.38%), 1826 times at Level 3 (or 53.02%), 823 
                                                          
 Neuroticism α is low in comparison to the fair to good αs of the other scales in the 
present study, yet, consistent with the neuroticism α reported in Veirman et al (2009). 
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times at Level 4 (or 23.90%), and 185 times at Level 5 (or 5.37%). For the 
componential scoring, the self and other descriptions were coded as 1, 3935 
times (57.13%) for the appraissal category (63.30% for self and 50.96% for 
other), 3915 times (56.84%) for the action tendency category (64.69% for self 
and 48.98% for other), 123 times (1.79%) for the bodily reaction category (2.58% 
for self and 0.99% for other), 985 times (14.30%) for the expression category 
(17.02% for self and 11.59% for other), 5031 times (73.04%) for the subjective 
feeling category (74.01% for self and 72.07% for other), and 315 times (4.57%) 
for the regulation category (4.62% for self and 4.53% for other). 
 
Reliability 
A subset of 348 scenarios for 58 randomly selected children (or 10% of the total 
sample) was scored according to the componential scoring by two independent 
raters. Inter-rater reliability was calculated by means of intra-class correlation 
coefficients (two-way random model, absolute agreement). Coefficients for self 
scores (single measures: .93), other scores (single measures: .92), and total 
scores (single measures: .95) were all above .80, thus, considered high 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
Internal consistency was examined by means of Cronbach’s alpha. For 
the original scoring, αs were .64 for self scores, .63 for other scores, and .74 for 
total scores. For the componential scoring, αs were .84 for self scores, .83 for 
other scores, and .90 for total scores. The αs for the original scoring were 
compared with the αs for the componential scoring (Cronbach, 1951; 
Diedenhofen, 2013; Feldt, Woodruff, & Salih, 1987). The αs were found 
significantly higher for the componential scoring for self scores, χ2(1, N = 574) = 
99.96, p < .001; other scores, χ2 (1, N = 574) = 82.60, p < .001; and total scores, 
χ2 (1, N = 574) = 127.65, p < .001. Pearson correlations among self, other and 
total scores for the original scoring and the componential scoring are reported in 
Table 1. 
  
70  Chapter 3 
Table 1 
Pearson Correlations among LEAS-C Self, Other and Total Scores for the 
Original and the Componential Scoring 
LEAS-C scores 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Original scoring - Self -     
2. Original scoring - Other .61** -    
3. Original scoring - Total .83** .84** -   
4. Componential scoring - Self .60** .48** .54** -  
5. Componential scoring - Other .50** .53** .53** .82** - 
6. Componential scoring - Total .58** .53** .56** .95** .95** 
**p < .01. 
 
Internal structure 
We applied CFA to the data scored with the original scoring key and the data 
scored with the componential scoring key via Mplus 6.11. (Muthén & Muthén, 
1998-2011). Schweizer’s (2010) criteria were used to evaluate the resulting fit 
indices (good fit: χ2/df < 2, CFI > .95, RMSEA < .05, and SRMR < .10; 
acceptable fit: χ2/df < 3, CFI > .90, RMSEA < .08, and SRMR < .10). Model 
parsimony was determined by inspection of the lowest BIC information criteria 
(Kline, 2005, p. 143). We used Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) rule of thumbs to 
interpret the resulting standardized factor loadings. Factor loadings above .71 are 
excellent, .63 are very good, .55 are good, .45 are fair, .32 are poor, and lower 
factor loadings are not interpreted. The theoretical model on the total scores 
yielded good fit indices for both scoring procedures (see Table 2 for fit values of 
the tested models). For each scoring procedure, the one-factor and two-factor 
models on the self and other scores jointly showed highly similar acceptable to 
good fit indices, yet, the lowest BIC values were observed for the one-factor 
models. The one-factor model on the self and other componential scores 
generally showed better fit values than the one-factor model on the self and other 
original scores (see Table 3 for standardized factor loadings of the tested 
models). 
 Table 2 
Comparison of Fit Indices of Various Models Regarding the Structure of the Adapted LEAS-C for the Original Scored Data and the 
Componential Scored Data Obtained by Confirmatory Factor Analyses (Maximum Likelihood)  
Model χ2 df χ2/df SRMR RMSEA CFI BIC 
Original scoring        
One-factor total 15.88 9 1.76 .02 .04 .99 9392.37 
One-factor self + other 156.07 54 2.89 .04 .06 .90 21188.25 
Two-factor self + other 155.30 53 2.93 .04 .06 .90 21190.66 
Componential scoring        
One-factor total 12.03 9 1.34 .01 .02 1.00 11137.02 
One-factor self + other 147.01 54 2.72 .03 .06 .97 15590.81 
Two-factor self + other 144.92 53 2.73 .03 .06 .97 15591.90 
Note. df = degrees of freedom; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; 
CFI = comparative fit index: BIC = Bayesian information criterion. 
  
 Table 3 
Standardized Parameter Estimates for All Tested Models Regarding the Structure of the Adapted LEAS-C for Original Scored Data and 
Componential Scored Data Obtained by Confirmatory Factor Analyses (Maximum Likelihood) 
  Original scoring  Componential scoring 
  One-factor  One-factor  Two-factor  One-factor  One-factor  Two-factor 
Scenario Ftotal  Fself/other  Fself Fother  Ftotal  Fself/other  Fself Fother 
1.  Fire trucks at home (you-mum) .57  .57/.57  .57 .57  .76  .68/.70  .69 .70 
2.  Saving pocket money (you-friend) .60  .50/.43  .50 .44  .78  .70/.63  .70 .64 
3.  Nice words (you-person) .58  .48/.47  .48 .48  .80  .68/.70  .68 .71 
4.  Death of pet (you-father) .51  .49/.44  .49 .45  .75  .70/.67  .70 .67 
5.  Inacceptable work (you-teacher) .58  .45/.43  .46 .44  .80  .72/.67  .73 .67 
6.  Secrets (you-kid) .58  .44/.41  .44 .42  .75  .61/.62  .61 .62 
Note. Ftotal: Factor loadings of total scores on the identified Total factor (one-factor total model); Fself/other: Factor loadings of self/other 
scores on the identified Self/Other factor (one-factor self + other model); Fself: Factor loadings of self scores on the first identified Self 
factor, and Fother: Factor loadings of other scores on the second identified Other factor (two-factor self + other model). Correlation 
between Fself and Fother is .97 for the original scoring, and .98 for the componential scoring. 
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Network of convergent and discriminant relationships  
Means and standard deviations of external criteria and correlations with self, 
other and total scores are presented in Table 45. For the original and the 
componential scoring, small positive correlations were found with facilitating 
thoughts, understanding emotions, managing emotions, overall emotional 
intelligence, verbal intelligence, overall intelligence, abstract reasoning, 
extraversion, and openess. A small positive correlation was also observed with 
neuroticism for the componential scoring. And finally, for both scoring 
procedures, small negative correlations were observed with externally-oriented 
thinking and overall alexithymia, whereas no significant correlations were found 
with performance intelligence and social and emotional impairment (i.e., self-
concept, depression, anxiety, anger and disruptive behaviors). 
  
                                                          
5
 Consistent with prior research on the LEAS and LEAS-C, correlations with external 
criteria are discussed in terms of total scores. For convention, correlations with external 
criteria are presented in Table 4 for total scores as well as self and other scores. 
 Table 4 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of External Criteria and Pearson Correlations (r) with Self, Other, and Total Scores of the 
adapted LEAS-C for Original Scored Data and Componential Scored Data 
   Original scoring   Componential scoring 
Scale M SD rself rother rtotal  rself rother rtotal 
Emotional Intelligence          
MSCEIT-YV – Perceiving emotions 32.27 7.19 .05 .05 .01  -.01 -.01 -.01 
MSCEIT-YV – Facilitating thoughts 28.85 5.58 .17** .08 .13**  .13** .13** .14** 
MSCEIT-YV – Understanding emotions 29.60 6.26 .20** .20** .21**  .17** .21** .20** 
MSCEIT-YV – Managing emotions 22.08 5.55 .19** .17** .17**  .14** .17** .16** 
MSCEIT-YV – Total 112.80 15.20 .24** .20** .20**  .17** .19** .19** 
Alexithymia          
AS-C – Identification 12.27 3.07 -.02 -.02 -.02  -.00 -.01 -.01 
AS-C – Communication 9.24 2.54 -.05 -.09* -.05  -.05 -.00 -.03 
AS-C – Externally-oriented thinking 14.41 2.39 -.12** -.10* -.12**  -.24** -.22** -.24** 
AS-C – Total 35.93 5.60 -.09* -.10* -.08*  -.13** -.10* -.12** 
Intelligence          
WISC-III – Verbal IQ 106.73 13.72 .11** .13** .13**  .13** .10* .12** 
WISC-III – Performance IQ 103.29 13.99 .02 .04 .04  .06 .03 .05 
WISC-III – Total IQ 105.88 13.48 .08 .10* .10*  .11** .08 .10* 
SPM – Abstract reasoning 46.69 6.26 .17** .15** .16**  .23** .22** .24** 
Note. LEAS-C: Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children; MSCEIT-YV: Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test 
Youth Version, branch and total scores are summed items scores; AS-C: Alexithymia Scale for Children; WISC-III: Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children Third Edition; SPM: Standard Progressive Matrices; HiPIC: Hierarchical Personality Inventory for 
Children; BYI: Beck Youth Inventories.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 Table 4 (continued) 
Means (M) and Standard Deviations (SD) of External Criteria and Pearson Correlations (r) with Self, Other, and Total Scores of the 
adapted LEAS-C for Original Scored Data and Componential Scored Data 
   Original scoring   Componential scoring 
Scale M SD rself rother rtotal  rself rother rtotal 
Personality          
HiPIC – Neuroticism 41.19 9.45 .05 .01 .04  .09* .09* .09* 
HiPIC – Extraversion 111.12 15.13 .11** .15** .15**  .09* .10* .10* 
HiPIC – Openness 81.79 11.63 .09* .11** .11**  .12** .09* .11** 
HiPIC – Agreeableness 142.01 16.44 .07 .08* .06  .08 .07 .08 
HiPIC – Conscientiousness 102.95 15.65 .08* .04 .08  .08 .03 .06 
Social and Emotional Impairment          
BYI – Self-concept 36.24 6.45 .02 .02 .02  -.01 -.01 -.01 
BYI – Depression 10.01 6.62 -.03 -.02 -.01  -.02 -.07 -.05 
BYI – Anxiety 14.30 7.55 .04 .01 .05  .05 .01 .03 
BYI – Anger 11.56 6.64 -.06 -.07 -.06  -.03 -.09* -.07 
BYI – Disruptive behaviors 6.51 4.45 -.01 -.00 .02  -.03 -.04 -.04 
Note. LEAS-C: Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children; MSCEIT-YV: Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test 
Youth Version, branch and total scores are summed items scores; AS-C: Alexithymia Scale for Children; WISC-III: Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children Third Edition; SPM: Standard Progressive Matrices; HiPIC: Hierarchical Personality Inventory for 
Children; BYI: Beck Youth Inventories.  
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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Gender and age 
Six ANCOVAs were performed to investigate gender differences. Verbal 
intelligence was controlled for because girls typically perform better than boys on 
verbal and written language tasks (Burman, Bitan, & Booth, 2008). Girls 
outperformed boys, for the original scoring on self scores, F(1, 571) = 15.78, p < 
.001 (partial η² = .03); other scores, F(1, 571) = 4.21, p < .05 (partial η² = .01); 
and total scores, F(1, 571) = 9.95, p < .01 (partial η² = .02); as well as for the 
componential scoring on self scores, F(1, 571) = 19.81, p < .001 (partial η² = .03); 
other scores, F(1, 571) = 10.65, p = .001 (partial η² = .02); and total scores, F(1, 
571) = 16.36, p < .001 (partial η² = .03). For the original scoring procedure, small 
positive correlations were observed between age and self scores (r = .17, p < 
.001), other scores (r = .14, p = .001), and total scores (r = .19, p < .001). For the 
componential scoring procedure, small to moderate positive correlations were 
observed between age and self scores (r = .30, p < .001), other scores (r = .28, p 
< .001), and total scores (r = .30, p < .001). Comparison of the correlations with 
age for the original and componential scoring indicated the latter were 
substantially higher, for self scores (z = 3.61, p < .001), other scores (z = 3.56, p 
< .001), as well as total scores (z = 2.92, p < .001). 
 
DISCUSSION 
The main aim of the present research was to investigate whether the validity of 
the original LEAS-C could be improved and the theoretically expected age 
differences in emotional awareness from childhood into adolescence would 
emerge in case the instructions and the scoring procedure of the LEAS-C were 
adapted on the basis of the componential emotion approach. 
The results showed that the adapted LEAS-C with a by half reduced 
number of scenarios is reliable. The original scoring procedure yielded similar 
internal consistency coefficients, yet, the componential scoring showed 
substantially higher internal consistency coefficients than those reported in 
literature for the original LEAS-C (Bajgar et al., 2005; Marchetti et al., 2010; 
Veirman et al., 2011). The componential scoring, moreover, showed high inter-
rater reliability, endorsing the quality of the componential scoring procedure. 
The internal structure of the adapted LEAS-C showed acceptable to good 
fit for all tested models. Generally, the tested models showed a better fit and 
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consistently higher factor loadings for the componential scoring compared to the 
original scoring. As expected, the one-factorial model on the total scores fitted 
well for both scoring procedures. However, contrary to the expectations, the two-
factorial model on the self and other scores jointly did not fit substantially better 
than the one-factorial model on the self and other scores jointly, neither for the 
original scoring procedure, nor for the componential scoring procedure. This 
finding is in contrast with prior research on the original LEAS-C, where a two-
factorial structure with distinct self and other factors clearly fitted better (Veirman 
et al., 2011). 
The one-factorial structure of self and other scores for the adapted LEAS-
C may have been the result of the componential instructions. It is likely that 
different aspects of the emotion process are salient for the self- and the other-
perspective. For instance, it could be that the feeling component is more salient 
for the self-perspective, as one has more access to one’s own internal 
experiences, while the action tendency component is more salient for the other-
perspective, because in a social interaction knowing how the other would behave 
is the important information. Such a difference in salience would affect the 
original LEAS-C with feeling instructions much more than the adapted LEAS-C 
with componential instructions. Because in the current study children were 
stimulated to report on the experience, thus the whole emotional process, for 
both perspectives and because all emotion components contributed to the 
scoring for both perspectives, the difference in salience may have had less effect 
on the scores. 
It has to be noted though that the one-factorial structure of self and other 
scores for the adapted LEAS-C does not exclude genuine differences between 
the self- and the other-perspective, because one has differential access to the 
emotion components from both perspectives in real-life, with bodily reactions and 
expressions being the most different. One has direct access to one’s own bodily 
reactions, while one has only seldom access to someone else’s bodily reactions 
(only in intense situations bodily reactions might become noticeable). In real-life, 
one has direct access to the expressions of others, but less so to one’s own 
emotional expressions. It is thus possible that some people are more able to 
interpret their internal experiences and others are more able to interpret the 
expressions of others. This can, however, not be investigated with a scenario-
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based instrument where all information, both for the self- and the other-
perspective, stems from a verbal description of an emotion eliciting situation. 
Indeed, only three of the six emotion components, feelings, action tendencies 
and appraissals were most frequently represented in the descriptions. So, 
children are in these scenarios mainly focused on what the self- and the other-
perspective would think (interpretation of the situation), do (resulting tendency to 
act or actions) and feel (comprehensive whole that captures the emotional 
experience) in the given situations. Because of the pure verbal nature of the 
information, participants have no access to their own bodily reactions, nor to the 
expressions of others. It would be therefore interesting for future research to 
investigate to which extent the frequences with which the components are 
respresented in descriptions depend on the methodology that is used. For 
instance, asking to re-experience past emotional episodes may result in more 
information on bodily reactions, or a video scenario test may result in more 
information on expressions.  
The observation that appraissals are among the most frequent 
represented components in the descriptions, stresses the importance of 
appraissals for emotion representations. This is in line with appraissal theories of 
emotion, considering that “people’s subjective evaluation of the significance of 
the events for their well-being and goal achievements elicits the emotion process 
and determines the response patterning” (Scherer, 2013; p. 11). At the same 
time, this observation constrasts the LEA model in which cognitions are related to 
low emotional awareness levels. 
With respect to the network of convergent and discriminant relationships, 
our results demonstrated that the pattern of correlations for this adapted LEAS-C 
is in line with prior research for both scoring procedures. For example, the 
absence of correlations with measures of psychopathology supports the claim 
that the instrument is measuring the structural properties of the emotional 
representation and not their typical content (e.g., Veirman et al., 2011). Yet, the 
magnitude of the significant correlations remains small. An explanation may be 
that the correlations between this structural type of measurement and self-report 
personality/emotional intelligence measures and maximum performance 
emotional intelligence measures are undersestimated because these measures 
have their own specific problems that a structural measure has not. Self-report 
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personality/emotional intelligence measures are for example liable to response 
biases (e.g., social desirability, acquiescent or extreme responding). Maximum 
performance emotional intelligence measures are for instance confronted with 
difficulties in identifying the correct responses to emotion-related questions. In 
either case, future research is needed to clarify the unique position that the 
LEAS-C holds between self-report and maximum performance emotional 
intelligence assessment. Since this type of measurement has been classified as 
measuring emotion processing (Ciarrochi, Caputi, & Mayer, 2003), experimental 
research is a possible patway to follow in future. The integration of a traditional 
psychometric approach to emotional awareness and the investigation of the 
underlying cognitive processes may be fruitfull for a better understanding of the 
concept of emotional awareness. 
Further, our results confirm the role of gender in explaining self, other, 
and total emotional awareness, supporting previous considerations in literature 
that girls outperform boys (Bajgar et al., 2005; Mancini et al., 2013; Veirman et 
al., 2011). We note that these gender differences are more pronounced for the 
componential scored data than the original scored data. 
Finally, our findings show that the change of the instructions already 
allowed us to find age differences in emotional awareness with the original 
scoring procedure. So, if children are asked to provide all information of the 
emotional experience they can cognitively represent, less random variation in 
responses occurs. In case the componential scoring was applied, age differences 
became even more pronounced, suggesting that this componential scoring is 
better able to capture the complexity of the emotion representations in people’s 
descriptions to scenarios. Moreover, these age differences are found for total 
emotional awareness, as well as self and other emotional awareness. These 
results on age differences for the adapted LEAS-C are the first in the LEAS 
literature, be it the child or adult version, to fully support Lane and Schwartz’s 
(1987) premise that emotional complexity develops with age. 
Some limitations also require discussion. A first limitation is that the 
adapted LEAS-C with componential instructions and scoring procedure is at least 
as intensive to score as the full LEAS-C with original instructions and scoring 
procedure. Even though the number of scenarios was halved, the componential 
instructions generally resulted in much richer and longer descriptions. Another 
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limitation is that the data of children and adolescents were collected in the 
general population. Whereas the adult version of this test has proven to be useful 
in clinical populations (e.g., Subic-Wrana, Bruder, Thomas, Lane, & Köhle, 2005), 
the utility of this adapted LEAS-C for clinical practice has still to be demonstrated. 
In conclusion, the results of the present study on the adapted LEAS-C are 
encouraging. The psychometric quality and the validity of the original LEAS-C 
was generally improved and age differences in emotional awareness were 
demonstrated, signifying that a componential emotion approach is a valuable 
basis for emotional awareness measurement. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Revisiting the Dimensional Structure of the Emotion Domain1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Recent research has claimed that a novelty dimension is needed to represent the 
cognitive emotion structure over and above valence, power and arousal. Novelty 
emerged when student samples evaluated the meaning of 24 emotion terms on 
142 emotion features. This claim is debatable, however, because to date novelty 
has never been found in similarity sorting studies. It is possible that novelty 
emerged because sophisticated student samples evaluated emotion terms on 
emotion features. The current research identified a large, representative set of 
emotion terms using a free-listing task in a middle childhood up to early 
adulthood sample (N = 5071). Children, adolescents, students and adults (N = 
1184) then evaluated the similarity between these emotion terms using a 
similarity rating task without priming any emotion feature. Novelty robustly 
emerged as the fourth dimension. The existence of novelty is thus confirmed with 
a different method across a wide variety of participants. 
  
                                                          
1
 Veirman, E., & Fontaine, J. R. J. (in press). Revisiting the dimensional structure of the 
emotion domain, Cognition and Emotion, doi:10.1080/02699931.2014.963518 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Wundt (1905) theorized that affective experiences can be represented 
in a three-dimensional space, dimensional models have played a prominent role 
in emotion psychology. Moreover, they are crucial for the assessment of 
emotional experiences (e.g., Yik, Russell, & Barrett, 1999) and are considered at 
the core of the emotion construct by some emotion theories (e.g., Russell, 2003). 
They have been used to study the connotative meaning in psycholinguistic 
research (e.g., Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975) and the cognitive emotion 
representation (e.g., Fontaine, Poortinga, Setiadi & Suprapti, 2002; Shaver, 
Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Conner, 1987; Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992). According 
to the most popular models, valence and arousal, or a rotation thereof, structure 
the emotion domain (e.g., Yik et al., 1999). However, other models postulate 
valence and power to be the most important dimensions (e.g., Gehm & Scherer, 
1988; Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000). Still other models claim that all 
three dimensions of valence, power and arousal are needed (e.g., Fontaine et al., 
2002; Osgood et al., 1975; Shaver et al., 1987, 1992). 
Recently, Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, and Ellsworth (2007) applied a new 
theory-guided methodology to study the cognitive representation of the emotion 
domain. Their approach was based on the componential emotion theory, 
according to which emotions are defined as synchronized processes between 
five human subsystems that are elicited by goal-relevant events. These 
subsystems, also called components, are appraisal, action tendency, bodily 
reaction, expression and feeling (e.g., Scherer, 2009). The instrument they 
constructed (called the GRID instrument) contained 24 emotion terms that had to 
be rated on the likelihood of 142 emotion features. The emotion terms (such as 
“pleasure”, “anger” and “guilt”) were a priori selected to represent the emotion 
domain. The emotion features were derived from different emotion theories (e.g., 
Ekman, 1972; Frijda, 1986; Russell, 1980) and operationalized each of the five 
components (such as “the person wanted to flee” for the action tendency 
component). The evaluation of the meaning of the emotion terms on the emotion 
features revealed a four-dimensional structure of valence, power, arousal and 
novelty, in that order of importance. Unanticipated was the finding of the fourth 
novelty dimension, which was characterized by appraisals of suddenness and 
unpredictability, and facial expressions of jaw drop and opening eyes widely. The 
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four-dimensional structure was first observed in English, French and Dutch 
(Fontaine et al., 2007) and has more recently been confirmed in 27 languages 
using the same 24 emotion terms and 142 emotion features (Fontaine & Scherer, 
2013). 
The existence of a novelty dimension in the cognitive structure of the 
emotion domain is, however, debatable as this dimension has never been 
observed before. It is possible that previous studies simply were not able to 
reveal novelty because of methodological constraints. Yet, another explanation is 
that the emergence of this dimension is an artefact of the GRID methodology. 
The emergence of the novelty dimension in the GRID research may have been 
caused by (1) a disproportionate representation of novelty-related emotion terms, 
and/or (2) a disproportionate representation of novelty-related emotion features 
and/or (3) the reliance on sophisticated respondents. In the early 1990s, Russell 
(1991) already suggested that the selection of the emotion terms determines 
whether arousal (in case predominantly intrapersonal terms are used) or power 
(in case predominantly interpersonal terms are used) emerges as the second 
dimension. Thus, the selection of emotion terms determines which dimensions 
are likely to emerge. The novelty dimension may also have been elicited by the 
precise selection of the features in the GRID instrument (such as suddenly and 
unpredictable). Moreover, the samples in the GRID research consisted almost 
exclusively of psychology and linguistics students. Since these students have 
been trained to represent subtle meaning differences, the novelty dimension may 
not be generalizable to non-student samples. 
In light of these alternative explanations for the emergence of the novelty 
dimension in the GRID research, the current research has three aims: (1) to 
empirically identify a representative set of emotion terms in which surprise-related 
terms are neither over- nor underrepresented, (2) to investigate whether novelty 
emerges as the fourth dimension in the cognitive emotion structure with a 
representative set of emotion terms and without priming (novelty-related) emotion 
features, and (3) to examine these two issues also in non-student samples. Two 
studies have been executed. In a first study, a representative set of emotion 
terms is empirically identified using a free-listing task in a middle childhood up to 
early adulthood sample. In a second study, the dimensional representation of the 
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emotion domain is examined on the basis of similarity ratings between emotion 
terms in a child-adolescent, a student and an adult sample. 
 
STUDY 1: THE EMPIRICAL IDENTIFICATION OF A REPRESENTATIVE SET 
OF EMOTION TERMS 
Since emotions cannot be defined by necessary and sufficient features, it is not 
possible to first clearly define the domain of emotion terms and then 
representatively sample from that domain. The emotion concept is rather 
organized as a prototype construct with a gradual shift from more to less 
prototypical emotion terms (e.g., Shaver et al., 1987). A free-listing task offers a 
simple and powerful way to identify the elements of a prototypically organized 
construct, because prototypical exemplars of a category come more readily to 
mind when the category is activated (e.g., Bernard, 2006). This method has often 
been used to identify emotion terms (e.g., Van Goozen & Frijda, 1993). An 
important limitation of previous studies is however the use of predominantly 
(psychology) student samples. Because students are sophisticated and 
especially psychology students might have been influenced by the psychological 
theories the research intents to investigate, the generalizability to a non-student 
population still remains to be demonstrated. In the current study, a free-listing 
task was applied to a large sample of middle childhood up to early adulthood 
participants representing various levels of education. 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
In total, 5071 Dutch-speaking children and adolescents from the second year of 
primary school up to the last year of secondary school participated in the 
research (53.2% females, Mage = 13.55, SDage = 3.12, 32.5% primary school 
children). 
 
Procedure and free-listing task 
A heterogeneous pool of private and state schools from the Dutch-speaking part 
of Belgium (i.e., Brussels and the Flemish region) was contacted by four trained 
research assistants of Ghent University. If a school agreed to participate, class 
teachers were informed on the purpose and design of the study. During regular 
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school hours, class teachers administered a paper and pencil questionnaire 
following specific guidelines (e.g., a procedure for responding to questions). 
Participation of pupils was anonymous and was based on passive consent. 
Pupils were first instructed to fill out demographic information. Then they were 
asked to write down as many emotion and feeling words and expressions as they 
could think of during a period of ten minutes. Based on a small pilot study, the 
term “emotie” (emotion) and the term “gevoel” (feeling) were both used in the 
instructions to make the task easier to understand, especially for the primary 
school children. 
 
RESULTS 
Identifying the prototypical emotion terms 
The participants generated in total 124886 utterings. This extensive qualitative 
material was coded in four subsequent steps. In a first step, a selection was 
made by identifying those utterings that were mentioned by at least 50 
respondents (or approximately 1% of the respondents). In a second step, the 
selected utterings were organized in categories by assigning all words with the 
same word stem and comparable meaning to the same category (e.g., happy, 
happily and happiness were all considered as members of the category happy). 
In total, 269 categories were identified and 89413 utterings (or 72% of all 
utterings) were coded in one of these categories.2 In a third step, all utterings of 
the same participant that were coded in the same category were considered as a 
single uttering, leading to 84660 coded utterings (or 68%). In a last step, the list 
of 269 categories was reduced to a list of only emotion terms using a committee 
approach. Categories that referred to a single emotion component on the basis of 
the componential emotion theory (e.g., Scherer, 2009), such as “warm” (bodily 
sensation) and “laughing” (facial expression), to aspects of the antecedent 
situation, like “family” and “school”, or to personality characteristics, as for 
instance “arrogance”, were excluded. Judgements were first made independently 
by three emotion researchers. In case of disagreement, the final decision was 
made at a committee meeting together with two additional emotion researchers. 
In this way, a list of 74 categories containing only emotion terms was identified 
(see Table 1). 
                                                          
2
 It was possible that an uttering contained information about more than one category. 
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Table 1 
Frequency and Proportion of the 74 Emotion Words in the Free Listing Task 
Dutch term English translation Frequency (Proportion) 
blij joyful 4097 (.81) 
boos angry 3390 (.67) 
verdrietig sad 3341 (.66) 
bang afraid 2215 (.44) 
verliefd in love 2189 (.43) 
gelukkig happy 1895 (.37) 
liefde love 1696 (.33) 
droevig sorrowful 1525 (.30) 
kwaad mad 1375 (.27) 
woedend infuriated 1365 (.27) 
angstig fearful 1172 (.23) 
haat hate 1026 (.20) 
jaloers jealous 936 (.19) 
verlegen shy 916 (.18) 
zenuwachtig flustered 915 (.18) 
eenzaam lonely 892 (.18) 
ongelukkig unhappy 868 (.17) 
triest triste 793 (.16) 
vrolijk cheerful 790 (.16) 
depressief depressed 712 (.14) 
verbaasd astonished 625 (.12) 
teleurgesteld disappointed 605 (.12) 
gestresseerd stressed 508 (.10) 
beschaamd ashamed 492 (.10) 
geschrokken scared 492 (.10) 
verveeld bored 487 (.10) 
gekwetst hurt 445 (.09) 
nieuwsgierig curious 384 (.08) 
opgewekt lively 375 (.07) 
geluk bliss 371 (.07) 
vreugde delight 345 (.07) 
geïrriteerd irritated 321 (.06) 
trots proud 319 (.06) 
verward confused 319 (.06) 
ontgoocheld disillusioned 317 (.06) 
twijfel doubt 304 (.06) 
opgelucht relieved 304 (.06) 
Note: Emotion terms that overlap with the GRID terms are in italics. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Frequency and Proportion of the 74 Emotion Words in the Free Listing Task 
Dutch term English translation Frequency (Proportion) 
verrast surprised 301 (.06) 
razend raging 299 (.06) 
vertrouwen trust 280 (.06) 
plezier pleasure 260 (.05) 
woest fuming 256 (.05) 
tevreden satisfied 245 (.05) 
enthousiast enthusiastic 240 (.05) 
schuldig guilty 238 (.05) 
fier proud 221 (.04) 
gefrustreerd frustrated 218 (.04) 
ongerust anxious 214 (.04) 
ontroerd moved 186 (.04) 
euforisch euphoric 185 (.04) 
verlangen longing 181 (.04) 
vervelend uncomfortable 177 (.04) 
treurig mournful 171 (.03) 
verwonderd amazed 168 (.03) 
spijt regret 165 (.03) 
bezorgd worried 159 (.03) 
hoop hope 150 (.03) 
medeleven sympathy 140 (.03) 
medelijden compassion 119 (.02) 
ongeduldig impatient 113 (.02) 
wanhopig desperate 109 (.02) 
geïnteresseerd interested 106 (.02) 
content content 95 (.02) 
furieus furious 87 (.02) 
verontwaardigd indignant 86 (.02) 
chagrijnig miserable 83 (.02) 
nijdig cross 72 (.01) 
neerslachtig dejected 66 (.01) 
gechoqueerd shocked 65 (.01) 
afgunstig envious 64 (.01) 
ontevreden dissatisfied 63 (.01) 
hopeloos hopeless 62 (.01) 
onschuldig innocent 58 (.01) 
heimwee homesick 57 (.01) 
Note: Emotion terms that overlap with the GRID terms are in italics. 
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In total, 44880 of the 84660 uniquely coded utterings (or 53%) were coded in one 
of the 74 emotion categories, each labelled with a single emotion term. Of these 
74 terms, five terms clearly imply appraisals of suddenness and unexpectedness 
of the emotional event, namely verbaasd (astonished), geschrokken (scared), 
verrast (surprised), verwonderd (amazed) and gechoqueerd (shocked). Thus, 7% 
of the emotion categories were surprise-related, which is more than the 4% in the 
GRID research. Moreover, further inspection showed that explicit interpersonal 
emotion terms represented 15% of the total number of emotion terms (compared 
to 33% in the GRID research), namely verliefd (in love), liefde (love), haat (hate), 
jaloers (jealous), verlegen (shy), eenzaam (lonely), beschaamd (ashamed), 
gekwetst (hurt), schuldig (guilty), medeleven (sympathy) and medelijden 
(compassion). 
 
Age and gender differences in the number of utterings, number of coded 
non-emotions and number of coded emotions 
Three regression analyses were performed to examine age and gender 
differences in predicting (1) the total number of utterings, (2) the number of coded 
non-emotion terms and (3) the number of coded emotion terms (see Table 2). 
Both the main effect of age and gender as well as the interaction effect between 
age and gender were significant for predicting the total number of utterings (see 
Figure 1a) and the number of coded emotion terms (see Figure 1c). Older 
participants reported more utterings and more emotion terms than younger 
participants, girls reported more utterings and more emotion terms than boys, 
and the age effect was more pronounced for girls than for boys. For the number 
of coded non-emotion terms, only the effect of gender and the interaction effect 
with age was significant. Girls reported more non-emotion terms than boys. 
Moreover, girls report more non-emotion terms with increasing age, while there is 
a tendency for boys to report fewer non-emotion terms with increasing age (see 
Figure 1b). 
 
  
Table 2 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses on the Number of Utterings, the Number of Non-Emotion Terms, and the Number of Emotion Terms 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
 Number of utterings  Number of non-emotions  Number of emotions 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1   Model 2 
Variable β t  β t  β t  β t  β t  β t 
Age .19 14.25***  .13 6.54***  .02 1.04  -.03 -1.61  .26 19.78***  .14 7.51*** 
Gender .14 10.19***  -.14 -2.37*  .14 9.92***  -.06 -.95  .22 16.83***  -.29 -4.91*** 
Age x Gender    .30 4.79***     .21 3.27**     .54 8.95*** 
Adj. R2  .06   .06   .02   .02   .12   .13 
Δ R2  .06   .00   .02   .00   .12   .01 
F for change in R2  152.91***   22.93***   49.72***   10.68**   336.21***   80.17*** 
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Figure 1. Number of utterings (a), number of non-emotions (b) and number of 
emotions (c) for boys and girls and for age.  
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
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STUDY 2: THE DIMENSIONAL REPRESENTATION OF PERCEIVED 
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN EMOTION TERMS 
 
The similarity sorting task is one of the most commonly used methods to study 
the cognitive representation of the emotion domain (e.g., Russell & Bullock, 1986; 
Shaver et al., 1987). In this task, emotion terms are sorted in piles of similarity 
without priming any emotion feature. Despite its frequent use in the literature, 
none of the previous studies has ever revealed a novelty dimension. It is 
possible, though, that methodological limitations of the similarity sorting task have 
prevented the novelty dimension to emerge. 
There are at least three such possible limitations. A first limitation is 
mutual dependency. The pairwise similarity is calculated as the frequency with 
which a pair of words is sorted into the same pile. This frequency does not only 
depend on the perceived similarity between the two words but also on the other 
words that are included in the similarity task. For instance, the unpredictability 
aspect implied by the emotion term shocked might have gone unnoticed as it is 
likely to be sorted in a pile with fear-related terms such as anxiety. A second 
limitation is the partial lack of differentiation. Emotion terms that are closely 
related in meaning are likely to be sorted in the same pile. However, when terms 
are not sorted in the same pile, it can both mean that they are unrelated or have 
an opposite meaning. A third limitation is unreliability. The less reliable the 
observed similarities, the less likely multidimensional scaling (MDS) techniques 
will identify the actual dimensionality of the domain. 
A similarity rating task can overcome these limitations. In a similarity 
rating task each pair of terms is rated on a response scale. Hence, there is no 
structural dependency between the pairwise similarities. Because a response 
scale is used, it is also possible to differentiate between terms that are unrelated 
in meaning and terms that have an opposite meaning. Moreover, the reliability of 
the similarity ratings can be investigated in a classical way. Possible problems 
with the reliability of the data can be easily detected before structural analyses 
are performed. The second study therefore uses a similarity rating task to 
investigate the cognitive structure of the emotion domain across children, 
adolescents, students and adults. 
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METHOD 
Pairwise similarity rating task 
A list of 85 Dutch terms3 was constructed by the following procedure. First, the 74 
emotion terms identified in the previous free-listing study were included. Second, 
we compared this set with the GRID terms used in the study of Fontaine et al. 
(2007). Only 2 out of the 24 GRID terms were not represented (see Table 1), 
namely walging (disgust) and minachting (contempt), and were added. Third, 
nine marker feeling terms were added to clarify the interpretation of the emotion 
dimensions, namely goed (good) and slecht (bad) for the valence dimension, 
sterk (strong) and zwak (weak) for the power dimension, and nerveus (nervous), 
actief (active), ontspannen (relaxed) and rustig (calm) for the arousal dimension. 
Moreover, vol van energie (full of energy) was added as separate though closely 
in meaning-related feeling term for actief (active). For the novelty dimension, no 
marker feeling terms could be identified. All terms were presented in their 
adjective forms. For 15 out of the 85 terms, no adjective form existed in Dutch, so 
these terms were presented with the qualifier “full of” (i.e., vertrouwen (trust) was 
replaced by vol van vertrouwen (full of trust); see Table 3). 
Combining all 85 terms with each other resulted in 3570 possible pairs. 
Because it was not feasible for a single participant to rate all pairs, 14 lists were 
created. Each list consisted of 307 pairs with 56 pairs that were included in all 14 
lists - and formed a common base across all participants4 - and 251 unique pairs 
that were randomly selected from the 3514 remaining pairs. The overlapping 
pairs were made by mutual combinations of the emotion terms bang (afraid), 
boos (angry), blij (joyful), verdrietig (sad), eenzaam (lonely), vol van liefde (full of 
love), geïrriteerd (irritated) and zenuwachtig (flustered) with the marker terms 
goed (good), slecht (bad), sterk (strong), zwak (weak), nerveus (nervous), actief 
(active), ontspannen (relaxed) and rustig (calm). 
 
                                                          
3
 No additional terms were selected because for each added term the pairwise similarities 
with all other terms had to be rated. Adding terms would have affected the feasibility of 
the pairwise similarity rating task. 
4
 A common base of terms was needed for technical reasons. In order to do MDS 
analyses with data from individual participants, some pairs had to be present for all 
participants. 
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Participants 
In total 1239 respondents participated on a voluntary and anonymous basis. 
Participants who made few differentiations were excluded from the final analyses 
(i.e., when they used the same response category in more than 90% of their 
responses). Using this criterion, 20 children and adolescents, 5 students and 30 
adults were removed. The remaining 1184 respondents, consisted of 270 
children and adolescents (54.1% female, Mage = 11.93, SDage = 1.94), 173 
students (86.1% female, Mage = 20.12, SDage = 3.06) and 741 adults (48.9% 
female, Mage = 38.50, SDage = 12.32). The child-adolescent sample consisted of 
primary (61.1%) and secondary (38.9%) schoolchildren. The student sample 
consisted of exclusively psychology students. In the adult sample, all education 
levels were represented (50.3% low, 22.0% middle and 27.7% high educated 
adults). 
 
Procedure 
Recruitment of the child-adolescent sample and the adult sample was made by 
psychology students of Ghent University for course credits. Students informed 
and encouraged eligible participants in their close environment to participate in 
the study. The student sample consisted of the psychology students who 
recruited the child-adolescent and adult samples. They were invited to participate 
anonymously in this study (without obligation and without receiving a reward). 
Upon agreement, participants (children, adolescents, adults and students) were 
directed to a protected web page on which they first had to declare their informed 
consent. After a few demographic characteristics, 1 of the 14 lists was randomly 
assigned. The participants had to rate on an implicit bipolar 6-point response 
scale (do not at all agree to fully agree; Russell & Carroll, 1999) to which extent 
they agreed that the terms of each pair were alike (for example jealous and hurt 
are alike). Pairs were shown on separate screens and rated one by one. 
 
RESULTS 
Reliability of the similarities 
The pairwise similarity judgements across the 307 pairs of terms for the 14 
administered lists were reliable. Average Cronbach’s αs ranged from .98 for the 
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adult sample over .94 for the student sample5 to .83 for the child-adolescent 
sample, with an average value of .98 across all respondents and versions.  
 
Selection of the most parsimonious dimensionality 
The dimensional representation was first investigated for the complete sample. 
Configurations were computed using non-metrical MDS on the average 
similarities across all respondents with the PROXCAL procedure of SPSS 
statistics 19. In MDS, the emotion terms are represented as points in a 
geometrical space in such a way that the distances between the points reflect the 
empirical similarities between the terms as accurately as possible. The 
dimensionality was selected by an examination of the fit indices, the scree plot 
and the interpretability (e.g., Borg & Groenen, 1997). 
The proportion of variance in the observed average similarities accounted 
for by the distances in a one- up to a ten-dimensional configuration was .64, .75, 
.83, .87, .90, .91, .92, .93, .93 and .94, respectively. As each respondent 
evaluated 307 of the 3570 pairs, it was also possible to investigate the fit of the 
dimensional representation with respect to the similarity ratings of each individual 
participant. A one- up to a ten-dimensional representation accounted on average 
for .30%, .35%, .38%, .40%, .41%, .42%, .42%, .43%, .43%, and .43%, 
respectively, of the individual similarity ratings. The scree plot gave no 
unequivocal indication for the dimensionality of the configuration since there was 
no clear inflexion point.  
The a priori expected four-dimensional structure fitted the data well. It 
accounted for 87% of the average similarities and on average for 40% of the 
individual similarity ratings. From the fifth to the tenth dimension, mainly single 
words or pairs of words were further differentiated, namely beschaamd 
(ashamed), schuldig (guilty), trots (proud), fier (proud), onschuldig (innocent), 
verveeld (bored), opgelucht (relieved), nieuwsgierig (curious) and hopeloos 
(hopeless). Therefore, we restricted our attention to one-, two-, three- and four-
dimensional representations of the similarities. 
 
Interpretation of the dimensions 
                                                          
5
 Preliminary results of the student sample have been reported elsewhere (Fontaine & 
Veirman, 2013). 
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As predicted, the dimensions in the four-dimensional representation could be 
interpreted as valence, power, arousal, and novelty. The first valence dimension 
opposed emotion terms from vrolijk (cheerful) to ontevreden (dissatified) (see 
Table 3).6 All marker items were differentiated on this dimension with ontspannen 
(relaxed), goed (good), rustig (calm), actief (active), vol van energie (full of 
energy), and sterk (strong) on the positive side, and slecht (bad), zwak (weak), 
and nerveus (nervous) on the negative side. The second power dimension 
opposed emotion terms from furieus (furious) to verlegen (shy). With respect to 
the marker items, sterk (strong) and zwak (weak) were the most strongly 
contrasted. The third dimension represented the arousal dimension with the most 
differentiating marker items being ontspannen (relaxed), rustig (calm), and 
nerveus (nervous).7 Ongeduldig (impatient) and zenuwachtig (flustered) were 
most opposed to onschuldig (innocent) and minachting (contempt) on this 
dimension. For the final novelty dimension, all surprise terms (i.e., verrast 
(surprised), verwonderd (amazed), gechoqueerd (shocked), geschrokken 
(scared), and verbaasd (astonished) were situated at the positive pole, whereas 
for instance the terms verveeld (bored), eenzaam (lonely), and jaloers (jealous) 
were located at the negative pole. No marker items showed the highest or 
second highest coordinate on this dimension. Moreover, a comparison of the 
four-dimensional representation with the one- up to the three-dimensional 
representation showed that only valence is represented in the one-dimensional 
representation (rvalence4_valence1 = .983), only valence and power are represented in 
the two-dimensional representation (rvalence4_valence2 = .992 and rpower4_power2 = .957, 
respectively), and valence, power and a combination of arousal and novelty are 
represented in the three-dimensional representation (rvalence4_valence3 = .997, 
rpower4_power3 = .986, rarousal4_arousal3 = .881 and rnovelty4_arousal3 = .322, respectively).  
                                                          
6
 To investigate whether the marker terms themselves had an influence on the emotion 
structure, a four-dimensional structure was computed on only the 76 emotion terms. 
After orthogonal Procrustes rotation the dimensions of this 76-words structure 
correlated .999, .997, .994, and .966, respectively, with the dimensions of the 85-words 
structure. This implies that the reported four-dimensional structure is not affected by the 
inclusion of the marker terms. 
7
 Contrary to the expectation, both actief (active) and vol van energie (full of energy) 
showed higher coordinates on the power and valence dimension than on the arousal 
dimension. 
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Table 3 
Coordinates of the 85 Terms in a Four-Dimensional Representation 
Dutch term English translation Dim1 Dim2 Dim3 Dim4 
vrolijk cheerful -.79 -.11 -.01 .02 
vol van plezier full of pleasure -.79 -.09 -.01 .09 
vol van geluk full of bliss -.78 .02 -.01 -.02 
content content -.78 -.05 -.07 -.11 
vol van vreugde delighted -.78 -.10 .00 -.02 
tevreden satisfied -.78 .00 -.12 -.08 
blij joyful -.77 -.03 -.02 .01 
gelukkig happy -.77 -.02 -.05 -.06 
ontspannen relaxed -.74 .08 -.31 -.22 
euforisch euphoric -.73 -.25 .15 -.05 
vol van vertrouwen full of trust -.73 -.12 -.10 -.32 
opgewekt lively -.73 -.13 .13 .00 
enthousiast enthusiastic -.73 -.14 .14 .10 
goed good -.72 .14 -.12 .00 
fier proud -.71 -.26 -.16 -.20 
opgelucht relieved -.69 -.03 -.39 .01 
trots proud -.67 -.26 -.19 -.15 
vol van liefde full of love -.65 .17 .09 -.10 
hoopvol hopeful -.65 .10 .13 -.25 
geïnteresseerd interested -.63 .13 .28 .20 
vol van energie energetic -.60 -.32 .12 .02 
rustig calm -.58 .25 -.39 -.35 
verliefd in love -.57 .12 .23 -.06 
actief active -.55 -.36 .20 .06 
sterk strong -.53 -.37 -.15 .00 
vol van verlangen longing -.50 .02 .26 -.28 
bang afraid .38 .33 .38 .04 
vol van twijfel doubtful .41 .37 .27 .09 
angstig fearful .44 .24 .38 .11 
vervelend uncomfortable .45 -.24 .32 -.44 
triest triste .46 .29 -.25 -.12 
vol van walging disgusted .46 -.41 -.41 .28 
vol van spijt full of regret .47 .45 -.20 .25 
kwaad mad .47 -.37 -.02 .15 
droevig sorrowful .48 .33 -.25 -.08 
verdrietig sad .48 .31 -.17 -.04 
hopeloos hopeless .48 .27 .09 -.34 
treurig mournful .48 .34 -.23 -.11 
geïrriteerd irritated .48 -.35 .23 -.07 
gekwetst hurt .49 .06 -.21 .10 
teleurgesteld disappointed .50 .09 -.42 -.01 
wanhopig desperate .50 .29 .18 -.22 
boos angry .51 -.37 -.09 .10 
Note: For each emotion term and marker term the highest absolute coordinate is 
placed in boldface. For each marker term the expected highest absolute 
coordinate is underlined. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Coordinates of the 85 Terms in a Four-Dimensional Representation 
Dutch term English translation Dim1 Dim2 Dim3 Dim4 
ontgoocheld disillusioned .51 .13 -.36 .09 
schuldig guilty .51 .04 .37 .48 
gefrustreerd frustrated .52 -.20 .12 -.03 
ongelukkig unhappy .57 .13 -.12 -.13 
neerslachtig dejected .58 .27 -.09 -.17 
slecht bad .58 -.32 -.13 -.22 
depressief depressed .60 .20 -.01 -.31 
ontevreden dissatisfied .62 -.06 -.12 -.11 
furieus furious .28 -.60 .01 .27 
razend raging .40 -.58 -.02 .22 
vol van haat full of hate .47 -.57 -.24 -.02 
woest fuming .44 -.54 -.05 .18 
nijdig cross .44 -.53 .05 -.05 
woedend infuriated .43 -.50 .02 .20 
chagrijnig miserable .48 -.48 .07 -.23 
afgunstig envious .41 -.42 -.30 -.34 
bezorgd worried .06 .41 .30 .19 
zwak weak .36 .50 .10 -.28 
ontroerd moved -.24 .50 -.28 .02 
vol van medeleven full of sympathy -.31 .61 -.16 .10 
beschaamd ashamed .26 .61 .12 .37 
vol van medelijden full of compassion .01 .63 -.36 .30 
verlegen shy -.05 .65 .33 -.12 
onschuldig innocent -.29 .26 -.60 .07 
vol van minachting full of contempt .39 -.39 -.55 -.11 
gestresseerd stressed .27 -.15 .48 -.01 
ongerust anxious .32 .22 .49 .06 
nieuwsgierig curious -.48 .02 .53 .15 
nerveus nervous .17 -.08 .54 .10 
zenuwachtig flustered .07 -.03 .54 .00 
ongeduldig impatient .08 -.24 .55 -.19 
verveeld bored .38 -.07 .20 -.61 
vol van heimwee homesick .20 .44 -.05 -.51 
eenzaam lonely .36 .31 -.20 -.46 
jaloers jealous .37 -.39 .05 -.40 
verward confused .30 .19 .22 .33 
verontwaardigd indignant .34 -.05 -.34 .38 
verrast surprised -.45 -.05 .03 .49 
verwonderd amazed -.35 .06 -.12 .55 
gechoqueerd shocked .30 -.12 -.20 .55 
geschrokken scared .19 .08 .04 .60 
verbaasd astonished -.14 .12 -.11 .62 
Note: For each emotion term and marker term the highest absolute coordinate is 
placed in boldface. For each marker term the expected highest absolute 
coordinate is underlined. 
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Differences in fit of the dimensional representation between and within 
samples 
For each of the three samples separately, average similarities were computed 
and an MDS with four dimensions was executed. For each participant, the 
difference in fit of the sample-specific structure and the overall structure was 
computed. Three one-sample t-tests showed no significant difference in fit for the 
adult sample, Mdifference = −0.0005, t(740) = −1.22, p = .22; a minor difference in fit 
for the student sample, Mdifference = 0.0042, t(172) = 2.69, p < .01, with the total 
structure fitting slightly better than the sample specific structure; and no 
significant difference in fit for the child-adolescent sample, Mdifference = 0.0021, 
t(269) = 1.06, p = .29. Thus, the overall structure did either not differ in fit or fitted 
even slightly better than the sample-specific structures. 
Three analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed to examine 
differences in fit of the four-dimensional solution within samples with respect to 
gender (all samples), age (child-adolescent sample and adult sample) and 
education level (adult sample). For the child-adolescent sample, a significant 
effect of age in favor of older children was observed, F(5, 258) = 5.50, p < .001 
(partial η² = .10). There was no significant effect of gender, F(1, 258) = .12, p = 
.73, and no significant interaction effect of age and gender, F(5, 258) = .73, p = 
.60. For the student sample, there was no significant effect of gender, F(1, 171) = 
.02, p = .90. For the adult sample, there was a significant effect of age in favor of 
older participants, F(1, 732) = 4.95, p < .05, but the size of that effect was very 
small (partial η² < .01). There was no significant effect of gender, F(1, 732) = 
1.28, p = .26. We observed a significant but small effect of education in favor of 
higher educated adults, F(3, 732) = 4.99, p < .01 (partial η² = .02). The interaction 
effect between gender and education was not significant, F(3, 732) = .19, p = .90. 
 
Differences in salience of the dimensions between and within samples 
We further investigated whether participants in each of the three samples differed 
with respect to the salience of each of the four dimensions (i.e., how important 
each dimension is in determining the similarity judgements between the emotion 
terms). We executed a weighted non-metrical MDS across all respondents with 
the PROXCAL procedure of SPSS statistics 19. In this analysis, the weights of 
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each of the four dimensions were allowed to vary from participant to participant.8 
The higher a dimension weight the higher its salience. It is important to note that 
the weights generated by the weighted MDS are not independent from one 
another. If the weight of one dimension increases, the weights of one or more of 
the other dimensions will tend to decrease. Four ANOVAs showed a significant 
difference between samples in the salience of valence (Mchild-adolescent sample = 
2.757; Mstudent sample = 3.103; Madult sample = 3.091), F(2, 1181) = 77.00, p < .001 
(partial η² = .12), power (Mchild-adolescent sample = 3.703; Mstudent sample = 3.513; Madult 
sample = 3.513), F(2, 1181) = 16.77, p < .001 (partial η² = .03), arousal (Mchild-
adolescent sample = 4.127; Mstudent sample = 3.883; Madult sample = 3.807), F(2, 1181) = 
34.66, p < .001 (partial η² = .06), and novelty (Mchild-adolescent sample = 4.104; Mstudent 
sample = 3.795; Madult sample = 3.842), F(2, 1181) = 20.17, p < .001 (partial η² = .03). 
Post hoc tests showed that these differences were situated between the child-
adolescent sample on the one hand and the student and adult samples on the 
other hand. There were no significant differences between the student and the 
adult sample. In general, the relative salience of the valence dimension is 
increasing, while the relative salience of the other three dimensions is decreasing 
from childhood to adulthood. 
Finally, a series of simple regression analyses was performed to examine 
differences in the salience of the four dimensions within samples with respect to 
gender (all samples), age (child-adolescent sample and adult sample) and 
education level (adult sample) (see Table 4). In none of the samples, gender 
made a contribution to predicting the salience of the four dimensions. For the 
child-adolescent sample, age was a significant predictor for the salience of 
valence, power, arousal and novelty. In line with the differences between 
samples, older participants showed a higher salience of valence and a lower 
salience of power, arousal and novelty. In the adult sample, older participants 
showed a slightly lower salience of arousal. Moreover, higher education was 
significantly related to a slightly higher salience of valence and lower salience of 
arousal. 
                                                          
8
 The coordinates of the replicated MDS were used as the coordinates of the overall 
structure in the weighted MDS. 
  
Table 4  
Simple Regression Analyses on the Salience of Valence, Power, Arousal, and Novelty in the Three Samples 
Note: Education was represented as two dummy variables, middle and high educated, with the low educated group serving as the 
reference group. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
  Valence  Power  Arousal   Novelty 
Sample Variable β t  β t  β t  β t 
Child-adolescent sample Age .22 3.63***  -.14 -2.18*  -.18 -2.98**  -.16 -2.53* 
 Gender .01 .14  -.00 -.02  -.03 -.41  .07 1.12 
 R2  .05   .02   .04   .03 
 F  6.99**   2.48   4.97**   3.40* 
Student sample Gender -.10 -1.33  .09 1.18  .11 1.46  .05 .59 
 R2  .01   .01   .01   .00 
 F  1.77   1.40   2.12   .35 
Adult sample Age .03 .77  .00 .02  -.10 -2.76**  -.01 -.38 
 Gender .04 1.04  .01 .13  -.04 -1.08  -.06 -1.54 
 Middle educated .05 1.19  .01 .16  -.06 -1.55  -.02 -.42 
 High educated .11 2.71**  -.05 -1.16  -.11 -2.80**  -.05 -1.18 
 R2  .13   .00   .02   .01 
 F  2.39*   .43   4.49**   1.03 
Chapter 4  105 
 
DISCUSSION 
The present research aimed at investigating the status of the recently identified 
novelty dimension in the GRID research. A first free-listing study identified the 
emotion terms that came most readily to mind in an extensive middle childhood 
up to early adulthood sample. A subsequent similarity rating study identified the 
cognitive representation of the emotion domain in children, adolescents, 
students, and adults without priming emotion features. 
 
Surprise terms and novelty 
The free-listing study showed that 7% of the most frequently reported emotion 
terms by a middle childhood up to early adulthood sample shared a surprise-
related meaning (i.e., astonished, scared, surprised, amazed and shocked) and 
that 24.6% of the respondents mentioned at least one of these surprise terms. 
This is in line with previous free-listing research in which the emotion term 
surprise was on average reported by 19.5% of English, Dutch, French and Italian 
speaking psychology students in seven countries (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Van 
Goozen & Frijda, 1993). Since only 4% of the terms had a surprise-related 
meaning in the GRID research (i.e., surprise), the emergence of the novelty 
dimension cannot be attributed to an overrepresentation of surprise-related 
emotion terms in the GRID research.  
The similarity rating study also showed that the emergence of novelty in 
the GRID research was neither elicited by a disproportionate representation of 
novelty-related features nor by the reliance on student samples. Here we find that 
novelty even emerged when no emotion features are primed. Moreover, this 
dimension is not only observed in the typical student sample but also in the child-
adolescent sample and the adult sample including participants with varying 
education levels.  
The finding of a novelty dimension fits both basic emotion theories and 
appraisal emotion theories. There is a long-standing tradition in basic emotion 
research to consider surprise as a separate basic emotion (e.g., Ekman & 
Friesen, 1971; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1982; Izard, 1977; McDougall, 1926; 
Plutchik, 2002; Tomkins, 1984). The emergence of a separate dimension on 
which surprise terms are differentiated highlights the distinctiveness of surprise in 
the emotion domain. According to the major appraisal theories, the appraisal of 
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novelty (also referred to as for instance suddenness, change, familiarity, or 
unexpectedness) plays a central role in the appraisal system (e.g., Frijda, 1986; 
Roseman, 1984; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1984, 2009; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; and for a recent overview Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, & Frijda, 
2013). Our research demonstrated that novelty is not only a specific dimension in 
the appraisal system but also more generally affects how emotions are 
cognitively structured. In line with Mandler’s (1975) theorizing, the current 
research finds evidence for the central role of novelty in the emotion domain.  
 
Interpersonal terms and power  
The current investigation also sheds some light on the power and arousal 
dimensions. When the data were represented in a two-dimensional solution, only 
valence and power emerged. Also in previous research on the connotative 
meaning (Osgood et al., 1975) and in the GRID research (Fontaine et al., 2007; 
Fontaine & Scherer, 2013) power emerged as the second dimension. The 
inclusion of explicit interpersonally oriented emotion terms in the current research 
may have contributed to the emergence of power as the second dimension and 
arousal as the third dimension (e.g., full of hate and full of compassion are highly 
differentiated on this dimension). Nevertheless, there was no overrepresentation 
of these interpersonal terms, as they were empirically selected on the basis of an 
extensive free-listing task. Moreover, only 15% of the selected emotion terms 
were explicitly interpersonally oriented, and some of these terms had higher 
coordinates (in absolute values) on the arousal than on the power dimension 
(e.g., in love). So these interpersonally oriented terms also contributed to the 
emergence of the arousal dimension. As especially anger-related terms are 
differentiated on the power dimension, it can be hypothesized that differentiating 
fear and sadness from anger is cognitively more fundamental than differentiating 
low- from high-aroused emotion terms.  
 
Age and gender 
The findings with respect to age can be interpreted in terms of the classic 
developmental concepts of differentiation and integration (e.g., Werner, 1957), 
which recently gained renewed interest in developmental research on cognitive 
change (e.g., Siegler & Chen, 2008). Differentiation refers to the process of 
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distinguishing entities that were not distinguished before (through for example 
explanation, cumulative experiences, or a single dramatic experience). 
Integration represents the combining of entities into a problem-solving approach 
(such as a strategy, an algorithm, or a rule). Our free-listing research illustrates 
that the number and range of emotion terms broaden and become more fine-
grained as children grow older. Furthermore, the similarity rating study showed 
more reliable pairwise similarities for adults and students than for children and 
adolescents and an age effect within the children and adolescent sample with 
older participants representing the emotion terms more accurately along the four 
dimensions. Moreover, the fact that the differences in fit between the sample-
specific representations and the overall four-dimensional representation were 
negligible indicates that people become more accurate along the lines of the 
same four dimensions as they grow older, that is, they get better in distinguishing 
the relations between emotion concepts. These more complex and accurate 
emotion representations thus point to an increased differentiation. 
The weighted MDS revealed a robust, but counter-intuitive effect: the 
relative salience of valence increased compared to the relative salience of the 
other three dimensions among older participants.9 This is the first study to 
observe this age effect. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study in 
the domain of dimensional emotion research that addressed the same issue in 
the past. In a study among 8- to 12-year-old children, Russell and Ridgeway 
(1983) found no differences between the younger and older children with respect 
to the salience of valence and arousal. They, however, used a less sensitive 
similarity sorting task. In the current study, the increased salience of valence 
compared to the other three dimensions is a robust finding. It is both observed 
within the child-adolescent sample and when comparing the child-adolescent 
sample with the student and adult samples. It is a counter-intuitive finding, 
though, as one may have expected that with increased differentiation higher 
dimensions are not only used more accurately but also become more salient in 
differentiating emotion terms. Yet, this finding fits the robust phenomenon in 
                                                          
9
 As the dimension weights generated by the weighted MDS are not independent from 
one another, the current findings do not mean that older participants use power, arousal 
and novelty less than younger participants, but that they use these dimensions less 
compared to valence. 
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emotion research that valence is a basic building block of our emotional life (e.g., 
Barrett, 2006). The current finding could mean that as children and adolescents 
grow older they start to understand better how at first sight very different emotion 
processes, such as for instance fear and sadness, resemble one another in terms 
of their hedonic tone. Developmentally, this observation could then be interpreted 
as a cognitive integration of the emotion domain along the valence dimension. 
Further research is needed to clarify this unexpected developmental 
phenomenon. 
For the gender differences a more complex picture emerged. Although 
girls reported more emotion terms and emotion-related utterings than boys - a 
difference that increased with age - we found no gender differences at all in 
accuracy of the cognitive representation, nor did we find gender differences in the 
salience of the four dimensions, even not in the large adult sample. This means 
that we can exclude gender differences in underlying cognitive ability in the 
emotion domain as an explanation for why women report more emotion terms 
and emotion-related utterings. Social expectations, personality, and interests 
form more likely explanations. Culture and society promote specific gender 
stereotypes of the way boys and girls are expected to deal with their emotions. 
Girls are tuned towards more excitable and emotionally-oriented behavior, 
whereas this type of behavior is less socially accepted for boys, who ought to be 
tough and reserved (e.g., Best, 2010). Cross-cultural research among 55 nations 
also showed that women generally express more neuroticism, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness than men (Schmitt, Realo, Voracek, & 
Allik, 2008). Moreover, women tend to be more interested in people/family-
oriented careers, whereas men are more interested in things/ideas-oriented 
careers (Wai, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2005). The absence of gender differences in 
the dimensional representation supports the robustness of the four-dimensional 
structure. 
It can be concluded that the current research further substantiates the 
evidence for a fourth novelty dimension in the cognitive representation of the 
emotion domain. The novelty dimension is also observable in children and 
adolescents and in men and women from different walks of life using a simple 
similarity rating task with a representative set of emotion terms. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
On the Bipolarity of Emotional Intelligence: A Bottom-up Approach to the 
Assessment of Ability Emotional Intelligence in Youth1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The scoring of ability emotional intelligence tests, that is, expert and consensus 
scoring, has been vigorously debated because the link between variation in 
responses to emotion-related questions and true variation in emotional 
intelligence remains unclear. So far, no studies attempted to examine raw 
responses. In the current research, we therefore investigated the internal 
structure at item level for raw responses of rating-based ability emotional 
intelligence tests and hypothesized that these responses would be predominantly 
structured by two factors: a bipolar emotional intelligence factor (on which 
incorrect items have negative loadings and correct items have positive loadings), 
and a unipolar acquiescence factor (on which all items have positive loadings). 
This was investigated in two studies via Procrustes rotations of exploratory factor 
structures to hypothetical target structures: in Study 1 (N = 630) for the rating-
based perceiving emotions, facilitating thoughts, and managing emotions tests of 
the youth version of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test 
(MSCEIT-YV), in Study 2 (N = 664) additionally for a rating version of the 
MSCEIT-YV’s understanding test and supplementary sets of items for perceiving 
emotions, facilitating thoughts, and managing emotions. Procrustes rotations 
indicated proof for the existence and generalizability of the proposed structure for 
all rating-based tests. Finally, we examined the implications of these results for 
the status of emotional intelligence as a standard intelligence. Procrustes 
                                                          
1
 Veirman, E., & Fontaine, J. R. J. (manuscript in preparation). On the bipolarity of 
emotional intelligence: A bottom-up approach to the assessment of ability emotional 
intelligence in youth. 
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weighted component scores for all rating-based tests were factored in a higher-
order model with a general emotional intelligence factor and a general 
acquiescence factor. The nomological network (i.e., intelligence, personality, 
alexithymia, and social and emotional impairment), and gender and age 
differences were examined for both the general emotional intelligence factor 
scores and the general acquiescence factor scores and further supported the 
interpretation of these factors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the term emotional intelligence entered scientific literature (Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990), many theories have been proposed at the interface between 
existing psychological conceptualizations of emotion and intelligence. None of 
them gained as much attention as Mayer and Salovey’s (1997) four-branch 
model. This model views emotional intelligence as a broad intellective factor 
comprising four hierarchically organized branches of emotion-related abilities, 
each assumed to develop from early childhood onwards: (1) perceiving (i.e., 
accurately identifying emotions in one’s self and others’ (non-)verbal behavior), 
(2) facilitating (i.e., using emotions to enhance thinking and reasoning), (3) 
understanding (i.e., labeling emotions and recognizing relations and transitions 
among them), and (4) managing (i.e., successfully managing emotions in oneself 
and in others by maintaining or changing emotions).  
Empirical evidence for this model has primarily been gathered from the 
few available maximum performance measurements that assess these four 
emotion-related abilities: the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (MEIS; 
Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000), its successor the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso 
Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002), and a 
recently developed youth version thereof (MSCEIT-YV; Mayer, Salovey, & 
Caruso, 2015). These ability emotional intelligence measures differ from 
traditional intelligence measures in that they cannot rely on rule-bounded 
standards (such as mathematics, logic, reasoning, and semantics) that 
unequivocally indicate a correct-incorrect categorization of responses to emotion-
related questions (Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001). This Achilles’ heel has 
primarily been dealt with by use of two alternative scoring methods. In expert 
scoring, experts in the field of emotions are consulted to decide upon which 
responses are correct. The scoring key is here based on what groups of experts 
in the field agree on. However, experts may still disagree, and there are no 
hands-on criteria to choose who is an expert on this topic (Matthews, Roberts, & 
Zeidner, 2004). In this case, consensus scoring provides an attractive alternative. 
In consensus scoring, correct responses are identified on the basis of what large 
numbers of non-experts agree on. Thus, the scoring key is based on the 
responses of a norm group. This approach fits a long-standing research tradition 
in psychology showing its usefulness for measuring other non-standard 
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constructs, like emotion perception (Geher, Warner, & Brown, 2001; Mayer, 
DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990) and social insight (Legree, 1995). Moreover, this 
approach has also been applied to standard constructs such as general cognitive 
ability (Legree, Martin, & Psotka, 2000). It has now been succesfully used too in a 
considerable number of studies in the field of emotional intelligence (e.g., 
Barchard, Hensley, & Anderson, 2013; Legree, Psotka, Tremble, & Bourne, 2005; 
Mayer et al., 2000; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & 
Sitarenios, 2003; Zeidner, Shani-Zinovich, Matthews, & Roberts, 2005), and is 
currently seen as the closest approximation of correct answers in ability 
emotional intelligence measurement. Yet, despite its frequent use, it has been 
claimed that this type of scoring may not be a valid way of scoring intelligence 
items (Matthews et al., 2004). Other criteria (i.e., conceptual, correlational, and 
developmental) have been put forward to decide on the legitimacy of ability 
emotional intelligence as a form of intelligence (Mayer et al., 2000). In this 
context, Maul (2012a) recently called for a shift in focus towards causal 
explanations of item responses by considering an explanatory approach to the 
assessment of emotional intelligence. He argued that the application of current 
scoring techniques has prevented emotional intelligence theorists from 
attempting to clarify how variation in emotional intelligence may result in variation 
in specific item responses (Maul, 2012b). 
In the footsteps of these recommendations, the present research 
proposes an alternative framework to the traditional consensus scoring. In 
traditional consensus scoring, various algorithms (i.e., proportion, mode, lenient 
mode, distance, adjusted distance) are used to score ability emotional 
intelligence tests and calculate the overall match between a person’s set of 
responses and the identified scoring key (for an overview, see MacCann, 
Roberts, Matthews, & Zeidner, 2004). To our knowledge, no efforts have been 
made within the field of ability emotional intelligence to examine raw responses 
without applying consensus or other forms of scoring. Furthermore, there is a 
scarcity of studies that focus on an omnibus test of the four-branch emotional 
intelligence model in younger people. This type of research may be of particular 
importance because the developmental status of ability emotional intelligence 
has still to be precisely identified (Peters, Kranzler, & Rossen, 2009; Rivers et al., 
2012). The current research therefore sought to address these gaps in the 
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literature via a bottom-up examination of the internal structure of raw responses 
of rating-based ability emotional intelligence tests in youth in two studies: a first 
study is focussed on the MSCEIT-YV rating-based tests (perceiving, facilitating, 
and managing), a second study is additionally focussed on a rating version of the 
MSCEIT-YV multiple choice understanding test and supplementary sets of items 
for perceiving, facilitating, and managing. The strength and immediately also the 
primary purpose of taking this approach is to identify the structure inherent in the 
raw data, without potential restraints imposed by scoring methodologies. 
We begin with an overview of how the structure of ability emotional 
intelligence at item level can be conceived. Within this first part, we propose a 
bipolar emotional intelligence factor. We then identify acquiescence and 
multidimensionality as potential confounding variables. We close by discussing 
conceptual, correlational, and developmental criteria that are used to decide on 
ability emotional intelligence as an intelligence. 
 
The structure of ability emotional intelligence 
Bipolarity 
In his Personal construct theory, Kelly (1955) reasoned that all human thinking is 
bipolar in nature. In particular, he suggested that people make sense of their 
experiences and the world they live in by developing constructs that reflect 
internal ideas of reality. People engage in an anticipatory construing process of 
discriminating between objects, things and people that constitute our world. The 
simultaneous awareness of similarity and difference is considered essential in 
understanding these discriminations, thus, constructs are seen as bipolar. For 
example, if we want to decide whether a person is introvert or extravert we 
compare this person with others on a bipolar introversion to extraversion 
continuum according to his/her degree of introversion or extraversion. 
We may broaden this reasoning to the field of ability emotional 
intelligence. We could argue that people interpret a facial expression as anger 
because they recognise features that represent the presence of anger and do not 
see features that point to the absence of anger. Or that people say that a 
particular action is effective in regulating their emotions, because they are aware 
of aspects that are not effective in regulating their emotions. So, as people 
classify response options to emotion-related questions according to degrees of 
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(in)correctness, we expect bipolar emotional intelligence factors (i.e., with 
incorrect items showing negative loadings and correct items showing positive 
loadings) to emerge for rating-based ability emotional intelligence tests. For the 
four branches of emotional intelligence, we expect that these bipolar factors will 
be: (1) absent to present emotions in faces for perceiving, (2) incompatible to 
compatible emotion labels and sensations for facilitating, (3) incorrect to correct 
emotion definitions, transitions, and changes for understanding, and (4) 
ineffective to effective actions to regulate emotions for management. 
Rather than providing an in-depth analysis of the longstanding debate on 
traditional consensus scoring, or applying a scoring algorithm and matching 
people’s response profiles to a traditional consensus scoring key, we focus on 
the fundamental idea behind the use of consensus scoring. Moreover, we test 
whether this idea holds for the structure of raw responses of rating-based ability 
emotional intelligence tests. Legree (1995) argued that responses of experts and 
non-experts are equivalent, except that non-experts are less consistent than 
experts. Responses of non-experts are here conceived as entailing common 
(expert) variance and unique (random) variance, implying that expertise can be 
closely approximated by large numbers of non-experts. For the field of ability 
emotional intelligence, the basic idea of consensus scoring is that correctness of 
emotional responses can be represented as an abstraction of what people use in 
everyday life, that is the agreement between people themselves and the rest of 
the group all interacting in the same emotional system (MacCann et al., 2004).  
So, if this idea behind the use of consensus scoring is a valid way to 
approach correctness of responses to emotion-related questions, we believe that 
the loadings of the items on the expected bipolar emotional intelligence factors 
will mirror the mean item ratings. For each rating-based ability emotional 
intelligence test, this means that items that have a high mean score are thus 
considered correct in a consensus sample and will have positive loadings on the 
bipolar emotional intelligence factor. Similarly, items that have a low mean score 
are thus considered incorrect in a consensus sample and will have negative 
loadings on the bipolar emotional intelligence factor.  
 
Acquiescence 
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We furthermore consulted the work of Russell and Carroll (1999) on the bipolarity 
of positive and negative affect to adress possible confounds. Within the context of 
affect ratings, acquiescence - or the tendency to agree (or disagree) with 
particular response options on ordinal or Likert-type response scales regardless 
of the content of the items - has been studied systematically over many years. 
Moreover, this particular response bias has played a pivotal role in the debate 
concerning positive and negative affect as independent unipolar dimensions or 
as opposite poles of a bipolar dimension. It has been found robustly that 
acquiescence biases the resulting structure away from bipolarity towards two 
unipolar factors (e.g., Russell, 1979; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977). 
We argue that acquiescence likewise may conceal the emergence of the 
expected bipolar emotional intelligence factors for rating-based ability emotional 
intelligence tests. As acquiescence consists of the tendency to rate all items 
more positively or negatively independent of the content of the items, it can be 
expected that acquiescence will emerge as a separate factor in the factor 
structure of rating-based ability emotional intelligence tests, with all items loading 
positively on it. 
 
Multidimensionality 
Multidimensionality is another concern that caused considerable confusion in 
testing the bipolarity of affect (Russell & Carroll, 1999). A first initiative to examine 
multidimensionality in the area of rating-based ability emotional intelligence 
assessment has already been made by Føllesdal and Hagtvet (2009). Using the 
generalizability theory, they showed that a large part of the variance in traditional 
consensus scores for perceiving as measured by the MCSEIT is due to the 
interaction between persons and stimuli. They argue that this may indicate that 
not one, but several factors may underly the scores. Additional exploratory factor 
analysis on consensus scores of the rating-based Faces MCSEIT test provided 
indeed support for multidimensionality. Three emotion perception factors were 
found, that is, the absence of positive emotions in mostly sad faces, the absence 
of negative emotions in surprise and mostly sad faces, and the absence of 
negative emotions in happy faces. These factors reflect three sources of 
variance: (1) the distinction between happy and sad faces, (2) the distinction 
between positive and negative emotions, and (3) the distinction between present 
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and absent emotions. These results contrast the claim that consensus scores for 
perceiving are unidimensional (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Mayer et al., 2002). From 
this point of view, we consider it essentual to explore multidimensionality for all 
rating-based ability emotional intelligence tests. 
To summarize, in light of the above described framework on how raw 
responses of rating-based ability emotional intelligence tests may be structured, 
we believe that two factors exist for each branch: one bipolar emotional 
intelligence factor (with items having either positive or negative loadings on it), 
mirroring the mean item ratings, and one unipolar acquiescence factor (with all 
items loading positively on it). Moreover, it is still possible that additional factors 
too may emerge and indicate multidimensionality. To test the structure for each 
branch, we will rotate the exploratory structure towards a hypothetical target 
structure through Procrustes rotation. 
 
Implications for ability emotional intelligence as standard intelligence 
The internal structures we expect to emerge empirically from the raw data of 
each branch may provide necessary, yet, not sufficient evidence to consider 
ability emotional intelligence as a type of intelligence. Therefore, we further 
examine (1) conceptual, (2) correlational, and (3) developmental criteria that have 
been used to see whether emotional intelligence meets the traditional intelligence 
standards. 
 
Conceptual criterion 
The conceptual criterion states that an intelligence should consist of a set of 
moderately correlated mental abilities reflecting actual mental performance rather 
than preferred ways of behaving, self-esteem of a person, or other non-cognitive 
achievements (Mayer et al., 2000). Mayer et al. (2002) theorized that emotional 
intelligence entails four related abilities (perceiving, facilitating, understanding 
and managing), with increasing complexity from the first to the fourth (perceiving 
and facilitating are more sensation-oriented and relate to the basic-level direct 
processing of emotional information, whereas understanding and managing are 
more reason-oriented and relate to higher-level conscious or deliberate 
processing of emotional information). In the current research, the Procrustes 
weighted emotional intelligence component scores and the Procrustes weighted 
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acquiescence component scores for all rating-based tests will be therefore 
represented in a higher-order model with a general emotional intelligence factor 
and a general acquiescence factor. In this confirmatory two-factor model, both 
first-order factors are expected to be zero-correlated. It is further investigated 
whether the second-order emotional intelligence branch factors are moderately 
correlated with one another, empirically form a coherent factor, and show a 
hierarchical pattern of loadings on a general emotional intelligence factor from the 
first to the fourth branch. We will also inspect the mean correlations of these 
second-order bipolar emotional intelligence branch factors with intelligence 
measures. 
 
Correlational criterion 
According to the correlational criterion, an intelligence should express 
convergent, discriminant and predictive relationships. Ability emotional 
intelligence has been asserted to entail both crystallized and fluid components 
(Côté, 2010) and to be more closely related to verbal than nonverbal intelligence 
(Brody, 2004; MacCann et al., 2004). Furthermore, Mayer and Salovey (1993) 
stressed the distinctiveness of ability emotional intelligence from personality, with 
exception of openness for which they predict low correlations in alignment with 
the observation that many intelligences show this particular relation (r = .30; 
Ackermann & Heggestad, 1997). Ability emotional intelligence should also be 
correlated with cognate measures of emotional intelligence and it has been seen 
as relevant to psychological well-being and interpersonal functioning (Mayer, 
Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001). In the present research, we will examine 
the relationships for the general emotional intelligence factor scores and the 
general acquiescence factor scores with intelligence (verbal, performance, and 
general intelligence, and abstract reasoning), personality (neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness), alexithymia 
(difficulties in identifying feelings, difficulties in describing feelings, externally-
oriented thinking, an general alexithymia), and social- and emotional impairment 
(self-concept, anxiety, depression, anger, and disruptive behaviors). We believe a 
meaningful pattern of correlations for the general emotional intelligence factor 
scores will emerge, yet, not for the general acquiescence factor scores. 
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Developmental criterion 
The developmental criterion states that, based on Binet and Simon’ 
groundbreaking work, an intelligence should vary with age and experience (e.g., 
Brown, 1997; Carroll, 1993; Fancher, 1985). It has also been suggested that 
women are more emotionally intelligent than men (e.g., Lumley, Gustavson, 
Partridge, & Labouvie-Vief, 2005). In our research, we will examine whether the 
general emotional intelligence factor scores reveal progression with age and 
show gender differences in favor for girls. We will further explore whether age 
and gender differences may be observed for the general acquiescence factor 
scores. 
 
STUDY 1 
MATERIALS AND METHOD 
Participants and procedure 
The sample consisted of 630 Dutch-speaking children and adolescents between 
the ages of 10 and 17 years from the fifth year of primary school up to the fourth 
year of secondary school (48.4% males; Mage = 13.37, SDage = 1.84, 34.76% 
primary school children). This sample was devided in two random split-half 
samples. Both the first random split-half (48.9% males; Mage = 13.35, SDage = 
1.85; 37.14% primary school children) and the second random split-half (47.9% 
males; Mage = 13.39, SDage = 1.84; 32.38% primary school children) consisted of 
315 children. Recruitment was achieved by trained psychology students of Ghent 
University in the context of a course assignment. Parents and their eligible 
underage children were informed about the objectives and procedures of the 
research. Participation was confidential and voluntary. Based upon written 
consent, several paper-and-pencil measures were administered individually at 
home. 
 
Measures 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth Version 
(MSCEIT-YV; Mayer et al., 2015) 
The MSCEIT-YV is a 101-item maximum performance test (of which 97 items are 
scored) that can be administered from age 10 years and onward. The ability of 
perceiving emotions (32 items) is measured by eight photographed faces that 
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vary in expression (type, strength, and valence of the expressed emotion), 
gender (an equal amount of boys and girls), age (aged 10 to 18 years), and 
ethnicity (white and coloured). For each face, respondents are asked to evaluate 
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = none at all and 5 = a very strong feeling) to which 
extent four emotions are apparent within the face. The targeted emotions (e.g., 
happiness, surprise, fear, anger, disgust, and sadness) differ slightly from face to 
face. The ability of facilitating thoughts (24 items) is assessed through 
synesthesia items in which emotion labels (e.g., happiness, anger, worry) and 
physical sensations related to temperature, speed, and color (e.g., cold, slow, 
red) are compared. Respondents are asked to rate to which extent an emotion 
feels like four different sensations or to which extent a combination of sensations 
feels like four different emotions. Answers are rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
does not feel this way and 5 = definitely feels this way). The ability of 
understanding emotions (23 items) is measured by multiple choice items on 
emotion definitions (i.e., coupling the correct emotion terms with descriptions of 
feelings), emotion transitions and changes (i.e., identifying emotions that arise 
from particular event descriptions), and emotion blends (i.e., choosing 
combinations of emotions that correspond to descriptions of particular emotional 
states). Respondents are asked to select the best suited answer out of four or 
five options. The ability of managing emotions (18 items) is measured via six 
stories. For each story, respondents are asked to evaluate on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all helpful and 5 = very helpful) to which extent three prescribed 
actions are effective in making a person feel a certain way. The Dutch version of 
the MSCEIT-YV was translated from the English version by the first author, in 
collaboration with a departmental colleague. The final version was decided upon 
by a committee of bilingual experts on emotions (see Table 1 for the original 
MSCEIT-YV measurement design). 
  
  
Table 1 
The Original Measurement Design of the MSCEIT-YV for Study 1 and Adaptations and Additions for Study 2 
Study Items Content Perceiving Facilitating Understanding Managing 
1 Original Task 
Stimuli 
Format 
8 faces 
4 items per face 
Rating 
6 assignments 
4 items per assignment 
Rating 
23 questions 
1 score per question 
Multiple choice 
6 stories 
3 items per story 
Rating 
2 Original Task 
Stimuli 
Format 
8 faces 
4 items per face 
Rating 
6 assignments 
4 items per assignment 
Rating 
 
6 stories 
3 items per story 
Rating 
 Adaptation/ 
Addition 
Task 
Stimuli 
Format 
7 faces 
4 items per face 
Rating 
6 assignments 
4 items per assignment 
Rating 
110 questions 
4 or 5 items per question 
Rating 
4 stories 
4 items per story 
Rating 
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Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Third Edition - NL (WISC-III-NL; 
Kort et al., 2005) and Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM; Raven, 
1960) 
The WISC-III and the SPM are developed to assess intelligence from age 6 
onwards. The WISC-III measures verbal and non-verbal ability via 13 subtests. 
Three intelligence scores are calculated, i.e., verbal IQ, performance IQ, and total 
IQ. The SPM measures abstract reasoning via 60 multiple choice items arranged 
in five different sets with increasing difficulty (α = .85). 
 
Hierarchical Personality Inventory for Children (HiPIC; Mervielde & De 
Fruyt, 1999) 
The HiPIC is a 144-item self-report questionnaire, measuring the Big Five 
personality factors of neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, openness, and 
conscientiousness in children from age 8 onwards. Items are rated on a 5-point 
Likert scale (1 = uncharacteristic and 5 = very characteristic). Cronbach’s αs 
were respectively .332 for neuroticism, .68 for extraversion, .64 for 
agreeableness, .83 for openness, and .85 for conscientiousness. 
 
Alexithymia Questionnaire for Children (AQ-C; Rieffe, Oosterveld, & 
Terwogt, 2006) 
The AQ-C is a 20-item self-report alexithymia questionnaire, suited for 
administration from age 9 onwards. Items are rated on a 4-point Likert scale (1 = 
not true and 3 = true), and measure difficulties in identifying feelings (α = .74), 
difficulties in describing feelings (α = .69), externally-oriented thinking (α = .41) 3, 
and overall alexithymia (α = .71). 
 
Beck Youth Inventories (BYI; Dillen, Fontaine, & Verhofstadt-Deneve, 2009) 
                                                          
2
 Neuroticism α is low in comparison to the fair to good αs of the other scales in the 
present research, however, consistent with the neuroticism α reported in Veirman et al 
(2009). 
3
 The low Cronbach’s α of externally-oriented thinking is consistent with those reported in 
literature (Rieffe et al., 2006), yet, signify that a carefull interpretation of correlations with 
this scale is needed. 
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The BYI assess social and emotional impairment via five 20-item self-report 
inventories that can be administered from age 7 onwards. Items are rated on a 4-
point Likert scale (0 = never and 3 = always) and measure self-concept (α = .83), 
depression (α = .89), anxiety (α = .86), anger (α = .88), and disruptive behaviors 
(α = .82). 
 
Data-analyses 
First, the structure of raw responses is examined for the original items of the 
rating-based perceiving, facilitating, and managing MSCEIT-YV tests. 
In a first random split-half, the factor structure of raw responses for all 
rating-based emotional intelligence tests is explored for each test separately by 
use of principal components analysis (PCA), no rotation is applied. The number 
of factors to retain is determined by inspection of the scree-plot, and the 
correlation between the loadings of the principal components and the mean item 
ratings. After, an orthogonal Procrustes rotation4 is performed. In this rotation, the 
initial retained component structure is rotated orthogonally as close as possible to 
our hypothetical target structure (Mulaik, 1972; Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). 
The target structure contains a hypothetical emotional intelligence factor (based 
on the mean item ratings), an acquiescence factor (corresponding to a fixed 
loading of .30, as an approximate estimation of the mean correlation between the 
summed ratings and the individual item ratings), and if necessary one or more 
additional factors. The degree to which both structures converge is determined by 
                                                          
4
 Affect research has shown that in case bipolarity is apparent in a single set of data, a 
Varimax rotation would tend to give two uncorrelated factors, depending on the strength 
of the acquiescence factor (Russell & Carroll, 1999). While Varimax rotation is in these 
cases used to simplify the interpretation of the principal components, it is often not the 
case because it doesn’t enable to clearly distinguish bipolarity from acquiescence. In 
orthogonal Procrustes rotation, the situation is different because there are two sets of 
data and the purpose is to compare these sets and find the rotation that will best 
approximate one from the other. Moreover, the analysis translates, rotates, and scales 
(stretches/shrinks) one set to another, minimizing the residual sum of squares between 
the sets, under the constraint of preserving orthogonality. This technique may be used 
for any two sets of data, and is especially a powerful tool for hypothesis-guided rotation 
as is here the case (for an example in personality research, see McCrea, Zonderman, 
Costa, Bond, & Paunonen, 1996). 
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inspection of the congruence coefficients: (1) the Tucker’s phi coefficients of 
agreement, also referred to as the coefficients of proportionality, and (2) the 
correlation coefficients5. Values smaller than .85 indicate non-negligible 
incongruences, values in the range .85 to .94 signify fair factorial comparability, 
and higher values indicate factorial similarity (Lorenzo-Seva & ten Berge, 2006). 
The stability of the structure in this first random split-half is then checked in the 
second random split-half via similar Procrustes rotations. In case stability is met, 
Procrustes rotations are performed on the complete sample and the results of 
these final Procrustes rotations form the base for further analyses. 
Second, it is investigated how these results may be informative to decide 
on the status of emotional intelligence as an intelligence. Structural analyses are 
performed via confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using Mplus 6.11 (Muthén & 
Muthén, 1998-2011) on the Procrustes weighted emotional intelligence 
component scores and the Procrustes weighted acquiescence component scores 
for perceiving, facilitating, and managing, and the Multi Health Systems (MHS) 
test publisher’s scores for understanding.  
Data are first screened on skewness and kurtosis. They are considered 
as non-normal if absolute values for skewness are greater than 1 and/or absolute 
values for kurtosis exceed 2 (Harlow, 2014). Model fit is evaluated by 
Schweizer’s (2010) criteria for χ2/df (acceptable in case < 3 and good in case < 
2), comparative fit index (CFI; acceptable above .90 and good above .95), root 
mean square of approximation (RMSEA; acceptable below .08 and good below 
.05), and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR; expected to stay 
below .10). Further, CFA estimated factor scores for a general emotional 
intelligence factor and a general acquiescence factor are used to determine 
Pearson correlations with the network of convergent and discriminant 
relationships (i.e., intelligence, personality, alexithymia, and social and emotional 
                                                          
5 
The Tucker’s phi coefficients are inspected for the Procrustes rotated bipolar emotional 
intelligence branch factors and the Procrustes rotated unipolar aquiescence branch 
factors. Inspection of the correlation coefficients is only possible for the Procrustes 
rotated bipolar emotional intelligence branch factors with the hypothetical emotional 
intelligence branch factors, and not for the Procrustes rotated unipolar aquiescence 
branch factors because the hypothetical unipolar aquiescence branch factors are set at 
a constant loading of .30. 
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impairment). These correlations are interpreted according to Cohen’s (1988) 
standards (i.e., .10 ≤ r < .30: small correlations, .30 ≤ r <.50: moderate 
correlations, r ≥ .50: large correlations). Finally, ANOVAs are performed to 
examine gender differences. Because verbal and written language performance 
is typically better in girls than in boys, and these tests have a high verbal load, we 
will control for verbal intelligence (Burman, Bitan, & Booth, 2008). Bivariate 
correlations are calculated to investigate age differences. 
 
RESULTS 
Internal structure at branch level 
Perceiving 
The scree plot for perceiving showed no clear inflexion point for the first random 
split-half sample. The first ten Eigenvalues were 3.70, 3.10, 2.28, 1.95, 1.74, 
1.56, 1.44, 1.38, 1.13 en 1.08. Of the first nine unrotated components, the 
loadings of the second, third and fourth unrotated component were correlated 
with the perceiving mean item ratings (respectively r = -.39, p < .05; r = .50, p < 
.01; and r = .47, p < .01). Thus, four components (34.44% variance accounted 
for)6 were considered relevant for further analyses. For all other unrotated 
components the correlation with the perceiving mean item ratings was not 
significant (r ≤ |.27|, p = ns). After Procustes rotation, an interpretable structure 
emerged with a first bipolar emotional intelligence perceiving factor (absent to 
present emotions in faces) and a second unipolar acquiescence factor7. The third 
and fourth factor were related to a tendency to interpret specific types of faces as 
representing happiness and surprise versus anxiety and disgust. In particular, the 
third factor expressed differences for two faces that express lifted eyebrows, eyes 
widely opened and an open mouth. Finally, the fourth factor was predominantly 
focused on two faces that express a closed or open smiling mouth, eyes not 
completely opened and frownd eyebrows. The results were found stable as the 
same interpretable structure occurred in the second random split-half sample. 
                                                          
6
 The third hypothetical factor of target loadings and the fourth hypothetical factor of 
target loadings are based upon the post hoc interpretation of the third and fourth 
principal component and are related to specific faces. 
7
 We note that two perceiving items showed a negative, near zero Procrustes rotated 
factor loading on the acquiescence factor. 
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Tucker’s phi’s for the bipolar emotional intelligence perceiving factor and the 
unipolar acquiescence factor and the correlation coefficient of the bipolar 
emotional intelligence perceiving factor with the hypothetical emotional 
intelligence perceiving factor can be found in Table 2 for both random split-half 
samples.  
  
Table 2 
Proportion of Variance Accounted for (VAR) and Tucker’s Phi’s (φ) for the Procrustes Rotated Bipolar Emotional Intelligence Branch 
Factors (EI) and the Procrustes Rotated Unipolar Acquiescence Branch Factors (ACQ), and Correlation Coefficients (r) for the 
Procrustes Rotated Bipolar Emotional Intelligence Branch Factors (EI) 
    Split1  Split2  Complete 
Branch Study Items Factor VAR φ r  VAR φ r  VAR φ r 
Perceiving 1 O EI 8.16 .87 .82  7.93 .89 .85  7.87 .89 .86 
   ACQ 10.27 .84 -  11.32 .82 -  10.50 .84 - 
 2 A EI 7.09 .87 .87  7.95 .93 .94  7.25 .94 .94 
   ACQ 17.15 .93 -  16.39 .96 -  16.60 .95 - 
  OA EI 5.74 .85 .84  6.50 .88 .88  5.83 .89 .89 
   ACQ 12.27 .91 -  11.77 .94 -  11.93 .93 - 
Facilitating 1 O EI 11.74 .90 .91  12.87 .92 .95  12.13 .92 .95 
   ACQ 13.13 .96 -  15.00 .95 -  13.88 .96 - 
 2 A EI 12.07 .97 .98  13.66 .97 .98  12.73 .98 .99 
   ACQ 18.30 .96 -  20.40 .98 -  19.28 .98 - 
  OA EI 9.50 .94 .96  11.72 .95 .97  10.55 .96 .97 
   ACQ 12.89 .95 -  14.53 .97 -  13.64 .97 - 
Understanding 2 A EI 8.62 .93 .92  6.96 .90 .89  7.60 .93 .92 
   ACQ 12.50 .95 -  14.93 .96 -  13.66 .96 - 
Managing 1 O EI 18.41 .98 .98  19.16 .96 .97  18.68 .98 .98 
   ACQ 14.79 .98 -  13.57 .96 -  14.01 .98 - 
 2 A EI 13.13 .97 .97  12.13 .95 .95  12.43 .96 .97 
   ACQ 14.99 .96 -  17.05 .97 -  15.96 .97 - 
  OA EI 13.73 .97 .97  13.63 .96 .96  13.47 .97 .97 
   ACQ 11.31 .96 -  13.02 .98 -  12.11 .97 - 
Note. NStudy1-Complete = 630, NStudy1-Split1 = 315, NStudy1-Split2 = 315, NStudy1 = 664, NStudy1-Split1 = 332, NStudy1-Split2 = 332. O = original items for 
perceiving, facilitating, and managing; A = additional items for perceiving, facilitating, and managing and the adapted rating version of 
the understanding items; OA = original and additional/adapted items combined.
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Facilitating 
The scree plot for facilitating showed a clear inflection point at three factors for 
the first random split-half sample which indicates two (major) components 
(24.88% of variance accounted for) for further analyses. The first ten Eigenvalues 
were 3.48, 2.49, 1.62, 1.41, 1.28, 1.17, 1.07, 1.05, 1.00 en .87. Of the first nine 
unrotated components, the loadings of the first and the second unrotated 
component were correlated with the facilitating mean item ratings (r = . 93, p < 
.001 and r = -.85, p < .001), while the other unrotated components showed no 
significant correlation with the facilitating mean item ratings (r ≤ |.22|, p = ns). 
After Procustes rotation, a first bipolar emotional intelligence facilitating factor 
(inconsistent to consistent emotion labels and sensations) and a second unipolar 
acquiescence factor were found. The same interpretable structure occurred in the 
second random split-half sample, showing the robustness of the found structure 
(see Table 2). 
 
Managing 
The scree plot for managing showed a clear inflection point at three factors for 
the first random split-half sample which suggests to retain two (major) 
components (33.21% of variance accounted for) for further analyses. The first ten 
Eigenvalues were 3.32, 2.66, 1.46, 1.35, .98, .91, .89, .80, .72, and .69. Of the 
first nine unrotated components, only the loadings of the first unrotated 
component were correlated with the managing mean item ratings (r = .98, p < 
.001). All other unrotated components had no significant correlation with the 
managing mean item ratings (r ≤ |.08|, p = ns). After Procustes rotation, a first 
bipolar emotional intelligence managing factor (ineffective to effective actions to 
regulate emotions) and a second unipolar acquiescence factor emerged. These 
findings were found robust as this interpretable structure was replicated in the 
second random split-half sample (see Table 2). 
As the structure for perceiving, facilitating, and managing was found to be 
stable over both split-half samples, the PCAs with Procrustes rotation were ran 
for each of these branches within the complete sample. As expected, the 
structure found for each branch in both split-half samples was also found for the 
complete sample (see Table 2). The item loadings after Procrustes rotation for 
perceiving, facilitating and managing are plotted against the mean item ratings for 
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respectively perceiving, facilitating and managing in Figure 1. It was decided to 
run further analyses on the complete sample8. 
  
                                                          
8
 The third and the fourth Procrustes rotated perceiving factor were not included in further 
analyses because they were related to specific faces. 
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Figure 1. The item loadings after Procrustes rotation on the bipolar emotional 
intelligence factor are plotted against the mean item ratings in the first study for 
1(a) perceiving, 1(b) facilitating, and 1(c) managing, and in the second study for 
2(a) perceiving, 2(b) facilitating, 2(c) understanding, and 2(d) managing. 
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Internal structure across branches 
To investigate the internal structure across branches, we perfomed a CFA. Since 
the values for skewness levels (-1.24, .44) and kurtosis levels (-.23, 2.80) of the 
Procrustes weighted component scores were not in the acceptable range, a CFA 
with Mean- and-Variance-Adjusted Maximum Likelihood was conducted. The 
tested two-factor model consisted of a general emotional intelligence factor and a 
general acquiescence factor (see Figure 2 for factor loadings and proportions of 
variance explained). The general emotional intelligence factor contained four 
indicators, i.e. the Procrustes weighted component scores for the first factor of 
perceiving, facilitating, and managing and the MHS scores for understanding (see 
Table 3 for intercorrelations). The general acquiescence factor contained three 
indicators, i.e. the Procrustes weighted component scores for the second unipolar 
acquiescence factor of perceiving, facilitating, and managing. A mutual zero-
order correlation (r = -.04) was found between both higher-order factors. The 
model produced acceptable to good fit values, χ2(13) = 37.38, p < .001, χ2/df = 
2.88, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05. Furthermore, correlations tend to be 
higher among the Procrustes weighted emotional intelligence component scores 
for perceiving, facilitating, and managing and the MHS scores for understanding 
(mean r = .29) than between these scores and cognitive markers (mean r = .21). 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. CFA results for Study 1 (panel on the left side) and Study 2 (panel on the right side) for the four-branch model using 
Procrustes weighted component scores. 
***p < .001.  
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Table 3 
Correlations among Procrustes Weighted Component Scores for Perceiving, 
Facilitating, and Managing and the MHS Scores for Understanding 
 1. 2. 3. 
1. Managing -   
2. Understanding .41*** -  
3. Facilitating .36*** .26*** - 
4. Perceiving .24*** .20*** .24*** 
***p < .01. 
 
Network of convergent and discriminant relationships 
The general emotional intelligence factor scores showed small (i.e., performance 
intelligence) to moderate (i.e., verbal intelligence, total intelligence, and abstract 
reasoning) positive correlations with measures of intelligence. Next, small 
correlations were observed between the general emotional intelligence factor 
scores and personality (postively correlated: extraversion, openness, and 
agreeableness; negatively correlated: neuroticism). Also a small positive 
correlation was found between the general emotional intelligence factor scores 
and self-esteem (i.e., self-concept). Furthermore, small negative correlations 
were found between the general emotional intelligence factor scores and 
alexithymia (i.e., communication, externally-oriented thinking, and overall 
alexithymia) and pathology (i.e., anger and disruptive behaviors). The general 
acquiescence factor scores in contrast showed no significant correlations with 
intelligence and alexithymia. Yet, small positive correlations were found with 
personality (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, and openness), self-esteem (i.e., self-
concept) and pathology (i.e., anxiety, depression, anger, and disruptive 
behaviors). Pearson product moment correlations are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4 
Pearson Correlations (r) of External Criteria and the Estimated Higher-order 
Factor Scores for the General Emotional Intelligence Factor and the General 
Acquiescence Factor from Study 1 (EI1, ACQ1) and Study 2 (EI1, ACQ2)  
Measure rEI1 rACQ1 rEI2 rACQ2 
Intelligence     
WISC-III – Verbal IQ .35*** .02 .28*** .02 
WISC-III – Performance IQ .23*** .02 .16*** -.01 
WISC-III – Total IQ .33*** .02 .27*** .01 
SPM – Abstract reasoning .43*** -.03 .38*** -.07 
Personality     
HiPIC – Neuroticism -.09* .13** -.03 .15*** 
HiPIC – Extraversion .15*** .19*** .21*** .22*** 
HiPIC – Openness .24*** .19*** .27*** .25*** 
HiPIC – Agreeableness .24*** -.06 .20*** -.04 
HiPIC – Conscientiousness .07 .04 .06 .01 
Alexithymia     
AS-C – Identification -.06 .07 -.07 .11** 
AS-C – Communication -.13** .01 -.08* .00 
AS-C – Externally-oriented thinking -.24*** -.05 -.22*** -.06 
AS-C – Total -.20*** .02 -.17*** .03 
Social and Emotional Impairment     
BYI – Self concept .11** .09* .11** .09* 
BYI – Depression -.08 .09* -.15*** .06 
BYI – Anxiety -.07 .17*** -.08 .13** 
BYI – Anger -.11** .16*** -.17*** .11** 
BYI – Disruptive behaviors -.08* .11** -.08* .06 
Note. NStudy1 = 630, NStudy2 = 664 for all scales, with the exception of NStudy2 = 659 
for the WISC-III; WISC-III: Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children Third Edition; 
SPM: Standard Progressive Matrices; HiPIC: Hierarchical Personality Inventory 
for Children; AS-C: Alexithymia Scale for Children; BYI: Beck Youth Inventories. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Age and gender differences 
To investigate gender differences in the general emotional intelligence factor 
scores and the general acquiescence factor scores two ANCOVAs were 
executed, controlled for verbal intelligence. A significant gender difference was 
found for the general emotional intelligence factor scores, F(1, 627) = 24.78, p < 
.001 (partial η² = .04), indicating that girls in general outperformed boys. No 
gender difference was found for the general acquiescence factor scores, F(1, 
627) = .54, p = .46 (partial η² = .00). Furthermore, a significant positive correlation 
was found between particpants’ age and the general emotional intelligence factor 
scores (r = .18, p < .001), showing that older participants in general achieve 
higher scores. No relationship was observed between age and the general 
acquiescence factor scores (r = .04, p = .30). 
 
STUDY 2 
MATERIALS AND METHOD 
Participants and procedure 
The sample consisted of 664 Dutch speaking children and adolescents between 
the ages of 8 and 16 years from the third year of primary school up to the fifth 
year of secondary school (39.8% males; Mage =13.42, SDage =1.85, 34.79% 
primary school children). This sample was also randomly split in two subsamples. 
Both the first random split-half (39.2% males; Mage =13.45, SDage =1.85; 33.73% 
primary school children) and the second random split-half (40.4% males; Mage 
=13.39, SDage =1.86; 35.84% primary school children) consisted of 332 children. 
The procedure for Study 2 was similar to the procedure of Study 1. 
 
Measures 
As in Study 1, participants completed the WISC-III-NL, SPM, AQ-C, HiPIC and 
the BYI9. Furthermore, to examine the stability and the generalizability of the 
                                                          
9
 Alpha’s were similar to those observed in study 1 for the SPM (α = .85), the HiPIC 
(neuroticism α = .30, extraversion α = .68, agreeableness α = .65, openness α = .82, 
and conscientiousness α = .86), the AS-C (difficulties in identifying feelings α = .75, 
difficulties in describing feelings α = .72, externally-oriented thinking α = .34, and overall 
alexithymia α = .72), and the BYI (self-concept α = .83, depression α = .90, anxiety α = 
.88, anger α = .89, and disruptive behaviors α = .82). 
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results that were found in Study 1, participants filled out (1) the MSCEIT-YV, that 
included the original tests for perceiving, facilitating, and managing and an 
adapted rating-based version of the original multiple choice understanding test, 
and (2) also three additional sets of items for perceiving, facilitating, and 
managing (see Table 1). 
 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth Version 
(MSCEIT-YV; Mayer et al., 2015) 
The original scales of perceiving, facilitating and managing are administered as 
was the case for Study 1. Instead of the multiple choice understanding test, 
respondents are asked to fill out a 110-item rating version of this test. On a 5-
point Likert scale (1 = not at all and 5 = very strong), they are asked to which 
extent emotion terms are compatible with descriptions of feelings (i.e., emotion 
definitions), emotions are related to paricular event descriptions (i.e., emotion 
transitions and changes), and a combination of emotions corresponds to 
descriptions of particular emotional states (i.e., emotion blends).  
 
Perceiving additional items 
The ability of perceiving emotions (28 items) is additionally measured by seven 
photographed faces (with frontal gaze direction and frontal view images) that 
were selected from the Radboud faces database (Langner et al., 2010). These 
faces (from four Caucasion white males, one Caucasion white boy, two 
Caucasion white females, and one Moroccan male) represent surprise, contempt, 
anger, happiness, anxiety, disgust, and sadness. The targeted emotions (e.g., 
surprise, contempt, anger, happiness, anxiety, disgust, and sadness) differ from 
face to face. For each face, respondents are asked to rate four emotion terms: 
one term corresponds to the emotion that the face expresses; one term 
represents an emotion that is clearly not expressed by the face; the two other 
terms represent emotions that in the initial validation study of Langner et al. 
(2010) were found to be confouned with the emotion that the face expresses10. 
                                                          
10
 An exception is made for the happiness face. The results of the study of Langner et al. 
(2010) showed that only one emotion was confused with happiness within this face, so 
for the current research two emotions that pointed to absent emotions in this face were 
selected. 
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Respondents are asked to evaluate on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = none at all and 
5 = a very strong feeling) to which extent four emotions are expressed in the 
face.  
 
Facilitating additional items 
The ability of facilitating thoughts (24 items) is assessed through additonal items 
in which six emotion words are compared with targeted emotion words: joyful 
(with irritated, full of trust, proud, and jealous), sad (with dejected, fearful, full of 
hate, and unhappy), angry (with full of compassion, hopeless, hurt, and 
frustrated), afraid (with desperate, homesick, anxious, and astonished), in love 
(with enthousiastic, longing, envious, and disillusioned), and ashamed (with shy, 
impatient, bored, and afraid). These items are based on a study of Veirman and 
Fontaine (in press) on the dimensional structure of the emotion domain. In their 
free listing study, joyful, angry, sad and afraid emerged as the four most 
frequently reported emotion terms, whereas in love is the most frequently 
mentioned positive interpersonal emotion term, and ashamed is the most 
frequently mentioned negative interpersonal emotion term. In their similarity 
rating study, 85 emotion terms were, based on multidimensional scaling 
techniques, represented in a four-dimensional space of valence, power, arousal 
and novelty. The distances among these 85 emotion terms in this four-
dimensional space were used to select the targeted emotion words. For each of 
the six emotion words, two closely in distance related emotion words and two 
emotion words that were not closely in distance related were selected. 
Respondents are asked to rate to which extent an emotion feels like four other 
emotions. Answers are rated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = does not feel this way 
and 5 = definitely feels this way). 
 
Managing additional items 
The ability of managing emotions (16 items) is measured via four additional 
stories. These stories (i.e., friend blames you for his bad grade, chest club 
members complain on you as secretary, friends make less effort than expected 
upon your move, unfair teacher warning for entering a restricted area while not 
aware of) were selected from the initial 16 stories of the research version of the 
youth Situational Test for Emotion Management (MacCann, Wang, Matthews, & 
Roberts, 2010) on the applicability of their content to children and adolescents. 
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For each story, respondents are asked to evaluate on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = 
not at all helpful and 5 = very helpful) to which extent four prescribed actions are 
effective in making a person feel a certain way. 
 
Data-analyses 
The structure of raw responses is examined and interpreted the same way as in 
Study 1. First, the internal structure for the additional sets of items for perceiving, 
facilitating, and managing and the rating version of the items for the 
understanding MSCEIT-YV test is investigated. Second, the internal structure is 
investigated for perceiving, facilitating, and managing, jointly on the original and 
the additional items of the MSCEIT-YV subtests. 
Moreover, it is also investigated the same way as in Study 1 how these 
results may be informative to decide on the status of emotional intelligence as an 
intelligence. Structural analyses in Study 2 are performed on the Procrustes 
weighted emotional intelligence component scores and the Procrustes weighted 
acquiescence component scores for perceiving, facilitating, understanding and 
managing. 
 
RESULTS 
Internal structure at branch level 
Perceiving 
First, the internal structure was investigated for the additional items of perceiving. 
The scree plot expressed a clear inflexion point at two factors for the first random 
split-half sample, which suggests one (major) component. The first ten 
Eigenvalues were 4.86, 1.99, 1.88, 1.69, 1.42, 1.40, 1.30, 1.11, 1.04 and .97. Of 
the first nine unrotated components, the loadings of the second, and third 
unrotated component were correlated with the mean item ratings (r = -.65, p < 
.001, and r = .57, p < .01, respectively), thus, three components were retained for 
further analyses (31.17% of variance accounted for)11. For all other unrotated 
components the correlation with the mean item ratings was not significant (r ≤ 
|.34|, p = ns). After Procustes rotation, an interpretable structure emerged, with a 
                                                          
11
  The third component of the additional items for perceiving gave no clear indication for 
specific hypotheses, thus, a factor with random target loadings was used in the 
Procrustes rotation. 
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first bipolar emotional intelligence perceiving factor (absent to present emotions 
in faces) and a second unipolar acquiescence factor12. The third factor was not 
clearly interpretable. The results were found robust as the same structure 
occurred in the second random split-half sample. Tucker’s phi’s for the bipolar 
emotional intelligence perceiving factor and the unipolar acquiescence factor and 
the correlation coefficient of the bipolar emotional intelligence perceiving factor 
with the hypothetical emotional intelligence perceiving factor are presented in 
Table 2 for both random split-half samples. 
Second, the internal structure was investigated for the original and the 
additional items of perceiving jointly. The scree plot expressed no clear inflexion 
point in the first random split-half sample: a first inflexion point appeared at two 
factors, suggesting one (major) component, but a second inflexion point 
appeared at five factors, suggesting to retain four (major) components. The first 
ten Eigenvalues were 7.81, 3.24, 2.87, 2.69, 2.14, 1.92, 1.79, 1.72, 1.70, and 
1.51. Of the first nine unrotated components, the loadings of the second, and 
third unrotated component were correlated with the mean item ratings (r = .56, p 
< .001, and r = .61, p < .001, respectively). For all other unrotated components 
the correlation with the mean item ratings was not significant (r ≤ |.12|, p = ns), 
with exception for the 8th component (r = .34, p < .01). Similar to the results for 
perceiving in Study 1, four factors were retained for further analyses (27.67% of 
variance accounted for)13. After Procustes rotation, a first bipolar emotional 
intelligence perceiving factor (absent to present emotions in faces) and a second 
unipolar acquiescence factor was found14. The third factor expressed differences 
related to the recognition of surprise in positive faces versus negative faces. The 
fourth factor is charcterized by a general tendency to recognize positive versus 
negative emotions in non-prototypical faces. These findings were found to be 
                                                          
12
 One item of the additional items for perceiving showed a negative, near zero 
Procrustes rotated factor loading on the unipolar acquiescence factor. 
13
 The third hypothetical factor of target loadings and the fourth hypothetical factor of 
target loadings are based upon the post hoc interpretation of the third and fourth 
principal component and are related to specific faces. 
14
  Two perceiving items showed a negative, near zero Procrustes rotated factor loading 
on the acquiescence factor. 
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stable as this interpretable structure was replicated in the second random split-
half sample (see Table 2). 
 
Facilitating 
First, the internal structure was investigated for the additional items of facilitating. 
The scree plot of the first random split-half sample showed a clear inflection point 
at three factors which points to two (major) components (30.37% of variance 
accounted for). The first ten Eigenvalues were 4.63, 2.67, 1.39, 1.27, 1.17, 1.05, 
1.03, .94, .87 and .85. Of the first nine unrotated components, the loadings of the 
first and the second unrotated component were both correlated with the mean 
item ratings (r = .69, p < .001 and r = -.96, p < .001). For all other unrotated 
components the correlation with the mean item ratings was not significant (r ≤ 
|.15|, p = ns). After Procustes rotation, a first factor corresponded to a bipolar 
emotional intelligence facilitating factor (inconsistent to consistent emotions) and 
a second factor represented the unipolar acquiescence factor. Again, similar 
results were found for the second random split-half sample thus the structure was 
stable (see Table 2). 
Second, the internal structure was examined for the original and the 
additional items of facilitating jointly. The scree plot of the first random split-half 
sample expressed a clear inflection point at three factors which points to two 
(major) components (22.39% of variance accounted for). The first ten 
Eigenvalues were 6.85, 3.90, 1.77, 1.69, 1.53, 1.51, 1.43, 1.43, 1.32, and 1.26. 
Of the first nine unrotated components, the loadings of the first and the second 
unrotated component were both correlated with the mean item ratings (r = .88, p 
< .001 and r = -.92, p < .001). All other unrotated components had no significant 
correlations with the mean item ratings (r ≤ |.12|, p = ns). After Procustes rotation, 
a first bipolar emotional intelligence facilitating factor (inconsistent to consistent 
emotion labels and sensations) and a second unipolar acquiescence factor 
emerged. Again, the results were found robust as the second random split-half 
sample yielded the same interpretable structure (see Table 2). 
 
Understanding 
The internal structure was investigated for the adapted rating version of 
understanding. The scree plot of the first random split-half sample showed a clear 
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inflection point at three factors which points to two (major) components (21.12% 
of variance accounted for). The first ten Eigenvalues were 15.55, 7.69, 3.03, 
2.83, 2.53, 2.22, 2.15, 2.05, 1.94, and 1.89. Of the first nine unrotated 
components, the loadings of the first and the second unrotated component were 
correlated with the mean item ratings (r = -.59, p < .001 and r = .94, p < .001). A 
smaller correlation was observed for the third component (r = -.22, p < .05), 
whereas the other unrotated components showed no significant correlations with 
the mean item ratings (r ≤ |.08|, p = ns). After Procustes rotation, a first bipolar 
emotional intelligence understanding factor (incorrect to correct emotion 
definitions, transitions, and changes) and a second unipolar acquiescence factor 
were found. The same interpretable structure emerged for the second random 
split-half sample, signifying the robustness of the results (see Table 2). 
 
Managing 
First, the internal structure was investigated for the additional items of managing. 
The scree plot of the first random split-half sample indicated a clear inflection 
point at three factors which points to two (major) components (28.13% of 
variance accounted for). The first ten Eigenvalues were 2.49, 2.01, 1.49, 1.27, 
1.04, 1.02, .92, .85, .79 and .74. Of the first nine unrotated components, the 
loadings of the first and second unrotated component were correlated with the 
mean item ratings (r = .89, p < .001 and r = -.95, p < .001). For all other unrotated 
components, the correlation with the mean item ratings was not significant (r ≤ 
|.17|, p = ns). After Procustes rotation, a first bipolar emotional intelligence 
managing factor (ineffective to effective actions to regulate emotions) and a 
second unipolar acquiescence factor emerged. A similar interpretable structure 
occurred also in the second random split sample, showing the robustness of the 
results (see Table 2). 
Second, the internal structure was examined for the original and the 
additional items for managing jointly. The scree plot of the first random split-half 
sample expressed a clear inflection point at three factors which points to two 
(major) components (25.02% of variance accounted for). The first ten 
Eigenvalues were 4.68, 3.83, 1.77, 1.57, 1.41, 1.26, 1.20, 1.14, 1.04, and 1.01. 
The loadings of the first unrotated component were correlated with the mean item 
ratings (r = .97, p < .001), while for all other unrotated components no significant 
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correlations with the mean scores of the items were observed (r ≤ |.23|, p = ns). 
After Procustes rotation, a first bipolar emotional intelligence managing factor 
(ineffective to effective actions to regulate emotions) and a second unipolar 
acquiescence factor occured. These results were stable as the same 
interpretable structure was replicated for the second random split-half sample 
(see Table 2). 
As the structure for perceiving, facilitating, understanding and managing 
was found to be stable over both split-half samples, the PCAs with Procrustes 
rotation were ran for each of these branches within the complete sample. As 
expected, the structure found for each branch in both split-half samples was also 
found for the complete sample (see Table 2). It was decided to run further 
analyses on the complete sample with the original and the additional items taken 
together for perceiving, facilitating and managing and the items of the rating 
version for understanding15. The item loadings after Procrustes rotation for 
perceiving, facilitating, understanding and managing are plotted against the mean 
item ratings of perceiving, facilitating, understanding and managing in Figure 1. 
 
Internal structure across branches 
To examine the internal structure across branches, we executed a CFA. Because 
the values for skewness levels (-1.32, .49) and kurtosis levels (.23, 4.21) for the 
Procrustes weighted component scores were not in the acceptable range a CFA 
with Mean- and-Variance-Adjusted Maximum Likelihood was performed. The 
tested two-factor model contained a general emotional intelligence factor and a 
general acquiescence factor (see Figure 2 for factor loadings and proportions of 
variance explained). The general emotional intelligence factor and the general 
acquiescence factor each contained four indicators, that is, the Procrustes 
weighted component scores for perceiving, facilitating, understanding and 
managing (see Table 5 for intercorrelations). A mutual zero-order correlation (r = 
-.01) was observed between both higher-order factors. The model showed 
acceptable to good fit values, χ2(19) = 93.77, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.94, CFI = .93, 
RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .07. Furthermore, correlations tend to be higher among 
the Procrustes weighted emotional intelligence component scores for perceiving, 
                                                          
15
  The third and the fourth Procrustes rotated perceiving factor were again not included in 
further analyses because they were related to specific faces. 
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facilitating, understanding, and managing (mean r = .48) than between these 
scores and cognitive markers (mean r = .18). 
 
Table 5 
Correlations among Procrustes Weighted Component Scores for Perceiving, 
Facilitating, Understanding and Managing 
 1. 2. 3. 
1. Managing -   
2. Understanding .65*** -  
3. Facilitating .50*** .61*** - 
4. Perceiving .33*** .45*** .37*** 
***p < .001. 
 
Network of convergent and discriminant relationships 
The general emotional intelligence factor scores showed small (i.e., verbal, 
performance, and total intelligence) to moderate (i.e., abstract reasoning) positive 
correlations with intelligence (see Table 4). Furthermore, small positive 
correlations were observed between the general emotional intelligence factor 
scores and personality (i.e., extraversion, openness, and agreeableness) and 
self-esteem (i.e., self-concept), while small negative correlations were observed 
between the general emotional intelligence factor scores and alexithymia (i.e., 
communication, externally-oriented thinking, and overall alexithymia) and 
pathology (i.e., depression, anger, and disruptive behaviors). The general 
acquiescence factor scores showed no significant correlations with intelligence. 
Small positive correlations were observed between the general acquiescence 
factor scores and personality (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, and openness), 
alexithymia (i.e., identification), self-esteem (i.e., self-concept) and pathology 
(i.e., anxiety and anger). 
 
Age and gender 
Two ANCOVAs, controlled for verbal intelligence, were performed to investigate 
gender differences in the general emotional intelligence factor scores and the 
general acquiescence factor scores. A significant gender difference was 
observed for the general emotional intelligence factor scores, showing that girls 
generally outperformed boys, F(1, 656) = 26.19, p < .001 (partial η² = .04). There 
was no gender difference observed for the general acquiescence factor scores, 
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F(1, 656) = .36, p = .55 (partial η² = .00). Furthermore, a significant positive 
correlation was found between particpants’ age and the general emotional 
intelligence factor scores (r = .28, p < .001), showing that older participants in 
general obtain higher scores. No relationschip was found between age and the 
general acquiescence factor scores (r = .03, p = .45). 
 
DISCUSSION 
Rating-based ability emotional intelligence tests have been used for over 20 
years. Yet, until now studies have mainly been concerned with consensus scored 
responses. Despite the fact that the use of consensus scoring may have a 
profound impact on the validity and utility of this type of tests, it is not clear how 
consensus scores are linked to ability emotional intelligence. The present 
research is in this respect different because it developed a framework to 
understand how these tests operate and how variation in raw responses to 
emotion-related questions may be related to variation in ability emotional 
intelligence. The value of this framework was supported by empirical results of 
two studies. 
 
The structure of ability emotional intelligence 
For both studies the initial found PCA structures for each branch that were 
Procrustes rotated to the hypothetical structures showed high congruence 
coefficients. Indeed, as expected the Procrustes rotated factor structure could be 
consistently interpreted for each branch as containing a bipolar emotional 
intelligence factor, and a unipolar acquiescence factor. Only few of the Tucker’s 
phi’s and correlations were below .85 and for perceiving (5.6%), 34.4% were in 
the range of .85 to .94 signifying fair factorial similarity, and 60.0% were .95 or 
higher indicating equal factors. Further, multidimensionality was only for 
perceiving. 
 
Bipolarity 
The results of Study 1 and Study 2 thus show that bipolarity is a robust and 
recurrent phenomenon that generalizes across rating-based ability emotional 
intelligence tests. The Procrustes rotated bipolar emotional intelligence branch 
factors point to the importance of recognizing similarities and differences in the 
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emotion domain, reflecting the degree of (in)correctness of item responses. In 
this way, these factors mirror (1) the ability to identify present and absent 
emotions in faces, (2) the ability to identify compatible and incompatible emotion 
labels and sensations, (3) the ability to identify correct and incorrect emotion 
definitions, transitions, changes, and blends, and (4) the ability to identify 
effective and ineffective actions to regulate emotions. As most MSCEIT-YV items 
mainly focus on one pole of the bipolar emotional intelligence factor for each 
branch (i.e., absence, inconsistency, incorrectness, ineffectivity), it might be 
recommended to make improvements to the current version of the MSCEIT-YV 
by adding items that focus to the opposite pole (i.e., presence, consistency, 
correctness, effectivity). Moreover, the Procrustes weighted emotional 
intelligence component scores for each branch show individual differences in 
people’ insight in the emotion domain. Because people that rate the correct 
responses higher and incorrect responses lower are those that are awarded 
higher scores, people may be ranked on these ability emotional intelligence tests, 
as is the case in traditional intelligence tests. 
Furthermore, Study 1 and Study 2 provide support for the idea behind 
consensus scoring. In both studies, the mean item ratings are almost perfectly 
reflected in the loadings of the items on the bipolar emotional intelligence factor 
for the different branches, implying that the idea of consensus is reflected in the 
correlational pattern of the items.  
 
Acquiescence 
The results of both studies bring furthermore robust evidence to the fore that raw 
responses of rating-based ability emotional intelligence tests are affected by 
acquiescence. Moreover, it has been found that in the majority of the cases most 
of the variance is accounted for by the Procrustes rotated unipolar acquiescence 
branch factors and not by the Procrustes rotated bipolar emotional intelligence 
branch factors. It stands to reason that this especially warrants attention for 
further use of the traditional consensus scoring, because the assumed 
correctness of the responses in consensus scoring keys is also influenced by 
acquiescence, yet, not accounted for at all. This in particular may have resulted in 
spurious conclusions about the ability emotional intelligence construct. As 
acquiescence is only one response style among others (for a recent overview, 
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see Van Vaerenbergh & Thomas, 2013), future research is challenged to 
broaden the scope of the present research and investigate the influence of other 
response styles on rating-based ability emotional intelligence tests.  
 
Multidimensionality 
The results of both studies demonstrate that multidimensionality of the four-
branch ability model was only partially supported by additional factors for 
perceiving. The observation that multidimensionality was not found for other 
branches is in line with the findings of Føllesdal and Hagtvet (2009). The 
detected additional factors for the perceiving branch relate to a small set of 
responses (items) for a few faces (item stems). Inspection of these faces 
indicates that (1) these faces are not prototypical for any emotion or (2) features 
for different emotions are mixed in these faces. In these cases, people’s 
responses may go various directions. For example, in non-prototypical faces, one 
sees either positive or negative emotions. These specific faces had less weight in 
the overall structure of Study 2 - where items were added - compared with Study 
1. These results seem to plead against recent research on the emotion-specificity 
of ability emotional intelligence, in that a different emotion processing might 
operate for different emotions (MacCann, Pearce, & Roberts, 2011; Schlegel, 
Grandjean, & Scherer, 2012). We found no emotion-specific factors for 
perceiving, nor for the other branches. Further research on emotion-specificity of 
ability emotional intelligence is however advised in this fairly new area of 
research. 
 
Implications for ability emotional intelligence as standard intelligence 
The present research further showed how structural results of rating-based ability 
emotional intelligence tests may be reconciled with conceptual, correlational and 
developmental criteria that have been put forward to establish ability emotional 
intelligence as standard intelligence (Mayer et al., 2000). 
 
Conceptual criterion 
The results for the two-factor model are for both studies in congruence with the 
theoretical underpinnings of the MSCEIT-YV and provide support for the four-
branch emotional intelligence model, where the underlying emotional intelligence 
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abilities perceiving, facilitating, understanding, and managing define a global 
emotional intelligence factor (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). While the Procrustes 
weighted emotional intelligence component scores and the Procrustes weighted 
acquiescence component scores are derived independently for each of the four 
branches, they are organized into a general emotional intelligence factor and a 
general acquiescence factor. This indicates that it is justified to use an overall 
emotional intelligence score as indicative for ability emotional intelligence in case 
acquiescence is controlled for. As predicted, perceiving and facilitating show the 
lowest loadings, whereas understanding and managing show the highest 
loadings on the general emotional intelligence factor. These results are in line 
with prior theorizing and recent results on the MSCEIT (MacCann, Joseph, 
Newman, & Roberts, 2014) and the MSCEIT-YV (Rivers et al.. 2012). 
Intercorrelations between perceiving and facilitating show that both branches are 
not redundant (rStudy1 = .24**, rStudy2 = .27**). This is an important finding because 
nowadays some MSCEIT studies have begun to exclude facilitation as a 
separate branch due to its high correlations with perceiving (i.e., r = .90; Fan, 
Jackson, Yang, Tang, & Zhang, 2010) and a better fit of the data (Gignac, 2005; 
Palmer, Gignac, Manocha, & Stough, 2005; Rossen, Kranzler, & Algina, 2008). 
As such, the results of the present research suggest to not throw the baby out 
with the bathwater and first further examine to which extent acquiescence in 
traditional consensus scoring may have an impact on the position of facilitating 
within the four-branch model. On average, correlations tend to be higher among 
the Procrustes weighted emotional intelligence component branch scores than 
between these scores and cognitive markers, supporting the distinctiveness of 
emotional intelligence from intelligence measures. 
 
Correlational criterion 
Inspecting whether intelligences are correlated with other intelligences is a 
standard method to determine whether an intelligence actually exists (Neisser et 
al., 1996). Because emotional intelligence has been seen as a new type of 
intelligence, parallel to verbal, perceptual-organizational, and broad-visualization 
intelligence, focusing on the specific content domain of emotions (Mayer, 
Roberts, & Barsade, 2008), it is particularly relevant to investigate how emotional 
intelligence is related to a comprehensive representation of other intelligences. 
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The observed correlations between the general emotional intelligence factor 
scores and a wide variety of intelligence measures (verbal, performance, and 
total intelligence, and abstract reasoning) were small to moderate. These 
correlations further substantiate MSCEIT evidence for the involvement of both 
crystallized aspects (mainly verbal) that require acculturated emotion knowledge 
accumulated over time as well as fluid aspects (mainly nonverbal) that require 
reasoning in ability emotional intelligence (Kong, 2014). The strongest 
correlations were not found with verbal intelligence but abstract reasoning. This 
finding is in line with Mayer and colleagues’ (2008, p. 511) description of 
emotional intelligence as a form of intelligence, we see that they explicitely 
acknowledge a central position for reasoning: “Emotional intelligence concerns 
the ability to carry out accurate reasoning about emotions and the ability to use 
emotions and emotional knowledge to enhance thought.” However, 
understanding the meaningfulness of reasoning in relation to emotions requires 
also incorporating the complexity of emotions. In contemporary emotion 
psychology, emotions may be seen as interrelated, synchronized processes of 
change in different involved components (such as appraisals, expressions, bodily 
sensations, action tendencies, and feelings), in reaction to the evaluation of a 
relevant (internal of external) event (Scherer, 1984, 2005). Emotional intelligence 
may then be seen as the ability to recognize interrelationships among emotion 
components and abstract emotion component patterns. 
The observation that there was no correlation between intelligence 
measures and the general acquiescence factor scores stresses that we may be 
confident about the correlations between the general emotional intelligence factor 
scores and intelligence measures. This is not the case for correlations among the 
general emotional intelligence factor scores and measures of personality, 
alexithymia, and social and emotional impairment because these self-report 
measures themselves use rating scales. This implies that when traditional 
consensus scores are used, some correlations are likely to be overestimated and 
others to be underestimated because of acquiescence. For example, the general 
emotional intelligence factor scores and the general acquiescence factor scores 
showed both a positive correlation with extraversion, this may suggest an 
overestimation of the correlation between traditional consensus scored emotional 
intelligence and extraversion. Or, the general acquiescence factor scores showed 
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a positive correlation with anger, while the general emotional intelligence factor 
scores showed a negative correlation with anger. These opposite correlations 
may suggest a suppression of the correlation between traditional consensus 
scored emotional intelligence and anger. This may also, among other 
explanations, account for why existing evidence on the relationship between 
ability emotional intelligence and personality is still found to be equivocal. For 
example, Roberts, Schulze, and MacCann (2008) provided meta-analytic 
evidence on the MSCEIT for the strongest correlations of ability emotional 
intelligence with agreeableness (i.e., in the range of .18 to .27), correlations to a 
lesser extent with openness (i.e., in the range of .08 to .17), and the lowest 
correlations with extraversion, neuroticism, and conscientiousness (i.e., in the 
range of respectively .00 to .10, -.11 to -.02, and .03 to .12). In contrast, a recent 
study by Fiori and Antonakis (2011) endorses that openness (r = .29) and to a 
smaller extent agreeableness (r = .20) are substantially related to ability 
emotional intelligence. Furthermore, some MSCEIT studies found positive 
correlations with well-being (Brackett & Mayer, 2003) and mental health (Martins, 
Ramalho, & Morin, 2010), and negative correlations with anxiety (Bastian, Burns, 
& Nettelbeck, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2008), drug and alcohol use, and deviant 
behavior (Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004). Other studies found no significant 
relations with general psychosocial functioning (Kee et al., 2009), and well-being 
(Zeidner & Olnick-Shemesh, 2010). Because no other ability emotional 
intelligence research has explicitely dealt with acquiescence, our understanding 
is here limited to tentative interpretations of the present results. 
 
Developmental criterion 
Age has been considered relevant to the evolution of emotional intelligence, as it 
has been seen as paramount to the evolution of other intelligence types (Mayer 
et al,. 2000). Age differences have been found by Mayer et al. (2000), yet, these 
results were later questioned because an adult consensus scoring key was used 
for calculating the adolescent scores (Roberts et al., 2001). Further, evidence for 
age differences in youth is scarce and based on small samples or samples with 
restricted age range (Peters et al., 2009; Rivers et al., 2012). The present 
research expands previous work in this area by showing that age differences in 
large samples across a broad age range occur in raw data. Results indicated a 
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small, but non-neglegible positive correlation between the general emotional 
intelligence scores and age, suggesting that when children and adolescents grow 
older they improve in emotional intelligence. Furthermore, also gender 
differences were found in the general emotional intelligence factor scores, with 
girls outperforming boys. Here, we replicate gender differences that have been 
found in a wide variety of MSCEIT studies (e.g., Joseph & Newman, 2010b). 
Finally, there was no significant correlation between age and the general 
acquiescence factor scores, nor were gender differences found for the general 
acquiescence factor scores. 
 
Limitations and future research 
First, the current studies were restricted to self-report assessments of personality, 
alexithymia and social and emotional impairment. In retrospect, it is clear that 
using additional objective measures would have been better practice, given the 
impact that acquiescence may have had on the self-report rating scale tests. 
Moreover, whilst previous research has failed to find a relationschip between 
ability emotional intelligence and emotion information processing (Farrelly & 
Austin, 2007; Fiori & Antonakis, 2012; Roberts et al., 2006), accounting for 
acquiescence may potentially shed a different light on this non-finding. 
Second, our findings for both studies are novel, in congruence with the 
outlined expectations, and robust, yet, replication may further our understanding 
of their theoretical and practical significance. We therefore propose that available 
raw MSCEIT(-YV) data could be reanalyzed using the provided approach. Such 
reanalyses could further clarify conceptual, correlational, and developmental 
inconsistencies that have been observed in research towards the four-branch 
ability emotional intelligence model. 
Finally, future research is advised to address two questions from a 
cultural-comparative perspective. A first question is whether the observed internal 
structure in this individual sample is comparable to those that would emerge in 
other samples, thus, whether this particular structure would fit a similar overall 
structure across many samples. A second is which differences may occur in 
understanding items. Considerable agreement exists among emotion researchers 
that while basic, universal similarities exist, display rules may be culturally 
variable (e.g., Mesquita, 2001). First evidence with the MSCEIT is provided in this 
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area, showing that perceiving is indeed more universal while understanding and 
managing are more culture specific, yet, these results were based on traditional 
consensus scored data (Shao, Doucet, & Caruso, 2015). Maybe, the bipolar 
structure could serve as reference point, on which cultural specificity may be 
mapped. 
 
Conclusion 
Russell and Carroll (1999, p. 3) qouted that “science has repeatedly shown that 
things do not necessarily are the way they appear”. In agreement with this 
citation, the results of the present research showed that raw responses of rating-
based ability emotional intelligence tests incorporate rather an amalgan of 
diverse aspects that are not all related to the ability emotional intelligence 
construct as is intended. A first study showed that the structure at item level for 
the rating-based MSCEIT-YV tests of perceiving, facilitating, and managing 
consists of bipolar emotional intelligence factors and unipolar acquiescence 
factors. Multidimensionality was only found for perceiving. A second study 
demonstrated that these findings are replicable and characteristic for other rating-
based emotional intelligence tests too. For both studies, general emotional 
intelligence factor scores and not general acquiescence factor scores showed 
consistency with conceptual, correlational, and developmental intelligence 
standards, favoring the idea of ability emotional intelligence as a type of 
intelligence. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
General Discussion 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The main objective of this dissertation was to examine and improve the validity of 
two maximum performance measures that have been developed to assess 
emotional intelligence in children and adolescents, the LEAS-C and the MSCEIT-
YV. This objective was persued through four research questions that formed the 
basis of the empirical studies presented in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5. These 
research questions focused on (1) the validity of the original LEAS-C in children 
and adolescents, (2) the validity of an adapted version of the LEAS-C in children 
and adolescents, (3) the cognitive representation of the emotion domain in 
children, adolescents, students, and adults, and (4) the validity of the original 
MSCEIT-YV and an adapted and extended version of the MSCEIT-YV in children 
and adolescents. The empirical findings of these studies and the main 
contributions are briefly summarized and discussed in this final chapter. 
Furthermore, several strenghts, limitations and directions for future research are 
proposed. This chapter closes with a general conclusion of the doctoral 
dissertation. 
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RESEARCH OVERVIEW AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation started with a comprehensive summary of the literature on 
emotional intelligence. It presented a historical view on emotional intelligence 
research and described the traditional theoretical and measurement approaches 
to emotional intelligence. Moreover, it justified the choice for the ability model 
approach and the use of maximum performance measurement. Then, it 
highlighted that the ability model approach to emotional intelligence was 
understudied in childhood and adolescence and validity evidence for the few 
available maximum performance measures for use in childhood and adolescence 
was scarce and inconclusive. Therefore, the main objective of this dissertation 
was to investigate and improve the validity of two state-of-the-art maximum 
performance measures for the assessment of emotional intelligence in children 
and adolescents: the LEAS-C and the MSCEIT-YV. More specifically, this main 
objective was investigated through four research questions that related to: (1) the 
validity of the original LEAS-C in children and adolescents, (2) the validity of an 
adapted version of the LEAS-C in children and adolescents, (3) the cognitive 
representation of the emotion domain in children, adolescents, students, and 
adults, and (4) the validity of the original MSCEIT-YV and an adapted and 
extended version of the MSCEIT-YV in children and adolescents. These research 
questions were addressed in six empirical studies that were presented in Chapter 
2, 3, 4, and 5. The following sections briefly summarize the main findings and 
contributions of this dissertation and explicit how they answer the four research 
questions. 
 
Research question 1: Is the original LEAS-C a valid measure to assess 
emotional awareness? 
This first research question focused on the validity of the original LEAS-C in 
childhood and adolescence. When this dissertation started, the LEAS-C was 
believed to be a valid assessment of emotional awareness, yet, only one study in 
literature reported preliminary validity evidence on this LEAS-C (Bajgar, 
Ciarrochi, Lane, & Deane, 2005). This study was concerned with the construction 
and initial validation of the LEAS-C. It was executed in a small sample (N = 51) 
with a restricted age range (10 to 11 years), no internal structure analyses were 
performed, the network of convergent and discriminant relationships was 
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restricted to a limited breadth of correlates, and the key assumption of the LEA 
model that emotional awareness develops with age was tested against normative 
adult data and not supported. The first empirical study of this dissertation 
(Chapter 2) therefore extended the preliminary validity evidence of the original 
LEAS-C and tested age differences in emotional awareness in a substantially 
larger sample (N = 318) with a much broader age range (10 to 17 years). 
First, results indicated that the reliability was found to be acceptable for 
self-, other-, and total-awareness scores in agreement with the study of Bajgar et 
al. (2005). Second, the internal structure was tested for different theoretical and 
design-driven models. The structural results indicated that the total-awareness 
scores fitted the a priori theorized one-factor structure, implying that the total-
awareness score, which is mostly used in assessment, can be justified. Further, 
best fit was found for a design-driven two-factor structure on self-awareness and 
other-awareness scores. However, because these self and other factors were 
highly correlated, it remains appropriate to use a total-awareness score. Third, a 
much broader network of convergent and discriminant relationships was 
investigated. Our results showed that the pattern of correlations for total-
awareness scores was in line with the theoretical framework of the LEAS-C and 
prior findings with the LEAS-C (Bajgar et al., 2005) and the LEAS (e.g., Ciarrochi, 
Scott, Deane, & Heaven, 2003; Lane et al., 1996; Waller & Scheidt, 2004). We 
observed positive correlations with intelligence (verbal intelligence, overall 
intelligence, and abstract reasoning), personality (openness, agreeableness, and 
conscientiousness), emotional intelligence (understanding emotions, managing 
emotions, and overall emotional intelligence), negative correlations with 
alexithymia (externally-oriented thinking), and no correlations with social and 
emotional impairment (self-concept, depression, anxiety, anger, and disruptive 
behaviors). Moreover, gender differences were looked at. We confirmed that girls 
outperformed boys for self-, other-, and total-awareness scores (Bajgar et al., 
2005). An finally, age differences were investigated. Despite a large sample with 
a broad age range was used in this study, we were not able to find age 
differences in self-, other-, and total-awareness scores.  
So, the answer for the first research question Is the original LEAS-C a 
valid measure to assess emotional awareness? should be “no, but”. The lack of 
age differences in a substantially larger sample with a much broader age range 
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questions the validity of the LEAS-C. As the LEA model is rooted in 
developmental theorizing, that is, Piaget’s (Flavell, 1962) theory of cognitive 
development and Werner and Kaplan’s (1963) theories of symbolization and 
language development (Lane & Schwartz, 1987), a valid measurement of 
emotional awareness in children and adolescents should demonstrate an 
increase in emotional awareness with age. However, the tested models pointed 
to a straightforward internal structure, the network of convergent and discriminant 
relationships did show the expected pattern of relationships with intelligence, 
personality, emotional intelligence, alexithymia, and social and emotional 
impairment, and the gender differences were confirmed, which provided evidence 
for the potential value of the LEAS-C. 
 
Research question 2: Can the validity of the original LEAS-C be improved 
by redesigning the instructions and the scoring procedure based on the 
componential emotion approach? 
This second research question focused on the validity of an adapted version of 
the LEAS-C in childhood and adolescence. The original LEAS-C is based upon a 
cognitive-developmental theory, but is not embedded in a clear theoretical 
framework on emotions. The instructions and the scoring procedure are mainly 
focused on feelings, while contemporary emotion psychology recognizes a 
component process definition to emotion with the different emotion components 
of appraisal, action tendency, bodily reaction, expression, and feeling considered 
important (Scherer, 2005). The word feel in the instructions may have resulted in 
unwanted response variation because it is often differentially interpreted in daily 
life (Mulligan & Scherer, 2012). Moreover, the scoring procedure cannot account 
for the different emotion components that may be represented in the descriptions 
because it only takes information on the highest reached level of emotional 
awareness into account for each perspective in each scenario, irrespective 
whether descriptions contain information on other levels. The second empirical 
study of this dissertation (Chapter 3) therefore attempted to improve the validity 
of the original LEAS-C by adapting the instructions and the scoring procedure in 
agreement with the componential emotion approach. The instructions were 
changed from a focus on feelings to a focus on experience, while respondents 
were instructed to attend to all emotion components. Further, a new 
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componential scoring procedure was developed that takes the different emotion 
components that are represented in the descriptions into account. Because the 
changes required respondents to provide more information in their descriptions, 
the adapted LEAS-C contained only six scenarios to reduce the risk of tiredness 
and overload. This study moreover tested age differences in emotional 
awareness for this adapted version of the LEAS-C. The data were collected in a 
large sample (N = 574) with a broad age range (8 to 16 years) and scored with 
both the original and the componential scoring procedure.  
First, both the original and the componential scored data of the adapted 
LEAS-C were found reliable for self-, other-, and total-awareness scores. In light 
of the studies that up to now examined the reliability of the original LEAS-C 
(Bajgar et al., 2005; Marchetti et al., 2010; Veirman et al., 2011), similar internal 
consistency coefficients were found with the original scoring procedure, and 
substantially higher internal consistency coefficients were found with the 
componential scoring procedure. The better quality of the componential scoring 
procedure, compared to the original one, was further supported by a high inter-
rater reliability for self-, other-, and total-awareness scores. Second, the internal 
structure was investigated. Structural results showed that the total-awareness 
scores fitted a one-factor structure for both scoring procedures. Moreover, the 
self-awareness and other-awareness scores also fitted a one-factor structure for 
both scoring procedures, with best fit found for the componential scored data. 
This finding contradicts the support for a two-factor model for self-awareness and 
other-awareness scores that was found in Chapter 1 with the original LEAS-C. 
Possibly the different aspects of the emotion process that are salient from the 
self- and the other-perspective, have disappeared in the adapted LEAS-C 
because the componential instructions stimulated to report on the whole emotion 
process for both perspectives. Third, the network of convergent and discriminant 
relationships was examined. Our results showed that the pattern of correlations 
for total-awareness scores was in line with theoretical expectations and previous 
findings with the original LEAS-C (Bajgar et al., 2005; Marchetti et al., 2010; 
Veirman et al., 2011). For the original and the componential scoring, we 
observed positive correlations with intelligence (verbal intelligence, overall 
intelligence, abstract reasoning), personality (extraversion and openess), and 
emotional intelligence (facilitating thoughts, understanding emotions, managing 
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emotions, and overall emotional intelligence), negative correlations with 
alexithymia (externally-oriented thinking and overall alexithymia), and no 
correlations with social and emotional impairment (i.e., self-concept, depression, 
anxiety, anger and disruptive behaviors). Moreover, gender differences were 
inspected and confirmed that girls outperformed boys for self-, other-, and total-
awareness scores for both scoring procedures. Finally, the expected age 
differences in self-, other-, and total-awareness scores were now observed. The 
age differences emerged with the original scoring procedure and were even more 
pronounced when the componential scoring procedure was used. The adapted 
version of the LEAS-C thus fully supports Lane and Schwartz’s (1987) statement 
that emotional awareness develops with age. 
So, the answer for the second research question Can the validity of the 
original LEAS-C be improved by redesigning the instructions and the scoring 
procedure based on the componential emotion approach? should be “yes”. By 
using a component process definition to emotion, we were successful in adapting 
the instructions and the scoring procedure of the original LEAS-C. For the 
adapted LEAS-C, the tested models pointed to a clear-cut internal structure, the 
network of convergent and discriminant relationships showed the expected 
pattern of relationships with intelligence, personality, emotional intelligence, 
alexithymia, and social and emotional impairment, gender differences were 
confirmed, and most importantly also age differences were revealed. 
 
Research question 3: Do children and adolescents represent emotions the 
same way as students and adults do? 
This third research question addressed the comparability of the cognitive 
representation of the emotion domain for children, adolescents, students and 
adults. The scoring procedure that is applied to score the responses of the 
MSCEIT-YV is primarily based on adult criteria that combine theoretical criteria, 
research findings, and expert judgements. Consensus scoring based on a large 
sample of children and adolescents was thought not to be appropriate. In the 
initial normative sample, children and adolescents identified for many items not 
the best suited answer as being correct (Papadogiannis, Logan, & Sitarenios, 
2009). It may however be questioned whether adult criteria can be used to 
evaluate the correctness of responses to emotion-related questions for children 
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and adolescents. The third and fourth empirical study of this doctoral dissertation 
(Chapter 4) therefore investigated whether children and adolescents represent 
emotions the same way as students and adults do. These studies focused on 
emotion words because it has been demonstrated that emotion words contain 
information on all components of the emotion process (Fontaine, Scherer, 
Soriano, 2013) and emotion words are part of virtually every item in the MSCEIT-
YV.  
 The third empirical study of this dissertation (Chapter 4) was performed in 
a large sample of participants from mid-childhood up to early adulthood (N = 
5071). A representative set of free listed emotion terms was selected, using a 
component process definition to emotion (Scherer, 2005). These emotion terms 
included nearly all GRID emotion terms, a representative set of emotion terms 
that is based on often used words in emotion research and words that are 
derived from empirical findings in adults (Fontaine, Scherer, & Soriano, 2013). 
Generally, girls reported more emotion terms than boys, more emotion terms 
were reported with increasing age, and this age effect was more pronounced for 
girls compared to boys. The results of this study are important for emotion 
research as this study was the first to examine the emotion lexicon at this scale 
by way of free listing, showing that the number and range of emotion terms 
broadens and becomes more fine-grained with age. These results may signify 
that gender and age differences can be expected to occur in measures that 
predominantly rely on emotion terms. 
In the fourth empirical study of this dissertation (Chapter 4), a similarity 
rating task was developed, based on ideas of the GRID research that studied the 
components of emotional meaning (Fontaine, Scherer, & Soriano, 2013), and 
administered in a large sample of children, adolescents, students, and adults (N 
= 1184). The results showed that the pairwise similarities were more reliable for 
students and adults than for children and adolescents. However, the average 
similarities of the child-adolescent sample, the student sample, and the adult-
sample could all be adequately represented in the same four-dimensional space. 
With increasing age, children and adolescents become more accurate in 
representing the emotion terms along the same four dimensions that also 
structure the adult representation. Besides an age effect on the reliability of the 
similarity ratings, also the salience of the four dimensions differed between the 
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child-adolescent sample on one hand and the student and the adult samples on 
the other hand. Moreover, an age effect in the child-adolescent sample was 
demonstrated. It was observed that the valence dimension becomes more salient 
and the power, arousal, and novelty dimensions become relatively less salient 
with increasing age of children. This suggests that children and adolescents 
become better in understanding how different emotion processes resemble one 
another in function of their hedonic tone. The results of this study add to the field 
of emotion research as they show for the first time in literature that when no 
emotion features are primed and a simple similarity rating task with a 
representative set of emotion terms is used, a four dimensional structure with 
valence, power, arousal, and novelty is observed among children and 
adolescents, students and adults. Furthermore, these findings can justify the use 
of adult criteria in scoring child and adolescent measurements in emotional 
intelligence research. Both adults and children and adolescents organize the 
emotion domain along the same underlying dimensions. Moreover, it has to be 
noted that the results of these studies directly formed the basis for the 
development of a new additional set of emotional intelligence items for the 
second empirical study on the MSCEIT-YV in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. In 
these items, emotion terms are compared to other emotion terms. 
So, the answer for the third research question Do children and 
adolescents represent emotions the same way as students and adults do? 
should be “yes”. Children and adolescents reported similar emotion terms than 
those that are commonly used in adult research, and children and adolescents 
evaluate emotion terms along the same dimensions of valence, power, arousal, 
and novelty as students and adults do. 
 
Research question 4: Does a scoring directly based on the raw responses 
of rating-based ability MSCEIT-YV tests confirms the conceptual, 
correlational, and developmental criteria that are used to decide on 
emotional intelligence as a standard intelligence? 
Traditionally, either expert or consensus scoring have been applied to score 
maximum performance emotional intelligence tests. These scoring approaches, 
however, have been heavily criticised (e.g., Maul, 2012a, 2012b; Wilhelm, 2005). 
We developed a theoretical framework to understand how raw responses of 
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rating-based MSCEIT-YV and similar tests are structured, and investigated the 
value of this framework in the fifth and sixth empirical study of this doctoral 
dissertation (Chapter 5). First, a bipolar emotional intelligence factor was 
hypothesized for rating-based MSCEIT-YV tests and similar tests. This 
hypothesis was based on the Personal construct theory (Kelly, 1955). According 
to this theory, all human thinking is bipolar in nature. Moreover, it was 
hypothesized that acquiescence and possibly multidimensionality mask the 
emergence of the theoretically expected bipolar emotional intelligence factors. 
These hypotheses were derived from groundbreaking research on the bipolarity 
of affect (Russell , 1979; Russell & Carroll, 1999). The results were also related 
the three criteria (i.e., conceptual, correlational, and developmental) that Mayer, 
Salovey, and Caruso (2000) used to interpret emotional intelligence as a 
legitimate intelligence.  
A first study was performed in a large sample (N = 630) with a broad age 
range (10 to 17 years) on the rating-based MSCEIT-YV perceiving, facilitating, 
and managing tests. A second study was also executed in a large sample (N = 
664) with a broad age range (8 to 16 years) and looked additionally to a rating 
version of the MSCEIT-YV understanding test and additional sets of items for 
perceiving, facilitating, and managing.  
Our results showed evidence for the existence and generalizability of a 
bipolar emotional intelligence factor and a unipolar acquiescence factor for all 
rating-based tests. This structure was found in each study for each split-half 
sample and was also replicated for the complete sample, showing the robustness 
of the results. A two-factor model with a general emotional intelligence factor and 
a general acquiescence factor provided a good fit for the individual emotional 
intelligence and acquiescence scores for all rating-based tests. The general 
emotional intelligence factor showed the expected pattern of correlations with 
external criteria, gender differences in favor for girls, and growth with age.  
So, the answer for the fourth research question Does a scoring directly 
based on the raw responses of rating-based ability MSCEIT-YV tests confirms 
the conceptual, correlational, and developmental criteria that are used to decide 
on emotional intelligence as a standard intelligence? should be “yes”. Evidence 
on the validity of ability emotional intelligence does not necessarily has to rely on 
expert or consensus scoring, a coherent interpretable ability emotional 
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intelligence construct can be found on the basis of the raw data of rating-based 
tests. The results of both studies are important for the emotional intelligence 
domain, because they showed for the first time in literature that a bottom-up 
investigation of the internal structure of rating-based ability emotional intelligence 
tests offers a fruitful alternative to the traditional scoring procedures. They further 
highlighted that these traditional scoring procedures are vulnerable to 
acquiescence. Both studies stress the importance of adopting this new 
developed framework to further examine the validity of this type of 
measurements. 
 
STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
The studies that were performed in this dissertation are characterized by two 
major strengths. First, they all consisted of both large and heterogeneous (in 
terms of age, gender, and education level) samples. The robust results of these 
studies for the LEAS-C and the MSCEIT-YV can thus be safely generalized to 
the wider population of children and adolescents. Second, these studies all 
systematically focused on key validity issues such as the internal structure, the 
network of convergent and discriminant relationships, and the scoring, resulting 
in a comprehensive evaluation of the validity of the LEAS-C and the MSCEIT-YV. 
In spite of the strengths and contributions of the six studies that were 
conducted, the following paragraphs also describe some limitations that should 
be acknowledged. Also, possible avenues for future research are suggested. 
First, while the current dissertation extended existing validity evidence on 
the original LEAS-C in Chapter 2 and improved its validity by developing an 
adapted LEAS-C in Chapter 3, it was found that the self- and the other 
perspective were either very highly correlated in the original LEAS-C, or even 
non-distinguishable in the adapted LEAS-C. Future research that is interested in 
assessing differences between the self- and the other perspective may therefore 
need to develop other formats than the paper-and-pencil format. Because in 
everyday social interactions, people observe verbal and nonverbal behavior of 
others, a video-based format would provide a more realistic and vivid multimodal 
representation of the scenarios. For example, while the paper-and-pencil format 
with written scenarios for the adapted LEAS-C resulted in descriptions that 
contain mainly appraisals, action tendencies, and feelings, the descriptions could 
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show a larger difference between self- and other descriptions - with for instance 
much more reference to expressive information in the other-perspective - when 
the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the characters in the scenarios can be 
observed.  
Second, despite the fact that the expected pattern of correlations was 
consistently confirmed for the original LEAS-C (Chapter 2), the adapted LEAS-C 
(Chapter 3), the original MSCEIT-YV, and the adapted and extended MSCEIT-
YV (Chapter 5), the correlations with self-concept and psychopathology were 
either not significant or small. Two possible post hoc explanations can be 
formulated. 
A first explanation is related to the sample composition. All samples in this 
dissertation were community samples. It would be interesting for future research 
to move to clinical samples, and also establish the validity of the instruments in 
these samples. For example, the adapted LEAS-C could be administered in 
children and adolescents with eating disorders, depression, or autism spectrum 
disorders. It could be investigated whether the adapted LEAS-C is able to reveal 
impairments in emotional awareness in these samples in comparison to healthy 
controls. A step further, it would also be interesting to examine whether a 
baseline level of emotional awareness at the start of therapy would be improved 
during therapy. From a prevention perspective, it may also be fruitful to know 
whether the adapted LEAS-C would be a good tool for school psychologists to 
screen children and adolescents on emotional awareness deficits, in order to 
provide early supportive counseling.  
A second explanation is that the emotion-related abilities that are 
measured by these tests are helpful, but not of critical importance for 
intrapersonal functioning. As we focused mainly on intrapersonal functioning, 
future research could provide valuable insight on how these tests relate to 
interpersonal functioning. For example, children and adolescents that show a 
high emotional intelligence on the MSCEIT-YV may be better in starting 
friendships and maintaining relationships, may be more comfortable in group 
discussions and better cooperate with other pupils for class assignments. In our 
studies on the original LEAS-C (Chapter 2), the adapted LEAS-C (Chapter 3), the 
original MSCEIT-YV, and the adapted and extended MSCEIT-YV (Chapter 5), we 
found that emotional intelligence is related to extraversion and agreeableness. 
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These personality traits serve a social purpose. Extraversion includes facets of 
energy, expressiveness, optimism, and shyness. People who are high in 
extraversion tend to search for social stimulation and occasions to engage with 
others. Agreeableness comprises facets of trust, straightforwardness, altruism, 
dominance, egocentrism, compliance and irritability. People who are high in 
agreeableness tend to believe that most people are trustworthy, decent, and 
honest (e.g., De Fruyt et al., 2006; Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997; John & 
Srivastava, 1999). Furthermore, recents advancements in the literature on ability 
emotional intelligence indeed subscribe the importance of emotional intelligence 
for interpersonal functioning. For instance, it has been shown that emotional 
intelligence is inversely related to loneliness in adolescence and early adulthood 
(e.g., Wols, Scholte, & Qualter, 2015; Zhang, Zou, Wang, & Sima Finy, 2015; 
Zysberg, 2012).  
Third, the current disseration offered a powerfull framework to come to a 
less biased measurement of emotional intelligence by distinguishing emotional 
intelligence and acquiescence in rating-based MSCEIT-YV tests (Chapter 5). As 
such, an important step is made to raise awareness among researchers that (1) it 
is of crucial importance to remove acquiescence from scores that intend to reflect 
emotional intelligence and (2) part of the relationships that have been previously 
reported with consensus and expert scored rating-based emotional intelligence 
tests have to be attributed to acquiescence. Moreover, these findings pave the 
way for two lines of future research. 
A first line of research can examine the relationship between the MSCEIT 
and emotion processing tasks. Recent studies failed to find an association 
between the MSCEIT and emotion information processing, concluding that the 
MSCEIT may be tapping into just crystallized intelligence (Farrelly & Austin, 
2007; Fiori & Antonakis, 2012; Roberts et al., 2006). However, this conclusion 
may be premature because acquiescence may have concealed the association 
between the MSCEIT and emotion information processing tasks. As it has been 
claimed that emotional intelligence concerns the capacity “to carry out 
sophisticated information processing about emotions and emotion-relevant 
stimuli and to use this information as a guide to thinking and behavior” (Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2008, p. 503), it is problematic for the valdity of the MSCEIT 
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that hitherto no support is found for any relationship with experimental emotion 
processing tasks. 
A second line of research can explore the impact of other response 
biases that may confound scores. For example, future research could examine 
the impact of extremity. While it may be expected that extremity has an impact on 
the scores, distuinguishing extremity from valid differences in scores is a real 
challenge. Our results demonstrated that children and adolescents who have a 
higher emotional intelligence rate the items that represent correct responses 
higher and rate the items that represent incorrect responses lower on the 
response scales. Thus, within the assessment of emotional intelligence, extreme 
responding on rating scales also points to ability. 
Fourth, now that the current dissertation established age differences in 
emotional intelligence in cross-sectional samples, future studies could include 
longitudinal designs to follow up the same cohorts from childhood, over 
adolescence, into adulthood. These designs may allow to investigate how 
emotion-related abilities evolve over time and which trajectories they follow. 
Fifth, it is important to further investigate method effects on maximum 
performance emotional intelligence instruments. Most research in this area has 
been concerned with the relationship between self-reported emotional 
intelligence and performance based measurement (e.g., O’Connor & Little, 2003; 
Van Rooy, Viswesvaran, & Pluta, 2005; Warwick & Nettelbeck, 2004). However, 
it would also be interesting to compare different maximum performance 
assessment procedures for the different branches of the MSCEIT-YV. It would 
allow us to determine how well these different tests converge in the assessment 
of emotional intelligence, how much variance can be accounted for by 
methodological factors, and how much variance can be accounted for the 
construct they intend to measure. In the current dissertation, a first attempt has 
been made for the emotion-related ability of understanding emotions. While the 
MSCEIT-YV is considered as an integrative measure of all emotion-related 
abilities, including understanding emotions, the LEAS-C has been categorized as 
just a measure of understanding emotions (e.g., Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 
2008). Our results, however, suggest that both measures of understanding 
emotions are not interchangeable. As can be seen in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
only small correlations were observed between the LEAS-C (self, other, and total 
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scores) and the MSCEIT-YV (branch scores as well as total scores) in general (-
.01 ≤ r ≤ .24). Although the highest correlations for the LEAS-C self, other, and 
total scores are found with either the MSCEIT-YV understanding emotions 
branch scores (.16 ≤ r ≤ .21) or the MSCEIT-YV total emotional intelligence 
scores (.17 ≤ r ≤ .24), we actually expected at least to find moderate correlations 
among tests that are considered to measure the same subconstruct. These small 
correlations are in line with the small correlations that have been found between 
the LEAS and the MSCEIT in a prior study of Ciarrochi, Caputi, and Mayer 
(2003), suggesting that both tests measure distinct domains. A post-hoc 
interpretation of these low correlations may be that these tests each measure 
understanding at a different level. While the LEAS-C deals with the complexity of 
how people construe emotional experiences, the MSCEIT-YV rather deals with 
how well people conform to the societal norm with respect to emotional 
experiences. So, the complexity of emotional experiences does not necessarily 
has to correspond to the content of the emotional experiences. Our findings 
suggest that both tests are rather complementary than equivalent measures. 
Future research is yet needed to further disentangle the meaning of this 
complementarity and thus the specific usefulness of both tests in practice. 
Likewise, future research that is interested in the ability of managing emotions 
may compare the rating-based managing MSCEIT-YV test with for instance the 
recently developed child version of the multiple choice Situational Test for 
Emotion Management (STEM; MacCann, Fogarty, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2011; 
MacCann, Wang, Matthews, & Roberts, 2010). 
Finally, further research could see how the MSCEIT-YV could be 
improved. For example, despite Mayer et al. (2000) provide a broad, general 
interpretation of the ability of perceiving emotions, the tasks that are used are 
very specific. They define the ability of perceiving emotions from both the 
expresser and the observer standpoint, yet, the measurement is limited to the 
assessment of the observer point of view. Furthermore, the ability of perceiving 
emotions is measured via a restricted number of still faces while also other 
modalities (i.e., voice and body) are considered to be essential in emotion 
recognition ability (e.g., Elfenbein, Beaupré, Lévesque, & Hess, 2007). Recent 
promising advancements in adult research have been made in this area with the 
Geneva Emotion Recognition Test, that includes all modalities and works with 
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dynamic displays (GERT; Schlegel, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2014). Moreover, the 
fairness and measurement equivalence of the specific stimuli for subgroups could 
be examined (i.e., age: children and adolescents versus adults; gender: male 
versus female; ethnicity: the same ethnicity of the respondent versus other 
ethnicities). 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
To summarize, this dissertation contributes to the field of ability emotional 
intelligence by addressing the lack of research on maximum performance 
measures that are thought to be appropriate for use in children and adolescents. 
This dissertation focused on the test validation and the test adaptation of two 
state-of-the-art maximum performance measures, namely the LEAS-C and the 
MSCEIT-YV. We found that the original LEAS-C lacks important validity evidence 
because no relationship could be found with age. Moreover, we demonstrated 
that the validity of the LEAS-C was improved by adapting the instructions and the 
scoring system on the basis of the componential emotion theory and these 
adaptations enabled us to reveal the theoretically expected relationships with 
age. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the emotion domain is organized in a 
comparable way for children and adolescents on the one hand and adults on the 
other hand, justifying the use of adult criteria to score children and adolescent 
items and providing a solid base for item development. Finally, we demonstrated 
for the MSCEIT-YV that the raw responses of rating-based ability emotional 
intelligence tests can be used to identify emotional intelligence without using 
current scoring procedures. The various studies that were performed in this 
dissertation contributed to central themes in the emotional intelligence literature, 
and thereby set the stage for further research on emotional intelligence in various 
domains. 
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Inleiding 
De voorbije twee decennia kreeg emotionele intelligentie bijzonder veel aandacht 
zowel vanuit de populaire (e.g., Goleman, 1995) als de wetenschappelijke 
psychologie (e.g., Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Emotionele intelligentie wordt 
beschouwd als een belangrijke aanvulling op de traditionele benadering van 
intelligentie en wordt beweerd te bestaan uit een aantal emotionele vaardigheden 
waarbij het redeneren over emoties en het gebruiken van emoties om het 
redeneren te ondersteunen centraal staan (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008). 
Omdat er wordt van uitgegaan dat deze emotionele vaardigheden bijdragen tot 
het succesvol zijn in het leven (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2007) wordt 
emotionele intelligentie als een belangrijke predictor voor diverse uitkomsten in 
onderwijsomgevingen (e.g., leren; Barchard, 2003), de werkplaats (e.g., selectie 
van werknemers, gedrag van werknemers en werkgevers; Côté & Miners, 2006) 
en klinische contexten (e.g., behandeling; Nelis, Quoidbach, Mikolajczak, & 
Hansenne, 2009; Nelis et al., 2011) gezien, wat onmiddelijk ook het belang ervan 
voor de maatschappij onderschrijft. Het onderzoeksveld naar emotionele 
intelligentie wordt echter gekenmerkt door grote verdeeldheid over hoe het 
concept theoretisch moet worden gedefinieerd en empirisch moet worden 
gemeten (e.g., Mayer et al., 2008). 
Hoewel er doorheen de 20e eeuw sporadisch gebruik werd gemaakt van 
het woord emotionele intelligentie in de literatuur (e.g., Leuner, 1966; Payne, 
1986; Van Ghent, 1953), en onderzoekers geleidelijk aan evolueerden van een 
strikte scheiding tussen onderzoek naar intelligentie en onderzoek naar emotie 
tot een geintegreerd onderzoeksdomein van cognitie en emotie (e.g., Mayer, 
2001), werd emotionele intelligentie pas in 1990 voor het eerst in de 
wetenschappelijke literatuur geintroduceerd. Salovey en Mayer (1990, p. 189) 
defineerden emotionele intelligentie als “de vaardigheid om de eigen gevoelens 
en emoties en deze van anderen te monitoren en te onderscheiden, en deze 
informatie te gebruiken om het eigen denken en de eigen acties te sturen”. Drie 
jaar later benadrukten Mayer en Salovey de nood aan verder onderzoek naar 
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emotionele intelligentie en claimden ze dat emotionele intelligentie kan worden 
gezien als een vorm van klassieke intelligentie (Mayer & Salovey, 1993). In 1995 
zorgde het boek “Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ” van 
Daniel Goleman voor de popularisatie van emotionele intelligentie bij het brede 
publiek (Goleman, 1995). Hij definieerde emotionele intelligentie als “de 
capaciteit om de eigen gevoelens en deze van anderen te herkennen, om onszelf 
te motiveren, en om emoties in onszelf en onze relaties te reguleren,” en zag 
deze vaardigheden als “vaardigheden die te onderscheiden zijn van, maar 
complementair zijn met, academische intelligentie, de pure cognitieve 
capaciteiten zoals gemeten door IQ” (Goleman, 1998, p. 317). Sindsdien nam het 
aantal gepubliceerde wetenschappelijke artikelen exponentieel toe, vonden er 
vele verfijningen van het concept emotionele intelligentie plaats en werden 
diverse nieuwe instrumenten ontwikkeld om emotionele intelligentie te meten. 
 De theoretische benaderingen van emotionele intelligentie kunnen 
grofweg worden opgedeeld in twee grote stromingen: de gemengde modellen en 
de vaardigheidsmodellen van emotionele intelligentie. De gemengde modellen 
gaan er van uit dat emotionele intelligentie bestaat uit een combinatie van 
persoonlijkheidstrekken en niet-cognitieve vermogens en competenties (Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2000). Zo definieerde Bar-On (1997, p. 16) emotionele 
intelligentie als “een reeks van niet-cognitieve vermogens, competenties en 
vaardigheden die iemands kans van slagen en het omgaan met eisen en druk uit 
de omgeving beïnvloeden”. Deze brede definitie omvat dus een combinatie van 
dispositionele, motivationele, en situationele aspecten (MacCann, Matthews, 
Zeidner & Roberts, 2003). De vaardigheidsmodellen daarentegen beschouwen 
emotionele intelligentie als een type van klassieke intelligentie dat zich richt op 
de cognitieve verwerking van emotionele informatie (Mayer et al., 2000). Volgens 
de definitie van Mayer et al. (2000, p. 396) is emotionele intelligentie “de 
vaardigheid om emoties waar te nemen en uit te drukken, emoties te gebruiken 
in denkprocessen, emoties te begrijpen en te redeneren met emoties, en emoties 
in zichzelf en anderen te reguleren. De vaardigheidsmodellen worden opgedeeld 
in twee types: de specifieke vaardigheidsmodellen en de integratieve 
vaardigheidsmodellen. De specifieke vaardigheidsmodellen focussen op 
individuele mentale vaardigheden die van belang zijn voor emotionele 
intelligentie, de integratieve vaardigheidsmodellen daarentegen stellen een 
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integratie van deze vaardigheden voor in een omvattend, overkoepelend model 
(Mayer et al., 2008). 
De meetmethoden kunnen volgens Petrides en Furnham (2000a, 2000b, 
2001, 2003, 2006) in een alternatieve opdeling - deels overlappend met de 
beschreven conceptuele opdeling tussen de gemengde modellen en de 
vaardigheidsmodellen (Mayer et al., 2000) - worden geplaatst die rekening houdt 
met het fundamenteel onderscheid tussen typische en maximale performantie 
(e.g., Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Cronbach, 1949; Hofstee, 2001). Zij 
onderscheiden enerzijds emotionele intelligentie als trek, waarbij emotionele 
intelligentie wordt beschouwd als een persoonlijkheidstrek en wordt gemeten met 
zelfrapportage vragenlijsten, en anderzijds emotionele intelligentie als 
vaardigheid, waarbij emotionele intelligentie wordt beschouwd als een cognitieve 
vaardigheid en wordt gemeten met maximale prestatietesten. De zelfrapportage 
vragenlijsten zijn ontwikkeld om de percepties en opvattingen van mensen over 
hun competenties in bepaalde domeinen van emotionele intelligentie in kaart te 
brengen (Salovey, Woolery, & Mayer, 2000). In dit type van metingen wordt 
gevraagd aan te geven in welke mate men akkoord of niet akkoord gaat met een 
reeks beschrijvingen over het eigen niveau van emotionele intelligentie en vaak 
ook van een aantal emotie-gerelateerde disposities (e.g., Brackett, Rivers, 
Shiffman, Lerner, & Salovey, 2006; Pérez, Petrides, & Furnham, 2005; Schutte et 
al., 1998; Wong & Law, 2002). Deze meetinstrumenten zijn vooral ontwikkeld 
vanuit de gemengde modellen (e.g., Bar-On, 1997), hoewel er ook ontwikkeld 
zijn vanuit de vaardigheidsmodellen (e.g., Schutte et al., 1998). Maximale 
prestatietesten zijn ontwikkeld om emotionele vaardigheden van mensen in kaart 
te brengen (e.g., Mayer et al., 2008). In dit type van metingen wordt gevraagd het 
meest adequate antwoord te selecteren voor een reeks items die emotie-
gebaseerde probleemoplossing vereisen. De verkregen antwoorden worden 
vervolgens geëvalueerd volgens voorafbepaalde scoringscriteria (Roberts, 
Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001). Deze meetinstrumenten zijn allen gebaseerd op 
vaardigheidsmodellen (e.g., Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002). 
Dit doctoraat conceptualiseert emotionele intelligentie volgens de 
vaardigheidsmodellen en gaat er van uit dat enkel maximale prestatietesten 
geschikt zijn voor het in kaart brengen van emotionele vaardigheden omwille van 
semantische, theoretische, en empirische redenen. Semantisch gezien typeert 
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de indicator emotionele het zelfstandig naamwoord intelligentie (Carroll, 1993). 
Het zelfstandig naamwoord intelligentie duidt op een construct dat een cognitieve 
vaardigheid of een geheel van cognitieve vaardigheden omvat (Rivers, Brackett, 
Salovey, & Mayer, 2007). Daarnaast is een sterkere top-down evaluatie mogelijk 
van theorieën die emotionele intelligentie conceptualiseren als een vaardigheid of 
een geheel van vaardigheden in vergelijking met de meer inductieve 
conceptualisaties van emotionele intelligentie als een persoonlijkheidstrek. Tot 
slot is het de empirische evidentie die verkregen is met maximale prestatietesten 
en niet de empirische evidentie die verkregen is met zelfrapportage vragenlijsten 
die emotionele intelligentie als een vaardigheid of een geheel van vaardigheden 
ondersteund en is de empirische evidentie met zelfrapportage vragenlijsten voor 
conceptualisaties van emotionele intelligentie als een persoonlijkheidstrek eerder 
heterogeen en meer inconsistent (e.g., Mayer, et al., 2008). 
Onderzoek naar emotionele intelligentie vanuit de vaardigheidsmodellen 
met maximale prestatietesten blijkt tot hiertoe voornamelijk uitgevoerd te zijn bij 
volwassenen. Pas recentelijk zijn een aantal testen ontwikkeld voor gebruik bij 
kinderen en adolescenten. Deze testen zijn gebaseerd op de eerder ontwikkelde 
testen voor gebruik bij volwassenen, hoewel het niet duidelijk is of deze testen 
eenzelfde betekenis hebben voor kinderen en adolescenten en op een 
gelijkaardige manier functioneren bij kinderen en adolescenten. Als we de aard 
van emotionele intelligentie meer omvattend willen begrijpen is het dus 
noodzakijk om ook te focussen op een valide meting van emotionele intelligentie 
bij kinderen en adolescenten. Daarom richt dit doctoraat zich op de twee 
belangrijkste beschikbare testen voor kinderen en adolescenten, namelijk de 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children (LEAS-C) en de Mayer-
Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth Version (MSCEIT-YV). 
De vier onderzoeksvragen die in dit doctoraat centraal staan richten zich 
op de testvalidatie en de testadaptatie van deze testen: (1) de validiteit van de 
originele LEAS-C bij kinderen en adolescenten, (2) de validiteit van een 
aangepaste versie van de LEAS-C bij kinderen en adolescenten, (3) de 
cognitieve respresentatie van het emotiedomein bij kinderen, adolescenten, 
studenten, en volwassenen, en (4) de validiteit van de originele MSCEIT-YV en 
een aangepaste en uitgebreide versie van de MSCEIT-YV bij kinderen en 
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adolescenten. De vier onderzoeksvragen lopen parallel met de vier hoofdstukken 
die zes empirische studies beschrijven.  
In het volgende gedeelte wordt het onderzoeksproject geschetst. In een 
eerste deel wordt de LEAS-C beschreven en worden vervolgens (1) de 
onderzoeksvragen kort gekaderd binnen de bestaande literatuur, (2) de daaraan 
gekoppelde doelstellingen van de uitgevoerde studies beschreven, en (3) de 
belangrijkste bevindingen van deze studies en de daaruit volgende conclusies 
besproken. In een tweede deel wordt dezelfde benadering gevolgd voor de 
MSCEIT-YV. We sluiten tenslotte af met een korte algemene conclusie van het 
doctoraat. 
 
Huidig onderzoeksproject 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children 
De Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children (LEAS-C; Bajgar, 
Ciarrochi, Lane, & Deane, 2005) is de kindversie van de Levels of Emotional 
Awareness Scale (LEAS; Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, & Walker, 1990). Deze test 
meet één aspect van emotionele intelligentie, namelijk emotioneel inzicht, en 
gaat er van uit dat emotioneel inzicht een cognitieve vaardigheid is die ontwikkelt 
met leeftijd. Het instrument bekleedt een unieke positie tussen zelfrapportage 
vragenlijsten en maximale prestatietesten. Er wordt niet aan kinderen gevraagd 
om hun eigen niveau van emotioneel inzicht in te schatten zoals het geval is bij 
zelfrapportage vragenlijsten, en hun antwoorden worden ook niet gescoord op 
correctheid wat het geval is bij maximale prestatietesten. Ze worden gevraagd 
om te beschrijven hoe ze zichzelf zouden voelen (zelf-perspectief) en hoe een 
andere persoon zich zou voelen (ander-perspectief) in verschillende aangeboden 
scenario’s om zo de dispositionele manier van hoe men omgaat met emotionele 
informatie uit te lokken. 
Hoewel er verschillen zijn tussen de LEAS-C en de LEAS voor de 
scenario’s (12 scenario’s bij de LEAS-C en 20 scenario’s bij de LEAS), zijn het 
theoretisch kader en de scoringsprocedure van beide testen identiek. In 
overeenstemming met het Levels of Emotional Awareness (LEA) model worden 
er drie scores toegekend, namelijk een zelfscore, een anderscore, en een 
totaalscore (e.g., Lane & Schwartz, 1987; Lane et al., 1990). Deze scores 
worden verondersteld het niveau van complexiteit in de beschrijvingen voor elk 
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scenario weer te geven. Op Niveau 0 worden cognities gescoord (e.g., Ik zou 
denken dat het al van in het begin geen goed idee was). Op Niveau 1 worden 
lichamelijke gewaarwordingen (e.g., Ik zou me misselijk voelen) of een gebrek 
aan een emotionele respons (e.g., Ik zou helemaal niets voelen) geplaatst. Op 
Niveau 2 worden acties (e.g., Ik zou me voelen alsof ik mij niet kan bewegen) of 
algemene emotionele toestanden (e.g., Ik zou me goed voelen) gescoord. Op 
Niveau 3 worden enkelvoudige emoties geplaatst (e.g., Ik zou me jaloers voelen). 
Op Niveau 4 worden combinaties van emoties gescoord (e.g., Ik zou me blij en 
verliefd voelen). Tot slot, worden combinaties van emoties die voor het zelf en de 
ander gedifferentieerd zijn op Niveau 5 gescoord (e.g., Ik zou me beschaamd en 
bang voelen en mijn vriend zou zich kwaad en verdrietig voelen). De zelf- en 
anderscores zijn gebaseerd op het hoogst behaalde niveau in het antwoord op 
een scenario en kunnen dus variëren van 0 tot 4. De totaalscore is gebaseerd op 
de hoogste score voor zelf en ander, tenzij er voor zelf en ander een score 4 
wordt gegeven en er differentiatie is tussen de emotietermen voor het zelf- en het 
ander-perspectief. 
 
Onderzoeksvraag 1: Is de originele LEAS-C een valide maat om emotioneel 
inzicht te meten? 
De validiteitsevidentie voor de LEAS-C was bij de aanvang van dit doctoraat 
beperkt tot slechts één gepubliceerde wetenschappelijke studie (Bajgar et al., 
2005). Deze studie beschreef de constructie en de initiële validatie van de LEAS-
C in een kleine steekproef (N = 51) met een beperkt leeftijdsbereik (10- en 11-
jarigen). Er werden geen analyses op de interne structuur uitgevoerd, het 
netwerk van convergente en discriminante relaties was beperkt tot slechts een 
aantal correlaten, en de kernassumptie van het LEA model dat emotioneel inzicht 
ontwikkelt met stijgende leeftijd werd getest met behulp van normatieve data bij 
volwassenen met de LEAS (Lane et al., 1996) en niet ondersteund. 
 De eerste empirische studie die in hoofdstuk 2 van dit doctoraat wordt 
beschreven had daarom tot doelstelling om de bestaande preliminaire 
validiteitsevidentie uit te breiden en leeftijdsverschillen in emotioneel inzicht te 
testen in een substantieel grotere steekproef (N = 318) met een veel breder 
leeftijdsbereik (10- tot 17-jarigen). 
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 Uit de resultaten bleek dat de betrouwbaarheid aanvaardbaar was voor 
zelf-, ander-, en totaalscores, gelijkend aan de resultaten betreffende de interne 
consistentie die werden gerapporteerd in de studie van Bajgar et al. (2005). De 
resultaten van de interne structuur analyses toonden goede tot aanvaardbare 
fitmaten voor een één-factor model voor de totaalscores en een twee-factor 
model voor zelf- en anderscores samen waarbij de zelf- en anderfactoren hoog 
gecorreleerd bleken. Beiden ondersteunen het gebruik van de totaalscore voor 
de meting van emotioneel inzicht die het meest frequent wordt gehanteerd. Met 
betrekking tot het netwerk van convergente en discriminante relaties toonden de 
resultaten aan dat het patroon van correlaties voor de totaalscores met 
intelligentie, persoonlijkheid, alexithymie, emotionele intelligentie, en sociale en 
emotionele beperkingen in overeenstemming was met het theoretisch kader van 
de LEAS-C en eerdere onderzoeksbevindingen met de LEAS-C (Bajgar et al., 
2005) en de LEAS (e.g., Ciarrochi, Scott, Deane, & Heaven, 2003; Lane et al., 
1996; Waller & Scheidt, 2004). We vonden verder dat meisjes gemiddeld gezien 
hoger scoorden dan jongens voor zelf-, ander-, en totaalscores en bevestigen zo 
eerder gerapporteerde geslachtsverschillen (Bajgar et al., 2005). Er werden 
echter in tegenstelling tot onze verwachtingen geen leeftijdsverschillen gevonden 
voor zelf-, ander-, en totaalscores. 
De resultaten van dit eerste onderzoek laten geen duidelijk antwoord toe 
op de eerste onderzoeksvraag naar de validiteit van de LEAS-C. Het feit dat in 
deze studie met een substantieel grotere steekproef en een breder leeftijdsbereik 
geen leeftijdsverschillen werden gevonden is problematisch voor de validiteit van 
de LEAS-C. Het LEA model voorspelt immers een toename van emotioneel 
inzicht in de kindertijd en de adolescentie. Niettegenstaande vonden we dat de 
interne structuur, het netwerk van convergente en discriminante relaties, en de 
geslachtsverschillen volgens de verwachtingen waren en duidden op de 
potentiele waarde van de LEAS-C. 
 
Onderzoeksvraag 2: Kan de validiteit van de originele LEAS-C worden 
verbeterd door de instructies en de scoringsprocedure aan te passen op 
basis van de componentiële emotiebenadering? 
De LEAS-C is gebaseerd op een cognitieve ontwikkelingstheorie en is niet 
ingebed in een sterk theoretisch kader over emoties. De instructies en de 
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scoringsprocedure zijn voornamelijk gefocust op gevoelens. Binnen de huidige 
emotiepsychologie is het echter algemeen aanvaard dat een emotie bestaat uit 
verschillende emotiecomponenten (i.e., inschattingen, actietendenzen, 
lichamelijke reacties, expressies, en gevoelens) (Scherer, 2005). Omdat het 
woord voelen in het dagelijks leven op vele verschillende manieren kan worden 
geinterpreteerd kunnen de instructies geleid hebben tot ongewilde variatie in 
antwoorden (Mulligan & Scherer, 2012). Daarnaast is de scoringsprocedure ook 
niet in staat om de complexiteit van een emotionele ervaring in een beschrijving 
te vatten in termen van emotiecomponenten omdat het enkel het hoogst 
behaalde niveau van emotioneel inzicht in rekening brengt voor elk perspectief 
binnen elk scenario, ongeacht of een beschrijving nog informatie bevat over 
andere niveaus. 
 De tweede empirische studie die in hoofdstuk 3 van dit doctoraat wordt 
beschreven had daarom tot doelstelling om de validiteit van de LEAS-C te 
verbeteren door de instructies en de scoringsprocedure aan te passen in 
overeenstemming met de componentiële emotiebenadering. De instructies 
werden gewijzigd van voelen naar ervaren, en de aandacht van de deelnemers 
werd gevestigd op alle emotiecomponenten. Verder werd een nieuwe 
componentiële scoringsprocedure ontwikkeld die de verschillende in de 
beschrijvingen gerepresenteerde componenten in rekening bracht. Er werd in 
deze studie eveneens aandacht besteed aan de assumptie dat emotioneel 
inzicht ontwikkeld. De aangepaste LEAS-C betrof een verkorte versie van zes 
scenario’s om effecten van vermoeidheid en overbevraging te voorkomen en 
werd afgenomen van een aanzienlijk grote steekproef (N = 574) met een breed 
leeftijdsbereik (8- tot 16-jarigen). De data werden gescoord in overeenstemming 
met de originele scoringsprocedure en de componentiële scoringsprocedure. 
 De resultaten toonden aan dat zelf, ander, en totaalscores voor de 
aangepaste LEAS-C betrouwbaar waren, wat aansluit bij de bevindingen van 
studies die tot op heden zijn uitgevoerd met de originele LEAS-C (Bajgar et al., 
2005; Marchetti et al., 2010; Veirman et al., 2011). Er werden gelijkaardige 
betrouwbaarheden gevonden voor de originele scoringsprocedure en 
substantieel hogere betrouwbaarheden voor de componentiële 
scoringsprocedure. De componentiële scoringsprocedure vertoonde 
daarenboven een hoge interbeoordelaarsbetrouwbaarheid voor zelf, ander, en 
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totaalscores. De resultaten van de interne structuur analyses toonden goede 
fitmaten voor een één-factor model voor de totaalscores voor beide 
scoringsprocedures. Voor zelf- en anderscores werd de beste fit gevonden voor 
een één-factor model voor de componentieel gescoorde data. Deze bevinding 
spreekt de bevinding van het twee-factor model voor zelf- en anderscores uit 
Hoofdstuk 1 tegen. Waarschijnlijk heeft de aanpassing van de instructies ervoor 
gezorgd dat de beperkte verschillen tussen zelf en ander nu helemaal 
verdwijnen. Met betrekking tot het netwerk van convergente en discriminante 
relaties toonden de resultaten voor beide scoringsprocedures aan dat het 
patroon van correlaties voor de totaalscores met intelligentie, persoonlijkheid, 
alexithymie, emotionele intelligentie, en sociale en emotionele beperkingen in 
overeenstemming was met het theoretisch kader van de LEAS-C en eerdere 
onderzoeksbevindingen van de LEAS-C (Bajgar et al., 2005; Marchetti et al., 
2010; Veirman et al., 2011). We vonden eveneens dat meisjes gemiddeld gezien 
hoger scoorden dan jongens voor zelf-, ander-, en totaalscores en ondersteunen 
zo eerder gerapporteerde geslachtsverschillen met de originele LEAS-C (Bajgar 
et al., 2005; Marchetti et al., 2010; Veirman et al., 2011). Met de aangepaste 
versie werden zoals theoretisch verwacht leeftijdsverschillen voor zelf-, ander-, 
en totaalscores gevonden voor beide scoringsprocedures. Deze verschillen 
waren het meest uitgesproken voor de componentiële scoring. 
Het antwoord op de tweede onderzoeksvraag is dus duidelijk positief. De 
aanpassingen van de instructies en de scoringsprocedure in overeenstemming 
met een componentiële benadering op emoties resulteerden niet alleen een 
duidelijke interne structuur, het verwachte patroon van correlaties binnen het 
netwerk van convergente en discriminate relaties, en geslachtverschillen in het 
voordeel van meisjes. Meer nog, in deze studie met een grote steekproef en een 
breed leeftijdsbereik zijn nu ook leeftijdsverschillen gevonden, waardoor voor het 
eerst in de literatuur volledige ondersteuning wordt gevonden voor Lane en 
Schwartz’s (1987) claim dat emotioneel inzicht ontwikkelt met leeftijd.  
 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth Version 
De Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test - Youth Version (MSCEIT-
YV; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 2015) is de kindversie van de Mayer-Salovey-
Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT, Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, 2002), de 
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meest gebruikte omnibus test van het viertakkenmodel van emotionele 
intelligentie. Hoewel het achterliggend kader voor beide testen identiek is, zijn de 
taken en de scoringsprocedure verschillend. De MSCEIT heeft twee taken per 
tak, terwijl de MSCEIT-YV slechts één taak per tak heeft. De vaardigheid van het 
waarnemen van emoties (32 items) wordt gemeten via acht gezichten. Voor elk 
gezicht moeten kinderen aangeven in welke mate verschillende emoties 
aanwezig zijn in het gezicht. De vaardigheid van het gebruiken van emoties om 
het denken te faciliteren (24 items) is gemeten via zes synesthesie taken. Voor 
elke taak dienen kinderen aan te geven in welke mate een emotie voelt als vier 
verschillende sensaties of in welke mate een combinatie van sensaties voelt als 
vier verschillende emoties. De vaardigheid van het begrijpen van emoties (23 
items) is gemeten via een reeks meerkeuzevragen over emotiedefinities (i.e., het 
combineren van correcte emotietermen met beschrijvingen van gevoelens), 
emotietransities en veranderingen (i.e., het detecteren van emoties die ontstaan 
uit specifieke beschrijvingen van gebeurtenissen), en combinaties van emoties 
(i.e., het selecteren van een combinatie van emoties die corresponderen met 
beschrijvingen van emotionele toestanden). Kinderen moeten het best passende 
antwoord selecteren uit vier of vijf opties. De vaardigheid van het monitoren van 
emoties wordt gemeten door zes verhalen (18 items). Voor elk verhaal dienen 
kinderen aan te geven in welke mate drie acties effectief zouden zijn om een 
bepaalde emotionele toestand te realiseren. Terwijl de MSCEIT is voorzien van 
een expert scoringsprocedure en een consensus scoringsprocedure is de 
scoringsprocedure die wordt gebruikt om de antwoorden op de MSCEIT-YV te 
scoren gebaseerd is op volwassen criteria die theoretische criteria, 
onderzoeksbevindingen, en beoordelingen van experten combineren. In de 
initiële normatieve steekproef kozen de kinderen en adolescenten voor een groot 
deel van de items niet het beste antwoord, vandaar dat consensus scoring als 
een niet geschikte procedure werd bevonden (Papadogiannis, Logan, & 
Sitarenios, 2009). De scoring van MSCEIT-YV resulteert in vier takscores en een 
globale emotionele intelligentiescore. 
 
Onderzoeksvraag 3: Representeren kinderen en adolescenten emoties op 
eenzelfde manier als studenten en volwassenen? 
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Het kan in vraag gesteld worden of de hoofdzakelijk volwassen criteria waarvan 
de MSCEIT-YV scoringsprocedure gebruikt maakt, geschikt zijn om de 
correctheid van antwoorden op emotionele vragen te evalueren bij kinderen en 
adolescenten.  
De derde en vierde empirische studie die in hoofdstuk 4 van dit doctoraat 
worden beschreven hadden daarom tot doelstelling om de vergelijkbaarheid van 
de cognitieve representatie van het emotiedomein voor kinderen, adolescenten, 
studenten, en volwassenen na te gaan. Deze studies focusten op emotiewoorden 
omdat het is aangetoond dat emotiewoorden informatie bevatten over alle 
emotiecomponenten (Fontaine, Scherer, Soriano, 2013) en emotiewoorden ook 
deel uitmaken van nagenoeg elk MSCEIT-YV item. 
De derde empirische studie was gefocust op het emotielexicon en werd 
uitgevoerd in een grote steekproef kinderen en adolescenten (N = 5071). Deze 
studie resulteerde in de identificatie van een representatieve set van spontaan 
gerapporteerde emotietermen die sterk gelijken op emotietermen die 
volwassenen gebruiken (Fontaine, Scherer, & Soriano, 2013). De resultaten 
toonden aan dat meisjes in het algemeen meer emotietermen rapporteerden, dat 
er meer emotietermen werden gerapporteerd met stijgende leeftijd, en dat het 
leeftijdseffect meer uitgesproken was bij meisjes. Deze resultaten vormen een 
belangrijke bijdrage aan de emotieliteratuur omdat deze studie de eerste studie is 
die via spontane rapportage en op deze schaal het emotielexicon onderzocht. 
Deze resultaten suggereren dat geslachts- en leeftijdsverschillen kunnen worden 
verwacht in testen die voornamelijk gebruik maken van emotietermen. 
De vierde empirische studie was gefocust op de dimensionele structuur 
van emoties en werd uitgevoerd in een grote steekproef kinderen, adolescenten, 
studenten, en volwassenen (N = 1184). Voor deze studie werd een 
similariteitsbeoordelingstaak ontwikkeld, gebaseerd op de ideeën van het GRID 
onderzoek waarin de betekenis van emoties werd onderzocht op basis van de 
componentiële emotiebenadering (Fontaine, Scherer, & Soriano, 2013). In het 
bijzonder werd aan participanten gevraagd om aan te geven in welke mate ze 
akkoord waren dat de emotietermen van een set van woordparen gelijkend 
waren. De resultaten toonden aan dat de paarsgewijze vergelijkingen meer 
betrouwbaar waren voor studenten en volwassenen dan voor kinderen en 
adolescenten. Niettegenstaande konden de gemiddelde 
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similariteitsbeoordelingen voor iedereen adequaat worden gerepresenteerd in 
eenzelfde vierdimensionale ruimte (valentie, dominantie, arousal, en nieuwheid). 
Met stijgende leeftijd representeerden kinderen en adolescenten de 
emotietermen meer accuraat langs deze vier dimensies. Naast het leeftijdseffect 
voor de betrouwbaarheid van de similariteitsbeoordelingen, werd ook een 
leeftijdseffect gevonden voor de saillantie van de dimensies tussen enerzijds de 
kinderen en adolescenten, en anderzijds de studenten en volwassenen. Binnen 
de steekproef kinderen en adolescenten werd eveneens een leeftijdseffect 
aangetoond. We observeerden dat de valentie dimensie relatief gezien saillanter 
werd met stijgende leeftijd, terwijl dominantie, arousal, en nieuwheid relatief 
gezien minder saillant werden met stijgende leeftijd. Dit kan betekenen dat 
kinderen en adolescenten beter begrijpen hoe verschillende emotieprocessen op 
elkaar gelijken in functie van hun hedonische toon naarmate ze ouder worden. 
Deze resultaten leveren een belangrijke bijdrage aan de emotieliteratuur omdat 
voor het eerst een vier-dimensionale structuur van valentie, dominantie, arousal, 
en nieuwheid werd aangetoond bij kinderen, adolescenten, studenten, en 
volwassenen, louter en alleen op basis van een eenvoudige 
similariteitsbeoordelingstaak. Verder geven deze resultaten ook aan dat 
volwassen criteria kunnen worden gebruikt in metingen van emotionele 
intelligentie omdat deze populaties het emotiedomein structureren langs dezelfde 
onderliggende dimensies. De resultaten van deze twee studies werden ook 
gebruikt voor de ontwikkeling van een nieuwe set items voor de tweede 
empirische studie van de MSCEIT-YV in Hoofdstuk 5. In deze items werden 
emotietermen vergeleken met andere emotietermen. 
Het antwoord op de tweede onderzoeksvraag is dus positief. Kinderen en 
adolescenten rapporteren gelijkaardige emotietermen als volwassenen, en 
kinderen en adolescenten evalueren emotietermen volgens dezelfde dimensies 
van valentie, dominantie, arousal, en nieuwheid zoals studenten en 
volwassenen. 
 
Onderzoeksvraag 4: Kan een scoring die rechtstreeks gebaseerd is op de 
ruwe antwoorden van de beoordelingstaken van de MSCEIT-YV de 
conceptuele, correlationele, en ontwikkelingscriteria bevestigen die worden 
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gebruikt om emotionele intelligentie te kunnen beschouwen als een 
klassieke intelligentie? 
De traditionele expert en consensus scoringsprocedures van de MSCEIT-YV zijn 
sterk bekritiseerd door de jaren heen omdat het niet duidelijk is hoe variatie in 
scores gerelateerd is aan variatie in emotionele intelligentie (e.g., Maul, 2012a, 
2012b; Wilhelm, 2005). De scoringsprocedure die door de MSCEIT-YV wordt 
gebruikt, kan zo evenzeer bekritiseerd worden. Daarom ontwikkelden we een 
theoretisch kader om te begrijpen hoe de ruwe antwoorden op beoordelingstaken 
van de MSCEIT-YV en gelijkaardige taken gestructureerd zijn en onderzochten 
we de waarde van dit theoretisch kader in de vijfde en zesde empirische studie 
van dit doctoraat. We gingen er van uit dat de antwoorden op beoordelingstaken 
gestructureerd worden door een bipolaire emotionele intelligentie factor waarop 
de items ofwel een positieve ofwel een negatieve lading vertonen. Deze 
hypothese was gebaseerd op Kelly’s (1955) Persoonlijke construct theorie. 
Volgens deze theorie is het menselijke denken bipolair van aard. Verder gingen 
we er van uit dat instemmingstendens en meerdimensionaliteit deze theoretische 
verwachte bipolaire emotionele intelligentie factor zouden kunnen maskeren. 
Voor de instemmingstendens factor verwachtten we dat alle items positieve 
ladingen zouden vertonen. Meerdimensionaliteit werd exploratorisch onderzocht. 
Deze hypothesen werden afgeleid uit baanbrekend onderzoek naar de bipolariteit 
van affect (Russell, 1979; Russell & Carroll, 1999). Daarnaast verwachtten we 
ook dat de resultaten gekoppeld zouden kunnen worden aan de drie criteria (i.e., 
conceptuele, correlationele, en ontwikkelingscriteria) die Mayer et al. (2000) 
gebruikten om emotionele intelligentie als een legitieme intelligentie te 
beschouwen.  
De eerste studie werd uitgevoerd in een grote steekproef kinderen en 
adolescenten (N = 630) met een breed leeftijdsbereik (10- tot 17-jarigen) en nam 
de beoordelingstaken van de MSCEIT-YV voor waarnemen, faciliteren, en 
monitoren onder de loep. Een tweede studie werd eveneens uitgevoerd in een 
grote steekproef kinderen en adolescenten (N = 664) met een breed 
leeftijdsbereik (8- tot 16-jarigen), nam deze zelfde testen uit de eerste studie 
onder de loep en keek bijkomend naar een beoordelingstaak voor begrijpen van 
de MSCEIT-YV en additionele taken voor waarnemen, faciliteren, en monitoren. 
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De resultaten op itemniveau toonden inderdaad evidentie aan voor het 
bestaan en de generaliseerbaarheid van een bipolaire emotionele intelligentie 
factor en een unipolaire instemmingstendens factor. Deze structuur werd in elke 
steekproef voor elke split-half en voor de volledige steekproef gevonden voor alle 
rating-gebaseerde testen, wat de robuustheid van de resultaten benadrukt. 
Multidimensionaliteit werd enkel gevonden voor waarnemen. Verder bleken de 
individuele emotionele intelligentiescores en instemmingstendens scores voor 
alle beoordelingstaken in een twee-factor model te kunnen worden geplaatst met 
een algemene emotionele intelligentie factor en een algemene 
instemmingstendens factor. De algemene emotionele intelligentie factor toonde 
het verwachte patroon van correlaties met intelligentie, persoonlijkheid, 
alexithymie, en sociale en emotionele beperkingen, geslachtverschillen in het 
voordeel van meisjes, en leeftijdsverschillen. 
Het antwoord op de vierde onderzoeksvraag is dus positief. 
Validiteitsevidentie voor vaardigheidsemotionele intelligentie hoeft niet 
noodzakelijk gebaseerd te zijn op expert of consensus scoring. Er is een 
coherent emotionele intelligentie construct te vinden op basis van de ruwe data 
van beoordelingstaken. De resultaten van deze studies zijn belangrijk voor de 
literatuur rond emotionele intelligentie omdat ze voor het eerst aantonen dat het 
onderzoeken van de interne structuur op basis van ruwe data van 
beoordelingstaken een vruchtbaar alternatief vormt voor de traditionele 
scoringsprocedures. Ze tonen verder ook aan dat traditionele scoringsprocedures 
gevoelig zijn voor instemmingstendens en benadrukken het belang van verder 
onderzoek naar de validiteit van dit soort testen op basis van het aangereikte 
theoretisch kader. 
 
Conclusie 
Samengevat draagt dit doctoraat bij aan het onderzoeksveld van emotionele 
intelligentie door in te gaan op het gebrek aan onderzoek naar maximale 
prestatietesten bij kinderen en adolescenten. Meer specifiek was dit doctoraat 
gericht op twee belangrijke testen, de LEAS-C en de MSCEIT-YV. De eerste 
twee hoofdstukken die de LEAS-C onder de loep namen, waren gefocust op de 
originele LEAS-C en een aangepaste versie van de LEAS-C. We vonden in een 
eerste studie dat de originele LEAS-C beperkt is in zijn validiteit omdat er geen 
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leeftijdsverschillen werden gevonden. We toonden verder in een tweede studie 
aan dat de validiteit van deze originele LEAS-C verbeterd kon worden door 
gebruik te maken van de componentiële emotiebenadering voor het aanpassen 
van de instructies en de scoringsprocedure, en dat deze aanpassingen ons ook 
in staat stelden om de theoretisch verwachte leeftijdsverschillen te vinden. De 
laatste twee hoofdstukken die gericht waren op de MSCEIT-YV waren gefocust 
op de cognitieve representatie van het emotiedomein en op de validiteit van de 
MSCEIT-YV en een aangepaste en uitgebreide versie van de MSCEIT-YV. We 
vonden in een eerste studie dat de spontaan gerapporteerde emotietermen door 
kinderen en adolescenten sterk vergelijkbaar zijn met emotietermen die bij 
volwassenen worden gebruikt en gevonden. Daarnaast vonden we tevens dat 
kinderen en adolescenten op eenzelfde manier emotietermen evalueren als 
studenten en volwassenen. Het feit dat het emotiedomein op een gelijkaardige 
manier georganiseerd is, lijkt het gebruik van volwassen criteria te 
rechtvaardigen voor het beoordelen van de correctheid van antwoorden op 
emotie-gerelateerde items. Deze data vormen ook een sterke basis voor het 
ontwikkelen van nieuwe items. Tot slot, toonden de resultaten van een tweede 
studie aan dat de ruwe antwoorden van beoordelingstaken zoals deze van de 
MSCEIT-YV en gelijkaardige taken kunnen worden gebruikt om emotionele 
intelligentie in kaart te brengen zonder dat er nood is aan het toepassen van de 
traditionele scoringsprocedures. De verschillende studies die in dit doctoraat 
centraal staan, dragen dus bij aan een verbeterde assessment van emotionele 
intelligentie. 
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% Data Storage Fact Sheet 1 (versie 21 april 2015) 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet <Phd Elke Veirman, Chapter 2, Study 1> 
% Author: Elke Veirman 
% Date: 21/04/2015 
 
1. Contact 
 
1a. Main researcher 
 
− name: Elke Veirman 
− address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
− e−mail: Elke.Veirman@UGent.be  
 
1b. Responsible ZAP (if different from the main researcher) 
 
− name: Johnny R. J. Fontaine 
− address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
− e−mail: Johnny.Fontaine@UGent.be  
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data−ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of 
Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, 
Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies 
 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
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- Veirman, E., Brouwers, S. A., & Fontaine, J. R. J. (2011). The 
assessment of emotional awareness in children: Validation of the Levels 
of Emotional Awareness Scale for Children, European Journal of 
Psychological Assessment, 27, 265-273. doi:10.1027/1015-5759/a000073 
- Veirman, E. (2015). Emotional intelligence in children and adolescents: 
In search of a theoretical framework and improved assessment methods. 
PhD dissertation, Chapter 2, Study 1. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
All datasets reported in publication and PhD dissertation chapter. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
 
3a. Raw data 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
[x] researcher PC 
[x] research group file server 
[ ] research group file server via DICT 
[x] responsible ZAP PC 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
[x] main researcher 
[x] responsible ZAP 
[ ] all members of the research group 
[ ] all members of UGent 
[ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
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* Which other files have been stored? 
− [ ] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify:  
− [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify:  
- LEAS-C_raw data transformed data.sav. This file contains the raw data  
  that have been collected for this study and the transformed data thereof. 
− [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify:  
- All Mplus input files (.inp) and output files (.out) 
- All SPSS output files (.spo) 
− [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
− [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ... 
− [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content 
should be interpreted. Specify:  
− [x] other files. Specify: raw data file:  
- LEAS-C_M-PLUS scores.dat. This file contains only the scored LEAS-C   
  data, used to run the structural analyses in Mplus. 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored? 
− [x] individual PC 
− [x] research group file server 
− [x] other: responsible ZAP PC 
. 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
− [x] main researcher 
− [x] responsible ZAP 
− [ ] all members of the research group 
− [ ] all members of UGent 
− [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction 
 
* Have the results been reproduced?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
− name 
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− address 
− affiliation 
− e−mail 
 
Data storage fact sheet 2 (21/04/2015) 
 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet 2 (versie 21 april 2015) 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet <Phd Elke Veirman, Chapter 3, Study 1> 
% Author: Elke Veirman 
% Date: 21/04/2015 
 
1. Contact 
 
1a. Main researcher 
 
− name: Elke Veirman 
− address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
− e−mail: Elke.Veirman@UGent.be  
 
1b. Responsible ZAP (if different from the main researcher) 
 
− name: Johnny R. J. Fontaine 
− address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
− e−mail: Johnny.Fontaine@UGent.be  
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data−ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of 
Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, 
Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies 
 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
Data Storage Fact Sheets  207 
 
- Veirman, E. (2015). Emotional intelligence in children and adolescents: 
In search of a theoretical framework and improved assessment methods. 
PhD dissertation, Chapter 3, Study 1. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
All datasets reported in PhD dissertation chapter. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
 
3a. Raw data 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
[x] researcher PC 
[x] research group file server 
[ ] research group file server via DICT 
[x] responsible ZAP PC 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
[x] main researcher 
[x] responsible ZAP 
[ ] all members of the research group 
[ ] all members of UGent 
[ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
− [ ] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify:  
− [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify:  
- LEAS-C_raw data transformed data.sav. This file contains the raw data  
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  that have been collected for this study and the transformed data thereof. 
− [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify:  
- All Mplus input files (.inp) and output files (.out) 
- All SPSS output files (.spv) 
− [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
− [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ... 
− [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content 
should be interpreted. Specify:  
− [x] other files. Specify: raw data file:  
- LEAS-C_raw data coded data_all.xlsx. This file contains all written  
  transcriptions of the participants and the componential coded  
  transcriptions. These transcriptions were coded by one coder. 
- LEAS-C_raw data coded data_selection.xlsx. This file contains a  
  selection of the full file of transcriptions. These transcriptions were coded  
  with the componential scoring procedure by two independant coders to  
  examine the inter-rater reliability. 
- LEAS-C_M-PLUS scores original.dat. This file contains only the LEAS-C   
  data scored with the original scoring procedure, used to run the  
  structural analyses in Mplus. 
- LEAS-C_M-PLUS scores componential.dat. This file contains only the  
  LEAS-C data scored with the componential scoring procedure, used to  
  run the structural analyses in Mplus. 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored? 
− [x] individual PC 
− [x] research group file server 
− [x] other: responsible ZAP PC 
. 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
− [x] main researcher 
− [x] responsible ZAP 
− [ ] all members of the research group 
− [ ] all members of UGent 
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− [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction 
 
* Have the results been reproduced?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
− name 
− address 
− affiliation 
− e−mail 
 
Data storage fact sheet 3 (21/04/2015) 
 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet 3 (versie 21 april 2015) 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet <Phd Elke Veirman, Chapter 4, Studies 1-2> 
% Author: Elke Veirman 
% Date: 21/04/2015 
 
1. Contact 
 
1a. Main researcher 
 
− name: Elke Veirman 
− address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
− e−mail: Elke.Veirman@UGent.be  
 
1b. Responsible ZAP (if different from the main researcher) 
 
− name: Johnny R. J. Fontaine 
− address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
− e−mail: Johnny.Fontaine@UGent.be  
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If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data−ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of 
Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, 
Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies 
 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
- Veirman, E., & Fontaine, J. R. J. (in press). Revisiting the dimensional 
structure of the emotion domain, Cognition and Emotion, doi: 
10.1080/02699931.2014.963518 
- Veirman, E. (2015). Emotional intelligence in children and adolescents: 
In search of a theoretical framework and improved assessment methods. 
PhD dissertation, Chapter 4, Studies 1-2. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
All datasets reported in publication and PhD dissertation chapter. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
 
3a. Raw data 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
[x] researcher PC 
[x] research group file server 
[ ] research group file server via DICT 
[x] responsible ZAP PC 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
[x] main researcher 
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[x] responsible ZAP 
[ ] all members of the research group 
[ ] all members of UGent 
[ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
− [ ] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify:  
− [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify:  
- FREE LISTING_raw data_coded data.xslx. This file contains all written  
  transcriptions of the participants and the coded transcriptions. These  
  transcriptions were coded by one coder. 
- FREE LISTING_random emotion words.xlsx. This file contains the  
  randomization of the emotion list that is used for the similarity rating  
  study. 
- SIMILARITY RATING_pairwise similarity lists.xlsx. This file contains the  
  different versions of similarity rating tasks that were administered, with  
  specification of unique and overlapping pairs over the different lists. 
- SIMILARITY RATING_emotion word pairs.txt. This file contains  the  
  randomization of the emotion word pairs that are used to develop the  
  different versions of similarity rating tasks that were administered  
- FREE LISTING_frequency.sav; FREE LISTING_MAplusMBcoded.sav;  
  FREE LISTING_plots.sav; FREE LISTING_final.sav. These files contain  
  the data that are needed to perform the different steps that were taken in  
  the analyses. 
- SIMILARITY RATING_reliabilities.sav; SIMILARITY  
  RATING_versionmerged1_14.sav; SIMILARITY  
  RATING_versionmerged1_14_fullmatrix.sav; SIMILARITY  
  RATING_similarities total.sav; SIMILARITY RATING_coordinates 76  
  terms 85 terms.sav; SIMILARITY RATING_weights.sav. These files  
  contain the data that are needed to perform the different steps that were  
  taken in the analyses. 
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− [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify:  
- All SPSS output files (.spv) 
− [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
− [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ... 
− [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content 
should be interpreted. Specify:  
− [x] other files. Specify: raw data file:  
- SIMILARITY RATING_raw data.sav; SIMILARITY RATING_descriptives  
  adult.sav; SIMILARITY RATING_descriptives child-adolescent.sav;  
  SIMILARITY RATING_descriptives student.sav; SIMILARITY  
  RATING_raw data adult.sav; SIMILARITY RATING_raw data child- 
  adolescent.sav; SIMILARITY RATING_raw data student.sav. These files  
  contain the raw data and the descriptive information on the participants. 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored? 
− [x] individual PC 
− [x] research group file server 
− [x] other: responsible ZAP PC 
. 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
− [x] main researcher 
− [x] responsible ZAP 
− [ ] all members of the research group 
− [ ] all members of UGent 
− [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction 
 
* Have the results been reproduced?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
− name 
− address 
− affiliation 
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− e−mail 
 
Data storage fact sheet 4 (21/04/2015) 
 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet 4 (versie 21 april 2015) 
% Data Storage Fact Sheet <Phd Elke Veirman, Chapter 5, Studies 1-2> 
% Author: Elke Veirman 
% Date: 21/04/2015 
 
1. Contact 
 
1a. Main researcher 
 
− name: Elke Veirman 
− address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
− e−mail: Elke.Veirman@UGent.be  
 
1b. Responsible ZAP (if different from the main researcher) 
 
− name: Johnny R. J. Fontaine 
− address: Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Gent 
− e−mail: Johnny.Fontaine@UGent.be  
 
If a response is not received when using the above contact details, please send 
an email to data−ppw@ugent.be or contact Data Management, Faculty of 
Psychology and Educational Sciences, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000 Ghent, 
Belgium. 
 
2. Information about the datasets to which this sheet applies 
 
* Reference of the publication in which the datasets are reported: 
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- Veirman, E. (2015). Emotional intelligence in children and adolescents: 
In search of a theoretical framework and improved assessment methods. 
PhD dissertation, Chapter 5, Studies 1-2. 
 
* Which datasets in that publication does this sheet apply to?: 
All datasets reported in PhD dissertation chapter. 
 
3. Information about the files that have been stored 
 
3a. Raw data 
 
* Have the raw data been stored by the main researcher? [x] YES / [ ] NO 
If NO, please justify: 
 
* On which platform are the raw data stored? 
[x] researcher PC 
[x] research group file server 
[ ] research group file server via DICT 
[x] responsible ZAP PC 
 
* Who has direct access to the raw data (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
[x] main researcher 
[x] responsible ZAP 
[ ] all members of the research group 
[ ] all members of UGent 
[ ] other (specify): ... 
 
3b. Other files 
 
* Which other files have been stored? 
− [ ] file(s) describing the transition from raw data to reported results. Specify:  
− [x] file(s) containing processed data. Specify:  
- MSCEIT-YV1_raw data transformed data_all.sav; MSCEIT-YV1_raw  
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  data transformed data_split1.sav; MSCEIT-YV1_raw data transformed  
  data_split2.sav. These files contain the raw and transformed data that  
  have been collected for the first study. 
- MSCEIT-YV2_raw data transformed data_all.sav; MSCEIT-YV2_raw  
  data transformed data_split1.sav; MSCEIT-YV2_raw data transformed  
  data_split2.sav. These files contain the raw and transformed data that  
  have been collected for the second study. 
− [x] file(s) containing analyses. Specify:  
- All Mplus input files (.inp) and output files (.out) 
- All SPSS output files (.spv) 
− [ ] files(s) containing information about informed consent. Specify: ... 
− [ ] a file specifying legal and ethical provisions. Specify: ... 
− [ ] file(s) that describe the content of the stored files and how this content 
should be interpreted. Specify:  
− [x] other files. Specify: raw data file:  
- MEAN_PCA_BRANCH_STUDY_SAMPLE.sav files. These files contain   
  all information at item level for each of the four branchs, for Study 1 and  
  Study 2, and for the complete sample and splitt 1 and splitt 2,  
  separately. 
- MSCEIT-YV1_ M-PLUS_scores original.dat. This file contains only the  
  MSCEIT-YV data of the first study, used to run the structural analyses in  
  Mplus. 
- MSCEIT-YV2_M-PLUS_scores original extra.dat. This file contains only   
  the MSCEIT-YV data of the second study, used to run the structural  
  analyses in Mplus. 
 
* On which platform are these other files stored? 
− [x] individual PC 
− [x] research group file server 
− [x] other: responsible ZAP PC 
. 
* Who has direct access to these other files (i.e., without intervention of another 
person)? 
− [x] main researcher 
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− [x] responsible ZAP 
− [ ] all members of the research group 
− [ ] all members of UGent 
− [ ] other (specify): ... 
 
4. Reproduction 
 
* Have the results been reproduced?: [ ] YES / [x] NO 
* If yes, by whom (add if multiple): 
− name 
− address 
− affiliation 
− e−mail 
  
 
 
DANKWOORD 
 
Na zeven jaar gewerkt te hebben aan dit doctoraat is het tijd om even stil te 
staan bij de voorbije periode. Ik had voorheen nooit gedacht dat ik na mijn 
opleiding Klinische Psychologie zou starten aan een doctoraat in de Psychologie 
en dit boek zou schrijven. Doorheen de opleiding bleef ik mateloos geboeid in 
hoe menselijk gedrag kan worden beschreven, begrepen en voorspeld. Toen ik 
mijn thesisonderwerp koos bij Herbert Roeyers en een empirische studie 
uitvoerde naar angststoornissen bij kinderen en adolescenten met een 
autismespectrumstoornis wist ik al snel dat ik sterk geboeid was door 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Binnen het doctoraat kon ik het veld van het 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek verder betreden en me verdiepen in onderzoek naar 
emoties en emotionele intelligentie. Het finaliseren van dit doctoraat is het 
eindresultaat van veel denkwerk, hard werken, grenzen aftasten, en horizonten 
verruimen. Dit was uiteraard niet mogelijk geweest zonder de steun, de hulp, de 
inzet, en de inspiratie van heel wat mensen die ik hier graag zou willen 
bedanken. 
 Vooreerst wil ik graag mijn promotor Johnny Fontaine bedanken. Je gaf 
me de kans om dit doctoraat te starten. Dankzij jou kon ik door middel van dit 
doctoraat mezelf verder ontplooien en kon ik mijn leergierigheid kwijt. Ik heb van 
jou de voorbije jaren heel wat vrijheid en vertrouwen gekregen om mijn eigen 
ding te doen en zo op een zelfstandige manier te kunnen werken. Het was 
eveneens een rijke ervaring om zo dicht gestaan te hebben bij en zelf te kunnen 
deelnemen aan het baanbrekend GRID emotie onderzoek en vanuit dit 
vernieuwend perspectief op emoties ook mijn eigen weg te zoeken binnen het 
onderzoeksveld naar emotionele intelligentie. 
 Verder wil ik graag de leden van mijn begeleidingscommissie, Wim 
Beyers, Peter Kuppens, Herbert Roeyers, en Stijn Vanheule bedanken. Jullie 
constructieve feedback, verhelderende inzichten, en stimulerende ideeën hielpen 
me om mijn onderzoek vanop afstand te bekijken en in een bredere invalshoek te 
plaatsen. 
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Vervolgens zou doctoreren op de vakgroep PP09 niet hetzelfde zijn 
geweest zonder al die fijne collega’s. Het was een komen en gaan doorheen de 
jaren met inspirerende conversaties en grappige anekdotes. Het was een plezier 
om deel te mogen uitmaken van deze jonge groep die telkens klaar stond met 
goede adviezen, een luisterend oor, of een kritische kijk. 
Dank ook aan alle kinderen, adolescenten, volwassenen, studenten, 
leerkrachten en scholen om deel te nemen aan de studies die voor dit doctoraat 
werden uitgevoerd. Al deze vrijwilligers zijn de stuwende kracht achter de data en 
de onderzoeksresultaten. 
In het bijzonder wil ik mijn ouders bedanken om mij onvoorwaardelijk en 
met veel zorg en liefde telkens gesteund te hebben in de stappen die ik tot 
hiertoe heb ondernomen, en steeds klaar te staan om te helpen en bij te springen 
waar nodig, ook tijdens dit doctoraatstraject. Ook mijn grootmoeder wil ik 
bedanken voor de boeiende gesprekken, de fijne momenten, en de vele hulp en 
steun. Verder bedankt aan mijn broer Jan, mijn schoonzus Inge, en mijn 
schoonfamilie voor jullie interesse in mijn onderzoek. 
 Eveneens wil ik mijn vrienden, Eliska en Peter, bedanken. We hebben al 
zoveel momenten met elkaar gedeeld doorheen de jaren. Onze ontmoetingen 
waren rustpunten, ongedwongen en fijn, om even momenten van gepieker over 
het doctoraat aan de kant te schuiven. Vele babbels werden afgewisseld met de 
nodige afleiding van onze samenspelende zoontjes die ondertussen ook goede 
maatjes zijn. Bedankt voor jullie oprechte vriendschap. 
 Tot slot rest me mijn drie mannen in het bijzonder te bedanken. Jullie drie 
zijn datgene dat me drijft, datgene wat ik met heel mijn hart koester. Dimitri, ik 
hoef hier niet neer te schrijven wat wij voor elkaar betekenen, dat weten we al 
heel lang. Ons avontuur samen begon 13 jaar geleden en sindsdien hebben we 
elkaar niet meer losgelaten. Ondertussen hebben we twee wonderlijke zoontjes 
en genieten we van elk moment samen in vele kleine dingen. Bedankt voor jouw 
relativeringsvermogen, jouw geduld en jouw liefdevolle ondersteuning, om steeds 
aan mijn zijde te staan, mij te inspireren en te helpen met het doctoraat en 
daarbuiten. Bedankt ook aan mijn twee zoontjes Wout en Joppe voor het vele 
geduld als mama moest werken en er even minder tijd was voor jullie. Ik heb die 
momenten evenzeer als een gemis ervaren. Jullie zijn twee jongens met veel pit 
en gedrevenheid. Ik bewonder jullie sterk karakter en jullie wil om alles te 
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ontdekken en voorruit te gaan. Ik kan zoveel energie en moed putten uit jullie 
aanstekelijke glimlach en puurheid. 
